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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays studying economic agents making decisions
under uncertainty. I introduce and study two non-standard choice models which relax
dierent aspects of the standard model.
The rst essay models an agent who may be optimistic. Theories of optimism typically
hypothesize that optimism is driven by agents changing their beliefs, or view of the world.
I hypothesize that agents maintain their view of the world, but form optimistic beliefs
by distorting the information used to update beliefs in a motivated way. I behaviorally
identify the (possibly distorted) information used to update beliefs and provide a novel
behavioral denition of optimism that alters Dynamic Consistency to account for both
the distorted information and the optimistic nature of the distortion.
The second essay models an agent who may imperfectly understand acts—mappings
from states to outcomes. Given an act, I model coarse understanding using partitions of
the state space: for each cell of the partition, the agent knows the set of outcomes that
she could receive if the true state lies in that cell, but within each cell she is unable to
match states with outcomes. A key feature of the model is that the agent may understand
dierent acts using dierent partitions, which captures the idea that the structure of an act
can aect the agent’s understanding. This allows us to dierentiate limited understanding
of acts from coarse contingencies and ambiguity aversion, both related phenomena, using
vi
only static choice of acts. Our main results axiomatically characterize this model and
uniquely identify the partitions used to understand acts.
The third essay applies the coarse understanding model to a standard auction design
setting, where bidders may imperfectly understand how the allocation and payments de-
pend on the bid prole. The main result shows that it is optimal for the auctioneer to
design the auction so that bidders fully understand their win probability and payment
when truthfully revealing their type. This oers another point of contrast with the ambi-
guity literature, where it is optimal for the auctioneer to design the auction so that each
bidder’s payo is independent of other bidders’ bids.
vii
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1Chapter 1
Bayesian Optimism
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Motivation
Choice upon receipt of new information plays a signicant role in economic decision mak-
ing. There is considerable evidence from psychology that decision makers are more likely
to use new information to update their beliefs when the information received is in line
with their desires. When this is not the case, decision makers often reject or distort infor-
mation so that it aligns with their desires. Indeed, Ditto, Scepansky, Munro, Apanovitch,
and Lockhart (1998) write:
“The empirical phenomenon that has received the most attention...is the pervasive tendency
for individuals to more readily accept the validity of information that is consistent with a pre-
ferred judgment conclusion...than of information that is inconsistent with a preferred judg-
ment conclusion..."
In addition to a variety of psychology experiments demonstrating this eect, economists
have more recently conducted experiments that corroborate this evidence and rule out
standard Bayesian updating.1 For example, Eil and Rao (2011) conduct an experiment
1Among a variety of social psychology experiments, see Ditto, Jemmott III, and Darley (1988) and
Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Holt (1985). It was argued in Benoît and Dubra (2011) that several of these
experiments are in fact consistent with Bayesian updating, but Eil and Rao (2011) and Mobius, Niederle,
Niehaus, and Rosenblat (2014) (among others) address these methodological shortcomings and nd results
similar to the earlier psychology studies.
2where subjects are asked to evaluate their own appearance, and then are given feedback
(signals) regarding other subjects’ opinions of their appearance. Subjects receiving rela-
tively positive feedback followed Bayes’ rule closely, while subjects receiving relatively
negative feedback exhibited erratic and unpredictable updating behavior. Similarly, Mo-
bius et al. (2014) elicit subjects’ beliefs regarding their performance (relative to peers) on
an IQ test. They track the evolution of these beliefs as subjects are given signals and nd
that “subjects update as if they misinterpret the information content of signals, but then
process these misinterpreted signals like Bayesians." Mobius et al. also note that the dis-
tortion of signals is considerably less pronounced when subjects’ egos are not at stake,
suggesting that the distortion of signals is motivated and not due to cognitive constraints.
While the evidence above is indirect in the sense that subjects are not making choices,
decision makers who selectively accept information like these subjects are trying to main-
tain a certain belief that is motivated by personal desires. A natural implication of such
psychological processes is that decision makers are able to maintain an optimistic view of
the world.
In this paper, we present an axiomatic model of optimism that is driven by selective
acceptance of information. Imagine an otherwise standard agent who is motivated to
maintain a rosy picture of the world as it pertains to him, and responds to information
in a self-serving way. If he receives “good news," he happily accepts it; in our model he
would be entirely standard in that he would update his prior using Bayes’ rule and the
information given. But if he receives “bad news," in order to maintain his rosy view, he
resists it; for example, by doubting his information source. As a result, he subjectively
distorts his information, but nevertheless proceeds to update his prior using Bayes’ rule.
Throughout, we refer to the information the agent actually uses to update his belief as his
subjective information.
This subjective distortion of information may result in violations of Dynamic Consis-
3tency.2 For example, consider an investor who is choosing between two investing styles:
“active" (stock picking) and “passive" (index funds). His payo from active investing is
uncertain; it depends on whether he is low (s1), medium (s2), or high skilled at choosing
stocks (s3). Let f be the action corresponding to active investing, with long run payos
f = (0, 2, 6).3 Passive investing is independent of the agent’s skill, so let д = (1, 1, 1)
denote passive investing. Let A = {s1, s2} be the event that the agent is not high skilled at
picking stocks, and let f Aд = (0, 2, 1) correspond to the agent picking stocks if he is not
high skilled, but choosing index funds if he is. Suppose that before receiving any informa-
tion about his skill, the investor is a subjective expected utility maximizer with a uniform
prior. This ts with the assertion above that the agent we will study is standard apart
from his reaction to information. In this case, the agent would display the preference
f Aд ∼ д. (1.1)
Now, suppose that after a year of active investing, the agent’s returns imply that he is
either low or medium skilled at picking stocks, i.e. the event A = {s1, s2} occurred. This
is “bad news" for the agent, who is drawn to the high payo he would receive from suc-
cessfully picking stocks if he were highly skilled. As such, the agent may interpret these
returns optimistically, claiming they are just bad luck, and thus distorting the information
so that s3 is still possible. In this case, we would say that the agent’s subjective informa-
tion is {s1, s2, s3}. If the agent is otherwise standard but distorts the event A in this way,
we would observe the agent continuing to actively invest, displaying the preference
f A д, (1.2)
where %A denotes the agent’s conditional preference. Preferences (1.1) and (1.2) above
2As we formally dene in Section 1.3.1, Dynamic Consistency says that f Ah % дAh ⇐⇒ f %A д for all
acts f ,д,h.
3For illustration, assume that all other uncertainty about the investments is captured in the payos.
4constitute a violation of Dynamic Consistency.
Given that information distortion can result in violations of Dynamic Consistency,
we will present a relaxation. Our main axiom, Optimistic Dynamic Consistency, allows the
pattern of preferences above, and optimistic interpretation of information more generally,
while retaining the essence of Dynamic Consistency that ensures the agent’s ex ante and
ex post beliefs are related by Bayesian updating.
Optimistic Dynamic Consistency, along with other familiar axioms, characterizes a
representation of %A in which the agent being modeled evaluates acts as follows: Given
an act f and information A, the agent chooses a distortion of A from some xed set of
events EA to maximize the expected utility of f computed with the Bayesian update of
the agent’s prior belief pi conditional on the distorted information.4 Formally,
VA( f ) = max
E∈EA
∫
u ( f (s )) dpiE (s )
represents %A, where u is a vNM utility function and piE is the Bayesian update of the
agent’s prior conditional on the event E. The model is formally dened in Denition 1,
and a more detailed discussion surrounds that denition. The choice procedure above is
a specialization of the maxmax model (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), henceforth GS) to
accommodate the behavior we are interested in. One interesting feature of our model is
that we do not impose their main axiom, ambiguity seeking, as we discuss in the next
subsection.
1.1.2 Related Literature
So far, we have focused on optimism stemming from information distortion (holding be-
liefs xed). However, optimism has also been understood in terms of belief distortion.
More specically, optimism arises when an agent changes his view of the world, or belief,
4It may be argued that it is more natural for a decision maker’s distorted information to vary with the
menu he is facing instead of each individual act. We will begin with a model like this and observe that
WARP is satised, so we work with a preference for convenience. See Section 1.2.2.
5to one that makes his menu of potential actions appear more favorable. We now briey
discuss models in this spirit.
A seemingly natural alternative denition of optimism comes from the “optimistic"
version of the multiple priors model (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989). This model is char-
acterized by ambiguity seeking, or an aversion to hedging, which states that if two acts f
and д are indierent, then the agent weakly prefers f to the mixture α f + (1−α )д for any
α ∈ [0, 1]. A preference satisfying ambiguity seeking, along with other standard axioms,
can be represented by a functional
VGS ( f ) = max
µ∈Q
∫
u ( f (s )) dµ (s ),
where Q is a set of probability measures. One can interpret this representation as model-
ing an agent who chooses an action that maximizes the best case scenario among those
he views as plausible. The seemingly optimistic nature of the representation may tempt
one to behaviorally dene optimism using ambiguity seeking. However, introspection
suggests that optimism is a relative notion. For a behavior to be optimistic, there must
be some neutral, non-optimistic benchmark behavior to compare the optimistic behavior
to. For example, in Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) (discussed below), the agent’s be-
lief is optimistic relative to the objective probability distribution. The maxmax model is
silent on how the set Q is constructed, and there is no behavior that indicates that the
agent is always choosing a measure that improves his expected utility relative to some
benchmark measure. In particular, Q could be very small and/or constructed in a partic-
ularly pessimistic way. On the other hand, the model we propose has the feature that the
decision maker always distorts information in a way that improves his chosen action rel-
ative to the benchmark given by not distorting information (i.e. believing his information
source). Our analysis reveals that in our setting, our key axiom, Optimistic Dynamic Con-
sistency, implies ambiguity seeking. This suggests that optimism and ambiguity seeking
6are distinct phenomena, as the latter is possible without the former.
Epstein and Kopylov (2007) model an agent who chooses a menu of acts at an ex ante
stage when she holds a “cool headed" belief. In an interim stage, when it is time to choose
an act from that menu, she becomes optimistic5 about the possible outcomes and chooses
a new belief. In the temptation tradition, the agent’s ranking over singleton menus reveals
the agent’s cool headed belief, while temptation preferences reveal the agent’s optimistic
belief. The ex post choice implied by their model is in the spirit of GS, as the optimistic
belief is chosen from a set of beliefs to maximize expected utility of the best act in the
menu (i.e. maxmax). While the utility specication determining ex post choice is quite
similar to our model, there are two key dierences. First, the behavior underlying the two
utility specications is quite dierent, as their model represents ex post choices implied
by ex ante choice of menus. Second, the mechanism explaining the shift in beliefs is
anticipation. On the other hand, the agent modeled in this paper becomes optimistic due
to motivated information distortion. In Section 5.2, Epstein and Kopylov discuss adding
information arrival to their model. However, the arrival of information causes the agent to
revise her belief in a Consequentialist way, so the content of the information is respected.6
We have hypothesized the opposite, that information is distorted, but relative likelihoods
are preserved.
Another approach to behaviorally dening optimism would be through violations of
the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). This is a testable implication of the op-
timal expectations model of Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) (henceforth BP), as shown
in Spiegler (2008). The BP model is not axiomatic, and other testable implications have
not been fully explored. In BP, optimism is modeled via belief distortion, while respect-
5Most of their paper focuses on pessimism, but the optimistic counterpart is obvious and discussed
briey in their Section 5.
6Consequentialism is formally dened in Section 1.3.1. In the version of Epstein and Kopylov (2007)
featuring information arrival, the agent’s revised prior conditional on the signal, is absolutely continuous
with respect to the update of the original prior, conditional on the signal. This generically will not be the
case in the model we consider.
7ing the objective information. BP model an agent who chooses a belief to maximize time
averaged expected utility, where the cost of doing so is the ex post utility loss from mak-
ing suboptimal choices. The agent modeled herein is optimistic but still satises WARP.
The benets of doing so are threefold. Importantly, it requires a smaller departure from
the standard subjective expected utility (SEU) model of Savage (1954) and Anscombe and
Aumann (1963). Second, it allows us to draw more robust conclusions that are not subject
to change when irrelevant alternatives are added (see the discussion in Spiegler (2008) re-
garding risk attitudes in the BP model). Lastly, it allows us to focus on a more compelling
way to behaviorally identify optimism from choice. We show that in a setting where an
agent receives information, there is a more direct way to identify optimism than WARP
violations, which is important because the latter are consistent with a wide range of non-
standard models (notably pessimism, or inattention as in Ellis (2018)).
Closer in spirit to our model of optimism is Kovach (2016), who studies a decision
maker who distorts his belief ex post so that the action he took in a previous period ap-
pears more attractive, as if to cope with cognitive dissonance. On the contrary, the deci-
sion maker we study distorts information ex post to make the current action appear more
attractive.
Lastly, this paper is also related to the large literature on updating in which dynamic
consistency is altered or relaxed in various ways depending on the situation. Some exam-
ples of papers here are Ortoleva (2012) to account for updating null events, Kopylov (2016)
in an epsilon contamination model, and Hanany and Klibano (2007) to allow updating
to depend on the choice problem.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 1.2, we present the primitives and model.
Section 1.3 characterizes behavior associated with the decision making procedure we
model. Section 1.4 presents our main results, along with comments and a proof sketch.
Applications and conclusions follow in Section 1.5 and Section 1.6. Proofs are collected in
8the Appendix.
1.2 Setup & Model
In this section, we formally dene our primitives and model.
1.2.1 Primitives
We adapt the Anscombe and Aumann (1963) model as follows. There is a nonempty,
nite set of states, denoted by S , representing subjective uncertainty to the agent. Let
Σ = {A,B,E, . . . } be the power set 2S of all events—subsets of S . Our results are valid as
is for any algebra Σ ⊂ 2S .7 For any probability measure pi on the measurable space (S,Σ)
and any nonempty event E ∈ Σ, let piE denote the Bayesian update of pi conditional on E.8
Let Z be a compact metric space of outcomes or prizes, and let X B ∆(Z ) be the
set of Borel probability measures on Z . Let F = { f ,д,h, . . . } be the set of all acts—Σ-
measurable functions f : S −→ X . The set F is endowed with the product topology.9
Since X is convex, we dene mixtures in F statewise: for any f ,д ∈ F and α ∈ [0, 1],
(α f + (1 − α )д) (s ) B α f (s ) + (1 − α )д(s ) for each s ∈ S . In line with the literature on
subjective uncertainty, we slightly abuse notation and use x to denote the prize x ∈ X and
the act x ∈ F such that x (s ) = x for every s ∈ S . We also use the convention that for any
f ,д ∈ F and E ∈ Σ, the act f Eд denotes the act that is equal to f if s ∈ E and equal to д
if s ∈ Ec .
Let A ∈ Σ be any nonempty subset of S . The analyst observes binary choices both
before and after the agent is told that the event A occurred. Thus, our primitive is a pair
of preference relations on F denoted % and %A, respectively. We refer to % as the ex ante
7Thanks to a referee for pointing out that taking Σ = 2S is indeed without loss of generality.
8Formally, for any B ∈ Σ, piE (B) = pi (B∩E )pi (E ) .
9Since Z is compact,X is compact and metrizable (Theorem 15.11 of Aliprantis and Border (2006)). Since
S is nite, all meaningful topologies onF are equivalent. All our results would generalize to the case where
X is an arbitrary convex subset of a metrizable vector space.
9preference and%A as the ex post preference (we may use%S instead of%when convenient).
This primitive would naturally arise if the agent had access to an information partition
P , the event A ∈ P was the cell of the partition revealed to the agent, and we observed
choices both before and after the cell was revealed.
Two comments are in order regarding the primitive. First, we interpret the conditional
preference relations to represent actual choices made by an agent after he is told that the
event A occurred. As the realization of the true state and receipt of the payo are not
included in our model (as is the case in Savage (1954) and Anscombe and Aumann (1963)),
from a formal perspective it does not matter whether we interpret A as the event that
has objectively occurred, or simply the event that the agent was told occurred (so that
the information source may be wrong). However, it is important that each conditional
preference relation %A is a subset ofF ×F , as even though the agent was toldA occurred,
acts’ payos in Ac matter to the agent.
Second, our primitive includes a conditional preference. While this conditional pref-
erence is not derived from the ex ante preference as in Savage (1954), it is still observable
in principle. More specically, if we were interested in the agent’s information distortion
after being told that A occurred, we need not observe the agent’s choices after also being
told that A′ occurred (i.e. choice at some unreached part of the event tree). This choice
data could easily be collected in a lab setting, but could also be collected in the eld in
principle.
1.2.2 Model
Consider the following model that captures the intuition discussed in Section 1.1. An
agent is told that the event A occurred, and is choosing from a menu of acts F . Before
making a choice, the agent distorts his information to some event E∗. He then updates
his belief pi , and chooses the act that maximizes his expected utility computed with the
posterior piE∗ . Let C (F | A) denote the agent’s choice(s) from the (compact) menu F ⊆ F
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after is he told that the event A occurred. We propose the following representation:
C (F | A) = argmax
f ∈F
∫
u ( f (s )) dpiE∗ (s ) (1.3)
E∗ = argmax
E∈EA
max
f ∈F
∫
u ( f (s )) dpiE (s ), (1.4)
where E∗ is chosen by the agent from the subjective collection EA to maximize his expected
utility among all acts f ∈ F and events E ∈ EA (we assume (1.4) has a unique solution for
simplicity). If we modify the representation above slightly to account for ties in (1.4), it is
easy to show that C (· | A) satises WARP. Therefore, we will henceforth work with the
following model, where the agent distorts information with each act, rather than with each
menu. The two models are equivalent, so we will work with preferences for simplicity,
but we will sometimes refer back to the above model to guide intuition.
Definition 1. A pair of preference relations (%,%A) has a Bayesian Optimism repre-
sentation if there exists:
• a continuous and mixture linear function u : X −→ R,
• a probability measure pi on the measurable space (S,Σ) with full support,
• and a collection of events EA ⊆ Σ satisfying:
(i) A ∈ EA,
(ii) and A ⊆ E for all E ∈ EA,
such that % is represented by
V ( f ) =
∫
u ( f (s )) dpi (s )
and %A is represented by
VA( f ) = max
E∈EA
∫
u ( f (s )) dpiE (s ).
Given this denition, a Bayesian Optimism representation can be summarized by a
tuple 〈u,pi , EA〉. The interpretation of u and pi is standard as the decision maker’s tastes
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and beliefs, respectively. We interpret EA as the collection of events that may arise as
a result of the decision maker subjectively distorting the information A. Notice that we
can view the representation as a maximization over a set of probability measures, namely
the set of all posterior beliefs induced by pi and EA using Bayesian updating. As such,
the representation is related to maxmax expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989),
although we do not directly impose their main axiom (see Section 1.3).
Assumption (i) on EA requires that believing the information is feasible for the decision
maker. This is one way optimism is manifested in the representation: the agent distorts his
information from A to some event E in a way that always (weakly) increases his expected
utility relative to the expected utility a standard agent would obtain.
Assumption (ii) requires that every event in EA is a superset of A. In other words, the
agent never rules out states that his information source tells him are possible. This is one
way in which the agent is disciplined in how he distorts information. Another way of
interpreting this condition is that in learning thatA occurred, the agent has been told that
each s ∈ Ac has been ruled out. He will take all of this information into account only if
he nds it optimal to do so, otherwise he will “cherry pick" the information and behave
as if only states in Ec have been ruled out, where E is his subjective information. This
condition is particularly palatable if we interpret A as the event that objectively occurred;
under this interpretation, (ii) implies that the agent always puts positive probability on
the true state.
The representation above captures the “good news-bad news eect" studied by Eil and
Rao (2011). Say that A is good (bad) news for f if
∫
u ( f (s )) dpiA(s ) ≥ (≤) u ( f (s )) for all
s ∈ Ac . If A is good news for an act f , then the model predicts the decision maker updates
his belief as a Bayesian would. On the other hand, if A is bad news for f , the model
predicts that the agent distorts information and uses an event E ⊇ A to update his belief.
Both are consistent with the experimental evidence in Eil and Rao (2011) and Mobius et al.
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(2014).
1.3 Axioms
In this section, we present the behavior of the agent we are modeling. We begin with
axioms familiar from the literature on subjective uncertainty. Section 1.3.1 presents our
main behavioral postulate.
Since we want to focus on updating, we assume that ex ante the agent is standard, and
satises the Anscombe and Aumann (1963) axioms. This approach is not uncommon when
studying updating, e.g. Ortoleva (2012). The rst axiom formalizes that (parts (i)-(iv)) and
provides minimal restrictions on the conditional preference.
Axiom 1. For every B ∈ {A, S },
(i) (Weak Order) %B is complete and transitive.
(ii) (Strong Monotonicity) For every f ,д ∈ F such that f (s ) % д(s ) for every s ∈ S ,
f %B д. If additionally f (s )  д(s ) for some s ∈ B, then f B д.
(iii) (Continuity) For every f ∈ F , the sets {д  д B f } and {д  f B д} are open.
(iv) (Independence) For every f ,д,h ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1), f % д ⇐⇒ α f + (1 − α )h %
αд + (1 − α )h.
(v) (Certainty Independence) For every f ,д ∈ F , x ∈ X , and α ∈ (0, 1),
f %A д ⇐⇒ α f + (1 − α )x %A αд + (1 − α )x .
Parts (i) and (iii) are standard. Part (i) simply requires that each conditional preference
is a weak order. It is this condition that implies that the agent’s choices from menus would
satisfy WARP. There is no obvious reason why a decision maker who is optimistic would
have incomplete or intransitive preferences; even though we focus on the behavior of an
agent who distorts information, he still uses the information to evaluate acts in a standard
way.
13
The rst part of (ii) is also standard. The additional part of the monotonicity axiom
entails two restrictions. The rst requires a strict ex ante preference when f (s )  д(s ) for
some s ∈ S . This implies that the agent’s belief has full support, which is well known.10
The second rules out ex post indierence between two acts when one is strictly better on a
subset ofA (and weakly better everywhere). One can interpret this restriction as ensuring
that the agent believes his information to some extent, as indierence in this case could
be interpreted as the agent completely disregarding his information. This also captures
the idea that once the agent is told that A occurred, he cannot drive this thought from his
conscience, and so it aects the choices he makes even if he uses subjective information.
Lastly, notice also that part (ii) implies that the agent’s preference overX does not depend
on the realized event (see Lemma 1 in Section A.1), which is natural since elements of X
are state independent and thus independent of the realized event A. Now that this axiom
has been stated, in the sequel we will drop the A subscript on the conditional preference
when talking strictly about the agent’s preference over prizes.
Lastly, part (iv) imposes Independence on the ex ante preference only. Throughout,
we do not impose Independence on the ex post preference. However, as you can see in
part (v), we impose Certainty Independence on the ex post preference. See Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989) or Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006) for a lengthier discus-
sion of this axiom. To see why it is appropriate in our setting, recall that the agent we
are modeling is distorting information in order to make the act he is evaluating appear
more attractive. Since constant acts do not depend on the state, they are unaected by
information distortion. As such, mixing two acts f and д with a common constant act
(and the same mixing coecient) will not change the information distortion and hence
will not result in a preference reversal. While we view Certainty Independence as natural
given the decision maker we are modeling, it does rule out some plausible ways of opti-
10This is mostly for expositional convenience, as it eschews issues regarding null events when stating
subsequent denitions.
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mistically distorting information. For example, a decision maker who distorts information
more when there is more utility to gain from doing so may distort information more when
evaluating α f + (1−α )x than when evaluating β f + (1− β )x for some α > β . This type of
behavior would violate Certainty Independence, calling for something weaker like Weak
Certainty Independence (Maccheroni et al., 2006).
Notice that Axiom 1 implies that there exists a worst lottery, i.e. a %-minimal element
of X (it need not be unique). Going forward, let w ∈ X denote the lottery such that for
every f ∈ F , f (s ) % w for every s ∈ S .11
We next state an axiom that can be interpreted in either of two ways. First, it requires
that the agent does not get any direct benet from the process of distorting information.
Alternatively, it could be interpreted as requiring that the agent believes his informa-
tion when he has no incentive not to. In other words, the agent defaults to believing his
information source. In this sense, the axiom is a weak form of Consequentialism (see
Section 1.3.1 for a denition).
Axiom 2 (Constant Conseqentialism). For every x ∈ X , x ∼A xAw .
Returning to the second interpretation oered above, when evaluating x the agent
clearly has no reason to distort information. When evaluating xAw , resisting the informa-
tion that A occurred could only make the agent worse o, so he believes that A occurred.
1.3.1 Optimistic Dynamic Consistency
In this subsection, we present the main behavior of the model that allows Dynamic Con-
sistency violations like the one in the Introduction. Recall the following denitions that
connect ex ante and ex post preferences in the standard model (see Ghirardato (2002)).
11If one nds the boundedness of X unpalatable, small modications could be made so that the results
hold when wf ∈ X is the lottery such that f (s ) % wf for every s ∈ S ; this does not require bounded X .
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Definition 2. A pair of preference relations (%,%A) satises Dynamic Consistency if
for every f ,д,h ∈ F ,
f Ah % дAh ⇐⇒ f %A д. (1.5)
Definition 3. A conditional preference relation %A satises Consequentialism if for
every f ,д ∈ F such that f (s ) = д(s ) for all s ∈ A, f ∼A д.
It is well known that in the standard model, Dynamic Consistency ensures that the
decision maker’s posterior belief is the Bayesian update of his prior conditional on the
event A. Implicit in this result is that the support of the agent’s posterior is contained in
A, or equivalentlyAc is null according to %A.12 This is an implication of Consequentialism.
In the standard model, this allows a meaningful comparison between ex ante rankings of
acts that are equal onAc with rankings of acts ex post. Since we have not assumed Conse-
quentialism, Dynamic Consistency must be altered to take into account the information
the agent is actually using to update, since we can no longer be sure it is A. This calls for
a way of identifying the information the agent uses to update (his subjective information).
The following denition identies the agent’s subjective information. To gain intu-
ition, suppose for a given act f , there is a nonempty event E ∈ Σ such that the agent is
indierent between f and f Ew , where w ∈ X is as above. Then, in the spirit of Conse-
quentialism, we conclude that E contains the agent’s subjective information, i.e. the agent
does not consider payos in Ec when evaluating f . Moreover, if a given event E contains
the agent’s subjective information, then we infer that the smallest such E (in terms of set
inclusion) is the agent’s subjective information. We formalize this intuition as follows.
Definition 4. An event E is relevant for f given A if f ∼A f Ew and for every E′ ⊂ E,
f A f E′w .
The second part of the denition adds structure to the types of events considered, by
considering only the smallest events (in terms of set inclusion) that satisfy the denition.13
12In other words, hAf ∼A hAд for all f ,д,h ∈ F .
13Throughout, we use ⊂ to denote a strict subset. If equality is permitted, ⊆ is used.
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It is easy to see that in many situations, very large sets, or the entire state space, would
satisfy the denition without this restriction, which would render it not particularly use-
ful. Instead, focusing on the smallest events provides a good proxy for the information
the agent is actually considering (this connection will be made formal later).
In general, for a given f and A, relevant events may not be unique. This is the case
because the agent may nd two events, E and E′, that make f (givenA) equally attractive.
If neither event nests the other, then each will satisfy the denition.14 On the other hand,
relevant events generically exist.
Behaviorally identifying the agent’s subjective information in an intuitive way is one
main contribution of the paper. Given the dearth of research on non-Consequentialist
behavior and the fact that our agent violates Independence, it was not a priori obvious
that such a clean identication would be possible. We also show later (Proposition 2) that
this notion has a clear analog in the representation.1516
Now that we have provided a method for identifying the agent’s subjective informa-
tion, we can consider alterations to Dynamic Consistency that account for potentially
non-Consequentialist behavior. A natural alteration of Dynamic Consistency is the fol-
lowing: Suppose E is relevant for both f and д given A. Then
f Eh % дEh =⇒ f %A д (1.6)
for anyh ∈ F . This condition requires that if the agent’s subjective information is E when
evaluating f and д, and ex ante the agent prefers f when f (s ) = д(s ) for all s ∈ Ec , then
ex post the agent still prefers f .
14However, given Theorem 1 and Proposition 2, it can be shown that relevant events will be unique on a
dense subset of acts.
15In Ellis (2018), there is a notion of behaviorally determining which events are “decision relevant." How-
ever, the denition is quite dierent and motivated by determining properties of the agent’s cost of paying
attention, not eliciting the information the agent is actually paying attention to.
16Also, recall that we are using the term subjective information to refer to the agent’s subjective interpre-
tation of objective information, not to refer to his private information as is sometimes done in the literature,
e.g. Dillenberger, Lleras, Sadowski, and Takeoka (2014); Lu (2016).
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We strengthen the above axiom by requiring E to be relevant only forд givenA, instead
of for both acts. This permits the updating process to exhibit an optimistic bias, as we will
discuss following the formal statement.
Axiom 3 (Optimistic DC). For any f ,д,h ∈ F , such that E is relevant for д given A,
f Eh % дEh =⇒ f %A д.
Dynamic Consistency, as traditionally stated in (1.5), can be broken into two pieces,
one for indierence and one for strict preference. In particular, we could rewrite Dynamic
Consistency equivalently as follows:
f Ah  дAh =⇒ f A д
f Ah ∼ дAh =⇒ f ∼A д
Likewise, Optimistic DC can be decomposed to highlight the role that optimism plays
in the updating process. Consider the following slight strengthening of Optimistic DC,
where E is relevant for д given A:
f Eh  дEh =⇒ f A д (1.7)
f Eh ∼ дEh =⇒ f %A д (1.8)
It is easy to see that the above version of the axiom is slightly stronger, but we could use
this axiom in place of Optimistic DC and all our results would be unchanged. The strict
part of this axiom (1.7) plays the traditional role of Dynamic Consistency, requiring that
the agent’s beliefs are consistent from the ex ante to the ex post stage. The indierence
part (1.8) of this axiom is the manifestation of optimism in behavior. Recall that since
E is relevant for д given A, when evaluating д the agent is updating as if the event E
occurred. Since f Eh ∼ дEh, if no further information distortion occurs now that the agent
is choosing between f and д, we would expect f ∼A д. This indierence is consistent
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with the axiom, but f A д is also permitted. This strict preference indicates that the
agent’s subjective information has changed. Moreover, it indicates that it has changed in
an optimistic way, one that makes f appear even more attractive than it did when E was
the subjective information.
Put dierently, given that we have identied that E is the distorted information corre-
sponding toд, f Eh ∼ дEh indicates that f (on E) is a “rational" or “cool headed" equivalent
for the optimistically evaluatedд. Thus, ex post when optimism may also aect the agent’s
evaluation of f , the axiom says that f can only improve relative to д.
In the interest of fully connecting behavior to the interpretation of our model in which
the agent distorts information with each menu, discussed in Section 1.2.2, we oer one
nal interpretation of the Optimistic DC. Consider adding f to the menu {д,дEw }, where
E is relevant for д given A. If f Eh  дEh, then the agent has no incentive to distort
information dierently when f is added, so we expect C ({ f ,д,дEw } | A) = { f }. If f Eh ∼
дEh, then the agent’s subjective information may not change, in which case we expect
f ∈ C ({ f ,д,дEw } | A). However, Optimistic DC requires that if the agent’s subjective
information does change when f is added to the menu, then it must change in a way that
makes f appear more attractive than д and дEw , so that C ({ f ,д,дEw } | A) = { f }.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Representation
We begin this subsection with our main result, a characterization of the Bayesian Opti-
mism representation.
Theorem 1. The pair of preference relations (%,%A) satises Axioms 1-3 if and only if it
has a Bayesian Optimism representation.
The proof is in Section A.1; see Section 1.4.3 for a sketch and some additional com-
ments. We just note here that while we use the (dual of) the GS result as a building block
19
in the proof, we did not explicitly assume anything about the decision maker’s attitude to-
ward hedging. While the dynamic element of our primitive is necessary for such a result,
this characterization may still be of interest.
The next result states the uniqueness properties of the representation. Uniqueness of
u (up to ane transformation) and pi are standard and follow directly from Anscombe and
Aumann (1963). We say that a Bayesian Optimism representation 〈u,pi , EA〉 is nontrivial
if u is nonconstant.
Theorem2. If two nontrivial BayesianOptimism representations 〈u,pi , EA〉 and
〈
u′,pi ′, E′A
〉
represent the same pair of preferences (%,%A), then there exist λ > 0 and γ ∈ R such that
u′ = λu + γ , pi = pi ′, and EA = E′A.
The uniqueness of EA can be proved by using arguments from GS, after taking care of
one subtle point.17 Consider mapping each event E ∈ EA into its corresponding probability
measure piE ; call this set QA. Since S (and hence EA) is nite, QA is a nite subset of ∆(S ).
Since the integral is linear, we may take the closed convex hull ofQA without aecting the
underlying preference (since the maximum will occur at extreme points), denoted co (QA).
Then, applying the GS uniqueness result to the representations using co (QA) and co
(
Q′A
)
,
it follows that co (QA) = co
(
Q′A
)
(where Q′A is dened analogously). However, this need
not imply that EA = E′A, as we need to ensure that taking the closed convex hull of QA
does not introduce measures that are Bayesian updates of pi conditional on some B < EA.
Lemma 9 in Section A.2 veries that this cannot happen when EA satises the conditions
of the Bayesian Optimism representation. Importantly, the condition that A ⊆ E for all
E ∈ EA is critical for the uniqueness result to hold, as Lemma 9 may fail without this
condition.
Indeed, consider a more general representation that does not require that A ⊆ E for
all E ∈ EA, but retains the rest of the Bayesian Optimism representation. The following
example shows that EA may no longer be unique. Suppose that |S | ≥ 3, E′A = 2S \ ∅,
17Thanks to a referee for pointing out that one could indeed use the GS arguments.
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and EA = 2S \ {E, ∅}, for some nonempty nonsingleton event E. Let VA and V ′A denote
the representations corresponding to EA and E′A, respectively, constructed with the same
u and pi . Then since both E′A and EA contain all the singletons and pi has full support, it
follows that
VA( f ) = V
′
A( f ) = maxs∈S u ( f (s ))
for all f ∈ F , so VA and V ′A both represent the same underlying conditional preference.
1.4.2 The SEU Special Case
We now show under which conditions the Bayesian Optimism model reduces to the stan-
dard SEU model with Bayesian Updating. The following result conrms that adding Con-
sequentialism or Dynamic Consistency to Axioms 1-3 is equivalent to the SEU model with
Bayesian updating conditional on the event A (recall the denitions from Section 1.3.1).
Proposition 1. Suppose the pair of preference relations (%,%A) satises Axioms 1-3. Then
the following statements are equivalent:
(i) %A satises Consequentialism.
(ii) The pair of preference relations (%,%A) satises Dynamic Consistency.
(iii) For every f ,д ∈ F ,
f %A д ⇐⇒
∫
u ( f (s )) dpiA(s ) ≥
∫
u (д(s )) dpiA(s ),
where u and pi satisfy the assumptions in Denition 1.
The intuition for this result is the following. First, we have retained Axioms 1-3, which
have already done the job of ensuring the agent’s posterior is related to his prior via
Bayesian updating. Relying on Theorem 1, it suces to show that A is the solution to the
maximization problem in the Bayesian Optimism representation for every f ∈ F . Given
the tight connection between relevant events and these solutions, this is equivalent to
showing thatA is relevant for each f (givenA). To show (i) implies (iii), Consequentialism
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ensures that f ∼A f Aw , and Strong Monotonicity ensures that f A f A′w for all A′ ⊂ A,
so A is relevant (for all acts such that f (s )  w , which are dense). In this sense, Strong
Monotonicity is more than just a monotonicity assumption combined with a full support
assumption, as it adds structure to the set of relevant events (and hence the supports of the
agent’s feasible posteriors). The (ii) implies (iii) case is less subtle. Dynamic Consistency
requires that f Ax fA ∼ x fA , where x fA is the certainty equivalent for f given A. Using the
SEU representation of the ex ante preference yields the desired result.
1.4.3 Proof Sketch & Discussion
Before sketching the proof of Theorem 1, we present a result that shows the tight con-
nection between relevant events and the solution to the maximization problem in the
representation. We state it in terms of the Bayesian Optimism representation, although
other analogs are used in Section A.1. We rst state a denition.
Definition 5. For any f ∈ F , an event E is aminimal solution for f given A if
E ∈ argmax
B∈EA
∫
u ( f (s )) dpiB (s ) (1.9)
and there is no E′ ⊂ E that also satises (1.9).
Proposition 2. Suppose the pair of preference relations (%,%A) satises Axioms 1-3. For
any f ∈ F such that f (s )  w for every s ∈ S , an event E is relevant for f given A if and
only if it is a minimal solution for f given A.
This result shows that on a dense subset of acts, minimal solutions and relevant events
are equivalent. In other words, if an event E is relevant for f given A, then it is as if the
decision maker, when evaluating f , distorts A to E, and evaluates f as if he is a Bayesian
agent and was told that E occurred. For acts where f (s ) ∼ w for some s ∈ S , relevant
events are always contained in solutions, while minimal solutions are still relevant as in
Proposition 2 (one can make similar statements about solutions that are not minimal).
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We now move on to discussing the suciency part of the proof (necessity is imme-
diate and discussed at the end of the complete proof in Section A.1). The rst key step
is observing that Optimistic DC implies that %A satises what GS would call uncertainty
seeking and we will refer to as Convexity. This condition says that for any f ,д ∈ F ,
f ∼A д implies that f %A α f + (1 − α )д for all α ∈ [0, 1]. While not dicult to prove, this
result is surprising (at least in our opinion), so we discuss it here briey. At an intuitive
level, if the agent strictly prefers to mix two indierent acts, then they must hedge one
another in some way. However, the optimistic agent we are modeling sees no benet from
hedging, since he is distorting information and can simply ignore the states where mixing
with д would make f appear more attractive, and vice versa. More formally, suppose per
contra that there exists a case of strict uncertainty aversion, i.e. there exists f ,д ∈ F and
α ∈ (0, 1) such that α f + (1− α )д A f ∼A д. Let E be relevant for α f + (1− α )д given A.
Without loss of generality assume that f Eh % дEh. Then since the ex ante preference is
SEU, we must have f Eh % [α f + (1 − α )д]Eh % дEh. Since E was assumed to be relevant
for α f + (1 − α )д given A, applying Optimistic DC implies that f %A α f + (1 − α )д, a
contradiction.18
Now, given that %A satises Convexity, Axioms 1-3 imply that each conditional pref-
erence has a (max) GS representation, with set of priors QA. The key step that remains is
showing that for any f ∈ F , there is a
µ f ∈ argmax
µ∈QA
∫
u ( f (s )) dµ (s )
such that µ f is actually a Bayesian update of the prior pi (conditional on the support of
µ f ). We begin by taking an arbitrary f with f (s )  w for every s ∈ S and choosing
a minimal µ f that solves (1.9) (minimal in terms of its support). We rst show that the
18Since it may be of interest, if we restate Optimistic DC in terms of pessimism, by requiring the relevant
event in the statement of the axiom be relevant for f instead of д (see Section 1.5.2) it would imply that
each conditional preference is uncertainty averse by an argument analogous to the one above.
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support of µ f (call it E for now) is relevant for f given A, in the spirit of Proposition 2
above. Then, toward a contradiction, we suppose that µ f is not a Bayesian update of the
prior, i.e. µ f , piE . In this case, we can construct an act h (with h(s ) = f (s ) for all s ∈ Ec )
such that
∫
u (h(s )) dµ f (s ) >
∫
u ( f (s )) dµ f (s ) (and hence h A f ), but
∫
u ( f (s )) dpiE (s ) >∫
u (h(s )) dpiE (s ) (and hence f Eh′  hEh′ for anyh′ ∈ F ). If we can show that E is relevant
for h given A, the previous two inequalities jointly contradict Optimistic DC. However,
this is generically not the case.
As such, we consider an act дα B αhEw + (1 − α ) f Ew , and notice that for any α > 0,
we can replace дα with h in the inequalities above and preserve them. Additionally, the
way we dened дα implies that дα (s )  w for every s ∈ E whenever α > 0. Toward the
contradiction of Optimistic DC mentioned above, we show that E is relevant for дα (given
A) for some α > 0. The argument proceeds as follows: Consider a sequence {αn} → 0
with αn > 0 for all n ∈ N. Since дαn → f Ew and the “argmax" correspondence dened by
the GS representation is upper hemicontinuous,19 we can choose a sequence {µn}, where
each
µn ∈ argmax
µ∈QA
∫
u (дαn (s )) dµ (s ),
and each µn is a minimal solution forдαn . Upper hemicontinuity implies that this sequence
has a limit point µ that solves the GS maximization problem for f Ew (in this setting, a
convergent subsequence). We show that the support of every such µ contains E, since E is
relevant for f Ew givenA.20 Thus, we can show that for all n suciently large, the support
of µn contains E (since the convergent subsequence of measures cannot jump from putting
zero probability on some event to positive in the limit). Then since дαn (s ) = w for every
s ∈ Ec , and each µn was chosen to be minimal, E is relevant for дαn , as desired.
We conclude with three remarks. First, if we were to assume Convexity explicitly, we
19This follows from the theorem of the maximum, Aliprantis and Border (2006), Theorem 17.31. We verify
that the hypotheses of the theorem are satised in the formal proof.
20This follows from an analogous version of Proposition 2 since f Ew (s )  w for all s ∈ E. We later
extend this result to acts on the boundary using Continuity.
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could characterize the Bayesian Optimism representation by weakening Optimistic DC
to requiring that E be relevant for both f and д in the statement of the axiom (this is
the version discussed before its statement). This would keep the part of the axiom that
ensures beliefs are related by Bayesian updating, but does not allow optimistic information
distortion. Instead, Convexity would imply that information is distorted optimistically.
Second, notice that in the above arguments, Constant Consequentialism was never
used, and only a weaker form of Strong Monotonicity was used. Indeed, one can show
that Optimistic DC and a weakening of the monotonicity part of Axiom 1 characterize
the Bayesian Optimism representation without restrictions (i) and (ii) on the set EA.21 As
discussed earlier, this more general representation may have much weaker uniqueness
properties.
Lastly, if the primitive were richer and included a family of conditional preferences,
i.e. we observed % and {%A}A∈A for some A ⊆ Σ, we could apply Axioms 1-3 to each pair
(%,%A) for all A ∈ A and obtain a family of Bayesian Optimism representations where
the set EA varied with the information received, as suggested by the notation.
1.5 Applications
This section addresses two natural questions that might follow our analysis: comparing
agents’ optimism and pessimistic information distortion.
1.5.1 Comparative Optimism
We begin by providing a behavioral denition of one decision maker being more opti-
mistic than another, in the spirit of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002). Since we are focused
on information distortion, an ex post phenomena, the denition applies only to the con-
ditional preference and we hold beliefs and risk preferences xed. While this may at rst
21Only the full support part of monotonicity would need to be retained.
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seem limiting, there is still scope for considerable heterogeneity in how optimistic agents
are.
Definition 6. Suppose two agents have conditional preferences %1A and %
2
A. Then Agent 1
ismore optimistic than Agent 2 if for every f ∈ F and x ∈ X ,
f %2A x =⇒ f %1A x .
The denition says that Agent 1 is more optimistic than Agent 2 if anytime Agent 2
prefers an act f to some lottery x , then so does Agent 1. If we assume that agents’ tastes
and beliefs are the same, the denition suggests that Agent 1 is more optimistic than
Agent 2 if Agent 1’s subjective information makes f appear at least as good as Agent 2’s
subjective information does, for any f ∈ F . This is borne out in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Consider two BayesianOptimism representations
〈
u,pi , E1A
〉
and
〈
u,pi , E2A
〉
,
corresponding to two agents. Then Agent 1 is more optimistic than Agent 2 if and only if
E2A ⊆ E1A.
The proposition states that assuming two decision makers have the same beliefs and
risk preferences, dierences in the agents’ degree of optimism comes from the size of EA,
i.e. the degree to which each decision maker can subjectively distort the event A.
An immediate application of Proposition 3 is that it gives us a way to determine from
behavior when a decision maker is able to completely ignore the information that A oc-
curred, i.e. when S ∈ EA. This can be done by replacing Agent 2’s conditional preference
%2A with Agent 1’s ex ante preference %
1 in Denition 6 above (notice that Agent 1’s
ex ante preference is a conditional preference from a Bayesian Optimism representation
with EA = {S }). The following corollary is then a special case of Proposition 3; the proof
is omitted.
Corollary 1. Fix a Bayesian Optimism representation 〈u,pi , EA〉. Then S ∈ EA if and only
if for every f ∈ F and x ∈ X ,
f % x =⇒ f %A x .
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The corollary states that the agent is able to ignore information if and only if every
act f ∈ F is at least as valuable ex post as it is ex ante. In words, this means that learning
that A occurred never reduces the agent’s utility.
1.5.2 Pessimism
While we have focused most of our attention on a new channel for optimism, it seems
plausible that a decision maker might distort information in a pessimistic way, i.e. one that
makes his prospects look worse (although this is not what is observed in the experimental
evidence cited above). There are two changes that need to be made to the preceding
analysis to accommodate the pessimism story. First, we need to redene relevant events.
Specically, let b ∈ X be such that b % f (s ) for all f ∈ F and s ∈ S denote the “best"
lottery. Then an event E is p-relevant for f givenA if f ∼ f Eb and f ≺ f E′b for all E′ ⊂ E.
Roughly, E must be the event that the pessimistic decision maker must be using to update:
Since f ∼ f Eb, he is ignoring the states with high consequences, and since f ≺ f E′b for
all E′ ⊂ E, for any event smaller than E the decision maker strictly prefers f E′b since he
is putting positive probability on states with consequence b.
The second alteration is to the Dynamic Consistency condition. We rst state it, and
then discuss the dierence.
Axiom 4 (Pessimistic DC). For any f ,д,h ∈ F , such that E is p-relevant for f given A,
f Eh % дEh =⇒ f %A д.
Notice that the only dierence in the axiom relative Optimistic DC is that we require
E to be relevant for f instead of д. This has a similar interpretation as above. Since the
decision maker’s subjective information is E when evaluating f and f Eh % дEh, then ex
post when the decision maker is distorting information in a pessimistic way, д can only
appear worse than it did ex ante when there was no information to distort. Arguments
analogous to those given in Section 1.4.3 can be used to show that Pessimistic DC implies
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that each ex post preference is uncertainty averse. Given these alterations, simple mod-
ications of the arguments used to prove Theorem 1 can be used to show that the pair
of preferences (%,%A) satises Axioms 1, 2, and 4 (altering Constant Consequentialism in
the obvious way) if and only if % is SEU and %A is represented byWA, where
WA( f ) = min
E∈EA
∫
u ( f (s )) dpiE (s ),
and each component of the representation satises the conditions set forth in the Bayesian
Optimism representation. Of course, since Pessimistic DC implies that the conditional
preference is uncertainty averse and Optimistic DC implies that the conditional prefer-
ence is convex, assuming both simultaneously implies that the conditional preference is
uncertainty neutral, and hence a subjective expected utility preference.
Proposition 4. The pair of preference relations (%,%A) satises Axioms 1-4 if and only if
f %A д ⇐⇒
∫
u ( f (s )) dpiA(s ) ≥
∫
u (д(s )) dpiA(s ),
where u and pi satisfy the conditions set forth in Denition 1.
In light of Proposition 1, this implies that Optimistic DC is equivalent to the standard
notion of Dynamic Consistency in the presence of Pessimistic DC, or vice versa.
1.6 Conclusion
There are two ways in which we can think about optimism. The rst is that when facing
a menu of possible actions, an agent changes his belief in a way that makes his feasible
actions appear more attractive. Most models in the theory literature fall into this class
(e.g. Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), Epstein and Kopylov (2007)). In this paper, we con-
sidered an alternative mechanism: that agents may distort information in such a way that
allows them to hold an optimistic belief. This hypothesis is supported by a variety of
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experimental ndings in both psychology and economics. Optimism stemming from in-
formation distortion is potentially attractive because the agent’s view of the world does
not vary with the choice problem he is facing. The key parts of the axiomatic model
identify the information such a decision maker actually uses to update and behaviorally
dene optimism with a version of Dynamic Consistency that roughly requires the agent’s
evaluation of an act to weakly improve after receiving information, relative to the bench-
mark established by his ex ante preference. We showed that this condition implies that
the agent is uncertainty seeking after receiving information, which has been interpreted
in terms of optimism before.
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Chapter 2
Revealed Understanding
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Motivation
The world around us is extremely complex. Most choices require decision makers (DMs)
to choose between actions that are uncertain, in that a given action may lead to dierent
outcomes depending on the realized state of nature. In subjective expected utility theory,
to assess an action, DMs must determine likelihoods for the states of nature and deter-
mine which outcome the action leads to in each state. While much attention has been
paid to diculties in the assessing likelihoods, economists typically assume that the lat-
ter determination is costless for DMs. However, many actions lead to a large number
of consequences, so realistically DMs may struggle to identify which outcome will come
about in each state of nature.
In this paper, we study a decision maker who is constrained in her ability to match
actions’ possible outcomes with the states of nature, which she perfectly understands.
From choice, we identify the extent to which the DM is constrained and model how she
simplies actions she subjectively views as complex. To x ideas, consider a DM choosing
a new health insurance policy. A state of nature is a collection of treatments the DM may
receive while she is covered by the policy, which we will refer to as treatment plans.1 Each
policy is an action, which associates every possible treatment plan with a cost borne by
1For simplicity, suppose that the DM has no choice in which treatments she receives. This may be the
case if they are prescribed by a benevolent doctor and all the relevant treatments are necessary for the DM’s
survival.
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the DM. The DM we model can perfectly describe every treatment plan and can perfectly
identify the set of possible costs that each policy may leave her responsible for. However,
for a given policy, the DM may be constrained in her ability to match treatment plans
with their corresponding payments. This may be the case because the DM simply does
not have time to closely read the policy, or because she is cognitively constrained in her
ability to understand the ner details of the policy.
How might decision makers simplify actions (acts) that are too complex for them un-
derstand? Since complexity here refers to the DM being unable to match states and out-
comes for a given act f , the DM may attempt to reduce this complexity by matching a set
of states E with the set of outcomes f (E) that are possible given the act f . This simplica-
tion procedure naturally leads to a partition P f of the set of states S where for each E ∈ P f ,
the DM views outcomes in f (E) as possible. Finer partitions correspond to understanding
more details, or reading more closely. Indeed, the “standard” case—where the DM fully
understands acts—corresponds to the special case in which each E ∈ P f is a single state.
This simplication procedure may depend on the structure of f , so the DM may simplify
dierent acts in dierent ways.
To illustrate, we can revisit the health insurance example. Suppose the DM has injured
her knee playing basketball. To repair it, she needs one of two possible surgeries. Follow-
ing the surgery, she will be on one of two dierent rehabilitation plans that are common
to both possible surgeries. Suppose that prior to her surgery, the DM needs to choose a
new health insurance policy. Additionally, suppose for simplicity that the DM is certain
she will not need any other medical care for the duration of the plan. As such, the states
of the world are given by
S = {s1, s2} × {r1, r2} = {(s1, r1) , (s1, r2) , (s2, r1) , (s2, r2)} ,
where s1 refers to the rst possible surgery, r2 refers to the second possible rehab plan,
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and so on. In this case, an insurance policy is an act that describes the DM’s total required
payment in each of the four states above. The rst insurance policy available to the DM
fully covers s2 and r2, but s1 and r1 cost the DM $50 each. This policy is the act f =
(100, 50, 50, 0), where the rst entry corresponds to the DM’s total payment in state (s1, r1),
the second corresponds to state (s1, r2), etc. However, the DM needs to read the policy
closely to know that f ((s1, r1)) = $100, and so on. If she is unable to do so, she may
simplify f using the partition
P = {{(s1, r1) , (s2, r1)} ; {(s1, r2) , (s2, r2)}} ,
i.e. she views the plan f as costing $50 or $100 in states (s1, r1) and (s2, r1), and $0 or $50
in states (s1, r2) and (s2, r2). This might correspond to the DM “focusing” on the rehab,
coarsely understanding the policy as “rehab one will cost me at most $100, otherwise I’ll
pay at most $50”. Keep in mind that the DM’s understanding is subjective, and other
DM’s may simplify f in a dierent way. Moreover, we interpret P as how the DM is
understanding f at the time of choice. She does not reason further about f —the partition
P is the outcome of any reasoning she has done about f .
The second insurance policy available to the DM fully covers both rehab plans and
surgery two, but requires a $100 payment for surgery one. This policy is the act д =
(100, 100, 0, 0). In this case, the DM may simplify д using the partition
Q = {{(s1, r1) , (s1, r2)} ; {(s2, r1) , (s2, r2)}} ,
i.e. she views д as costing $100 in states (s1, r1) and (s1, r2), and $0 in states (s2, r1) and
(s2, r2). Notice that in this case, even though the DM may have limited understanding of
acts, her ability to simplify д using the partition Q is sucient to perfectly understand д
since it is Q-measurable. In this sense, the DM views д as a “simple” policy because her
constraints do not prevent her from understanding it. We refer to the partitions that the
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DM may use to understand acts, like P and Q above, as understanding strategies.
In the sequel, we provide an axiomatic model of a DM who has a limited capacity
to understand acts, like the DM above. When the DM views an act as simple, she is an
expected utility agent. When an act is complex, she simplies it using an understanding
strategy and then computes the act’s expected utility. One of our model’s key hypotheses
is that if P is an understanding strategy, then the DM views P-measurable acts as simple
(as with the policy д and partition Q above). As such, we identify the understanding
strategies from choice by looking at the set of partitions P such that the DM’s preference
satises the Independence axiom when choosing between P-measurable acts. In other
words, if the DM violates Independence for some triple f ,д,h of P-measurable acts, then
the DM must not be able to understand acts using the strategy P .2
Our axiomatic analysis identies a novel behavior that reveals the DM’s uneasiness
with, or aversion to, her limited understanding. Given an act f , we show in Section 2.3
how to identify the understanding strategy P the DM is using when assessing f . As above,
given an event E ∈ P , the DM can only see the set of outcomes f (E). Suppose that for
some constant outcome x , we observe the DM’s preference to be
f  xE f ,
where xE f is the act f outside of E but yields x for every s ∈ E. Since the DM’s limited
understanding lies in her inability to match states and outcomes, xE f is as simple as
possible on E, and the same as f elsewhere. As such, if the DM is indeed averse to her
limited understanding, we expect that she would not reverse her preference when xE f is
made more complicated, i.e. she also exhibits the preference
f  xAf
2Notice that this hypothesis rules out the possibility that the DM does not “notice” that an act is P-
measurable when P is an understanding strategy.
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for any A ⊆ E.
A slightly weaker version of the above behavior displaying aversion to limited un-
derstanding, along with other axioms that are implied by the subjective expected utility
model (with a nite state space and full support prior), characterizes the representation
V ( f ) = max
P∈P
∑
E∈P
pi (E) min
s∈E u ( f (s )),
where P is the set of understanding strategies identied using the procedure described
above, u is a vNM utility function and pi is a suitably dened set function representing the
DM’s beliefs. The representation suggests that the DM rst “chooses” a partition P ∈ P
to use to simplify the act f . Then for each E ∈ P , she knows that the possible outcomes
of f are given by f (E). Since the DM is aware that her reading of the act is incomplete,
she proceeds cautiously by considering only the worst outcome in f (E) when computing
her expected utility of f given P . In other words, she displays an aversion to her limited
understanding. We discuss the representation further following its formal presentation in
Denition 8.
Our main contribution is twofold. The standard subjective expected utility model (Sav-
age (1954) and Anscombe and Aumann (1963)) suggests that DMs understand the choice
environment well enough to fully conceptualize the state space and form a single prior
over it. There is an enormous literature on DMs’ inability to form a single prior (ambi-
guity), a smaller literature on DMs who may be unable to conceptualize the state space
specied by the analyst (coarse contingencies), and some work discussing how to dis-
tinguish the two (see Section 2.1.2 for more details on the relevant papers). Our rst
contribution is to observe a third way that DMs may not understand their environment.
Namely, even when a DM may be able to fully conceptualize the state space and form a
prior, acts themselves may be dicult to understand, as in the examples presented above.
Our second contribution is to provide a parsimonious model of this form of limited under-
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standing. Since the phenomenon we are modeling is uncertainty about the very structure
of acts themselves, it would be natural to encode this uncertainty by expanding the state
space to include every possible “true act” that an act could be, and supposing the DM
has a prior over each of these enlarged state spaces. However, this would require a dif-
ferent state space for each act, resulting in a very cumbersome model. Moreover, this
proposed model provides no guidance on how the DM’s beliefs should vary with the act.
On the other hand, the model presented here identies a belief over the traditional state
space, and identies how the agent understands each act using only the usual primitives
(a preference over acts dened on a common state space).
2.1.2 Relationship with Coarse Contingencies
The DM we are modeling perfectly understands the state space S and the set of outcomes
that could arise following any act f . However, the DM may coarsely understand the
mapping f , and thus identify each cell of the understanding strategy used to understand
f with a set of outcomes. As such, the DM may appear to coarsely understand the state
space. The key dierence between coarse understanding of the state space as it is usually
modeled and apparent coarseness resulting from limited understanding of acts is that in
the former case the DM’s coarseness is usually described by a single partition, while in the
latter the DM may use dierent partitions to understand dierent acts, as we described
above. In this subsection, we briey discuss some related work on coarse understanding
of the state space and how it diers from our model.
A number of papers have focused on the relationship between coarse understanding
of S (or coarse contingencies) and ambiguity, beginning with Mukerji (1997) and Ghi-
rardato (2001).3 Mukerji (1997) takes both the analyst’s and the DM’s state spaces as
observable and models the mapping between them. He considers the DM’s preference
3Each of these papers build on Gilboa and Schmeidler (1994), which oers an interpretation of Choquet
expected utility as modeling a DM completing a misspecied model.
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over acts dened on the analyst’s state space and shows that under some conditions it
may be represented by a Choquet integral (a model of ambiguity sensitive preferences
developed in Schmeidler (1989)). Ghirardato (2001) takes as primitive a preference over
correspondences whose domain is the analyst’s state space S . The fact that choice ob-
jects are correspondences instead of functions captures the DM’s coarse understanding of
the state space (it could also be interpreted as a model of limited understanding of acts).
He shows that under natural adaptations of the Savage (1954) axioms, the DM’s prefer-
ence may also be represented by a Choquet integral. A key dierence between this paper,
Mukerji (1997), and Ghirardato (2001) is that the latter two papers take the DM’s coarse
understanding to be observable, while one of our main contributions is identifying the
how the DM understands acts from choice. Indeed, Ghirardato writes that identifying the
DM’s perception of acts is “arguably...the most interesting part of the exercise” (p. 251).
In the menu choice literature following Kreps (1979) and Dekel et al. (2001, henceforth
DLR), Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo (2007) argue that coarse contingencies would induce
a DM to strictly prefer randomizing between two menus, as in the ambiguity aversion
literature. Relying on this intuition, Epstein et al. (2007) provide two models of coarse
contingencies within the DLR framework that can be interpreted as subjective state space
analogs of the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Aside from
the primitive, the major dierence between Epstein et al. (2007) and this paper is that in the
former paper the DM’s state space is xed and coarseness manifests via multiple priors.
In this paper, the “coarse state space” (partition) varies with the action and the DM has a
single belief.
The work of Mukerji (1997), Ghirardato (2001), and Epstein et al. (2007) begs the ques-
tion: Can ambiguity aversion be behaviorally distinguished from coarse contingencies?
In dynamic settings, Kochov (2018) and Minardi and Savochkin (2017) provide models
that distinguish between coarse contingencies and ambiguity. Minardi and Savochkin
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(2017) consider ex ante and conditional choice and identify the DM’s coarse state space
using violations of Dynamic Consistency. We discuss the identication in Kochov (2018)
in Section 2.4.5.
The fact that coarseness arises in our framework due to limited understanding of acts
allows us to distinguish ambiguity aversion from coarse contingencies using only static
choice between acts. We are able to do so because limited understanding of acts natu-
rally leads to multiple “coarse state spaces” (i.e. partitions), which relaxes the common
assumption that the DM’s coarse state space is independent of the act she is considering.4
To see how we dierentiate coarseness from ambiguity aversion, recall that ambiguity
aversion is typically identied with a preference for hedging, or smoothing out payos
across states.5 Now, return to the health insurance example above, and consider a third
policy h = (100, 0, 100, 0); i.e. h charges $100 for r1 and fully covers s1, s2, and r2. Notice
that h is P-measurable, so the DM fully understands h given our hypothesis. Suppose
the DM is indierent between h and д, which is also perfectly understood since it is Q-
measurable. Suppose further that P andQ are the DM’s only understanding strategies. In
this case, notice that policy f , which smooths out the DM’s payments across states, is not
understood. As such, if the DM is averse to her limited understanding, she may strictly
prefer д or h to f , which violates the weak preference for hedging usually identied with
ambiguity aversion.
The key intuition in the previous example is that mixing two acts that are measurable
with respect to two dierent understanding strategies creates a more complicated act in
the sense that the mixture is measurable with respect to a ner partition. Since this ner
partition may not be a feasible understanding strategy, the DM may be unable to under-
stand the mixture and thus may disprefer it. This suggests that the distinction between
limited understanding and ambiguity aversion relies crucially on the multiplicity of the
4This is the case in Mukerji (1997), Ghirardato (2001), Epstein et al. (2007), Kochov (2018), and Minardi
and Savochkin (2017).
5See Section 2.4.3 for a formal denition of uncertainty aversion.
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DM’s partitions, which is a key feature of our model. If the DM only has a single under-
standing strategy, every act is understood using this partition, and mixing two indierent
acts weakly improves them, as it makes them closer to constant on each cell of the DM’s
understanding strategy. In this sense, limited understanding of acts manifests itself as
ambiguity when the DM has a single understanding strategy, even though the DM has a
single belief. We explore this idea formally in Section 2.4.3.
Two nal notes on related literature: First, while Ahn and Ergin (2010) are concerned
with framing and not limited understanding, there are some connections between this
paper and their paper on framing, which we discuss in Section 2.4.6. Second, Gul, Pe-
sendorfer, and Strzalecki (2017) study a general equilibrium model where consumers are
restricted to choose consumption plans that are measurable with respect to a partition in
some exogenously specied set. Our paper can be understood as providing foundations
for a model of such consumers and showing how to identify which partitions are actually
feasible for consumers (i.e. endogenizing the set of partitions).
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2.2, we state our primitives and formally
dene the representation. Section 2.3 presents the axiomatic model. Our main results
are in Section 2.4, including further discussion about the relationship between limited
understanding and ambiguity, as well as more formal comparisons to the literature.
2.2 Setup & Model
In this section we describe the choice environment and formally present the utility rep-
resentation we intend to characterize.
2.2.1 Primitives
We use a version of the classic Anscombe and Aumann (1963) choice setting. Let S denote
a nonempty nite set of states of the world, and let Σ B 2S be the power set of all events—
subsets of S . Let X be the set of outcomes, which we assume to be a convex subset of a
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metrizable vector space. For example, this is the case if X is the set of simple probability
distributions over some prize set Z , as in the textbook presentation of the Anscombe and
Aumann (1963) model (Kreps, 1988).
An act is function from S to X . Let F B X S be the set of all acts, endowed with the
product topology.6 SinceX is convex, we dene mixtures inF pointwise: for any f ,д ∈ F
and α ∈ (0, 1), dene α f + (1 − α )д ∈ F as (α f + (1 − α )д) (s ) B α f (s ) + (1 − α )д(s ) for
every s ∈ S . For any event E ∈ Σ and acts f ,д ∈ F , we use f Eд to denote the act that
yields f (s ) if s ∈ E and д(s ) otherwise.
The primitive is the DM’s preference on F , a binary relation denoted %. We say that a
function V : F −→ R represents % if for every f ,д ∈ F , f % д ⇐⇒ V ( f ) ≥ V (д).
Two remarks are in order regarding the interpretation of the primitive. First, notice
that we are using the language of states, outcomes, and acts that is common and well
understood among economists. If the DM’s understanding of acts is limited, then there
are acts f that the DM does not view as the same function that the analyst does. However,
every act f corresponds to real world alternative that the DM may choose, even if she
understands it dierently than the analyst. In our introductory example, the insurance
plan f is not understood by the DM in the same way that the analyst understands it, but
the DM can choose that plan nonetheless. Indeed, a main objective of this paper is to elicit
how the DM understands actions using choice data.
Second, we assume throughout that the DM is standard aside from her limited ability
to understand acts. Since constant acts are trivial in the sense that they map every state
to the same outcome, we assume that the DM is standard when evaluating constant acts
in that her limited understanding does not aect her preferences over outcomes. This is
natural because no matter how the DM chooses to understand a constant act, for each
event she looks at there will only be one outcome and thus she will conclude that the act
6Since X is metrizable and S is nite, the product topology is equivalent to the topology induced by the
supnorm metric on F dened by d ( f ,д) = maxs ∈S dˆ ( f (s ),д(s )) where dˆ is a metric on X .
39
is constant. Equivalently, since the DM can see the set of outcomes associated with each
act, she knows that constant acts are constant because they only lead to one outcome.
2.2.2 Model
Before dening and discussing the model, we will introduce a bit more notation. A parti-
tion of S is a collection of nonempty, pairwise disjoint events in Σ whose union is equal
to S . Given partitions P andQ , we write P  Q to denote that P is (strictly) ner thanQ .7
Since partitions can be understood as functions from S to Σ, we write P (s ) to denote the
unique cell in P that contains s . Given a partition P , let σ (P ) denote the algebra generated
by P . In other words, σ (P ) is the collection of events that can be formed by taking unions
of events in P (with the empty set added in). Given a set of partitions P , let
E (P ) B
⋃
P∈P
σ (P )
denote the set of events that are in the algebra generated by some partition in P . Note
that in the absence of any further assumptions on P , E (P ) is in general not an algebra
itself, as it need not be closed under unions or intersections. The following denition will
be used in the formal denition of the representation below.
Definition 7. A set of partitions P is rich if for any P ,Q ∈ P , A ∈ σ (P ), and B ∈ σ (Q )
such that A ⊂ B, there exists R ∈ P such that B \A,A ∈ σ (R).
Loosely, a set of partitions P is rich if it is closed under a type of combination opera-
tion. To gain intuition, x P ,Q ∈ P . The join, or coarsest common renement, of P and
Q , denoted P ∨Q , is the set of all events E such that E = A∩ B for some A ∈ P and B ∈ Q .
If P were closed under the join operation, then for any P ,Q ∈ P , A ∈ σ (P ), and B ∈ σ (Q )
such that A ⊂ B, it follows that A,B \A ∈ σ (P ∨Q ); so P ∨Q plays the role of R in the def-
inition above. However, P ∨Q also consists of intersections of events in P andQ that may
7P  Q if for every E ∈ P , there exists E ′ ∈ Q such that E ⊆ E ′, and at least one of the set inclusions is
strict.
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not be nested. Requiring that P be rich instead of closed under the join operation relaxes
this second requirement, by allowing the partition R to be arbitrary on Bc . Following the
representation denition, we discuss richness in the context of the model.
Lastly, given a set of events A ⊆ Σ, say that a function pi : A −→ [0, 1] is normalized
if pi (S ) = 1 and pi (∅) = 0 whenever ∅, S ∈ A, additive if pi (A∪ B) = pi (A) + pi (B) for every
disjointA,B ∈ A such thatA∪B ∈ A, and strictly monotone ifA ⊂ B implies pi (A) < pi (B)
for every A,B ∈ A.8 We are now ready to introduce the model.
Definition 8. A preference % has a revealed understanding representation if there ex-
ists
• a continuous, mixture linear function u : X −→ R,
• a nonempty, rich set of partitions P ,
• and a normalized, additive, strictly monotone set function pi : E (P ) −→ [0, 1],
such that
V ( f ) = max
P∈P
∑
E∈P
pi (E) min
s∈E u ( f (s )) (2.1)
represents %.
We refer to the revealed understanding (RU) representation as a tuple 〈u,pi ,P〉. The
DM’s tastes and beliefs are represented by u and pi respectively, as in the standard model.
The set of partitions P captures the dierent ways in which the DM can understand ac-
tions.
The representation suggests that the DM coarsely understands actions, and simplies
them using a partition P ∈ P . More specically, given an act f and a partition P that
solves (2.1), for each E ∈ P , the DM knows that f could lead to any outcome in f (E).
The DM is aware that she is missing details regarding the mapping within each E, so she
proceeds cautiously by assigning the utility value mins∈E u ( f (s )) to each E ∈ P , i.e. she
8Throughout, we use ⊂ to denote a proper subset. When equality is permitted, ⊆ is used.
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is averse to her limited understanding. She then combines these utility values with her
beliefs {pi (E)}E∈P using an expected utility calculation. We oer two possible justications
for the DM’s extremely cautious attitude regarding her limited understanding. First, our
motivation primarily stems from situations in which the state space (and thus events in
these partitions) would be large relative to the sets of outcomes. Thus, we view the “min”
component as a parsimonious approximation to the DM minimizing over all the possible
functions mapping a large event E to a (relatively smaller) set of outcomes f (E). Second,
one could interpret it through an evolutionary lens. If the DM used alternative procedure,
self interested agents who are setting the DM’s menu (e.g. insurance companies) would
over time be able to extract large rents. Thus, over time one would expect the DM to
“learn” that the worst case outcome in each event is the most important consideration
when evaluating acts she coarsely understands.
The setP being possibly nonsingleton is the key feature of the model that is particular
to our interpretation of the DM as one who does not understand acts. As we argued in
Section 1.1, this is the distinguishing feature between a DM who does not understand acts
and a DM who does not understand the state space. In the latter case, one would expect
that if the DM could understand the contingencies in P and the contingencies in Q , then
the contingencies in P ∨ Q should also be understood. Iterating this reasoning would
result in a singleton P .9 However, the DM we are modeling understands the state space,
and the partitions are “tools” she uses to simplify or better understand acts. As such, it is
natural thatP is not closed under the join operation, since understanding an act’s possible
outcomes for each event in P∨Q is more demanding than doing so for P orQ individually.
In our introductory example, the DM understood policy f by thinking only about which
rehab she would need, and understood policy д by thinking only about which surgery she
would need. However, she may nonetheless be unable to understand policies for which
each surgery and rehab plan require distinct payments, since that would require a closer
9Without loss of generality, see Theorem 4.
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examination of the policy.
While one could imagine more exotic ways for the DM to “choose” a partition for each
act, the “max” operator is parsimonious and has two nice features. First, it interacts with
the cautious attitude within cells nicely; any solution to (2.1) will be as ne as possible.
More formally, if P ,Q ∈ P and P  Q , if Q solves (2.1), then so must P . This fact
also suggests an awareness regarding the DM’s limited understanding, as the DM tries
to understand the act to the best of her ability. A corollary of this fact is that the DM’s
limited understanding only causes her to depart from expected utility when acts cannot
be expressed in a way the agent can understand. More specically, if f is P-measurable
for some P ∈ P , then P is a solution to (2.1) and the utility of f is simply the expected
utility of f computed with pi .10 Thus, the DM’s limited understanding only aects her
evaluation of acts that are not P-measurable for all P ∈ P . As such, if P contains the
partition of all singletons {{s}s∈S }, then the DM is an expected utility agent.
We argued above that the DM may not be able to “combine” partitions, in the sense
that P may not be closed under the join operation. However, the representation requires
that P be rich, which we described above as a weaker requirement than P being closed
under the join operation. To see why this is a natural condition given our story, rst
recall that richness requires that if there exists P ,Q ∈ P , A ∈ σ (P ), and B ∈ σ (Q ) such
that A ⊂ B, then there exists R ∈ P such that A and B \A are in σ (R). Richness is natural
in this setting because we interpret the partitions in P as dierent ways that the DM can
understand acts. In particular, since B ∈ σ (Q ) and Q ∈ P , the DM can understand an act
f by considering the sets of outcomes f (B) and f (Bc ) (and similarly for A). Since A ⊂ B,
if the DM is understanding f by looking at f (B), the DM should be able to “focus” on A
within B, i.e. splitting f (B) into f (A) and f (B \A). This corresponds to the partition R in
the denition of richness. It is important to note that R may be very coarse on Bc , which
permits this “focusing” to be costly for the DM. This would not be possible if P were
10See Lemma 16 for a proof of this fact.
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closed under the join operation, which is why we impose only richness. In particular,
since A ⊂ B, it follows that Bc ⊂ Ac . So richness also requires that there exist R′ ∈ P such
that Bc ,Ac \Bc ∈ σ (R′), but does not imply that R = R′. In other words, the DM may face a
tradeo in choosing whether to focus on A within B or Bc within Ac . Moreover, requiring
that P be closed under the join operation would require that if A and B are as above but
not nested, then the DM is able to split them into A \B, B \A, and A∩B, i.e. there is some
R′′ ∈ P such that all three events are in σ (R′′). However, to perform this “split”, the DM
would need to look at A and B simultaneously, which she is only able to do if there exists
P ′ ∈ P such that A ∪ B ∈ σ (P ′). If this is true, then this type of focusing is implied by
richness. If it is not, then requiring that P be closed under the join operation supposes
the DM has more reasoning ability than she has revealed. Aside from richness, the set P
is arbitrary, but in applications there may be natural parametrizations, e.g. the set of all
partitions with k or fewer cells, where k ∈ N.11
Lastly, we note that while “inattention” typically refers to other things in the decision
theory literature, the RU representation could be interpreted as modeling a DM who is
attentive to acts’ outcomes on each state. In this interpretation, the partitions in P de-
scribe which parts of the state space the DM can pay closer attention to (and thus know
what the outcomes are on those events), and which tradeos the DM faces in allocating
her attention to dierent parts of acts’ outcomes.12 The “min” part of the representation
then corresponds to the DM’s caution toward her inattention (e.g. she wants to avoid low
payo surprises), while the “max” part corresponds to her wanting to distort the act as
little as possible. As we mentioned, this diers from the two types of inattention typically
studied: inattention to information (e.g. de Oliveira, Denti, Mihm, and Ozbek (2017); Ellis
11This parametrization is compatible with richness. For example, if |S | = 4, the set of all partitions with
k = 2 cells is P = {{{s1, s2} , {s3, s4}} ; {{s1, s3} , {s2, s4}} ; {{s1, s4} ; {s2, s3}}}, which is rich.
12Similarly, one could view acts as products with multiple attributes, and pi as the DM’s subjective weights
on the importance of each set of attributes. In this setting, the inattention interpretation of the model would
describe a DM who cannot pay attention to each attribute of a product, so instead maps the product into a
simpler one.
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(2018)) and inattention to items in the choice set (e.g. Masatlioglu, Nakajima, and Ozbay
(2012); Lleras, Masatlioglu, Nakajima, and Ozbay (2017)).
2.3 Axioms
In this section we present our behavioral model. The rst axiom collects some standard
behaviors common to many models of subjective uncertainty.
Axiom 5.
(i) (Weak Order) % is complete and transitive.
(ii) (Continuity) For every f ∈ F , the sets {д | д % f } and {д | f % д} are closed.
(iii) (Certainty Independence) For every f ,д ∈ F , x ∈ X , and α ∈ (0, 1),
f % д ⇐⇒ α f + (1 − α )x % αд + (1 − α )x .
Parts (i) and (ii) are standard. Part (i) requires that the preference is a weak order, so
the DM’s choices from menus of acts would satisfy the Weak Axiom of Revealed Prefer-
ence (WARP). We have hypothesized that the DM views each act in isolation when trying
to understand them because the process of understanding may depend on the acts’ pos-
sible outcomes. As such, the model naturally rules out any menu eects. This is another
feature of our model that distinguishes it from coarse understanding as it is tradition-
ally understood, as some models of coarse contingencies imply that the DM may violate
WARP. Indeed, the ex post (stochastic) choice from menus implied the model in Epstein
et al. (2007) may violate (the stochastic choice analog of) WARP because the ambiguity
implied by coarse contingencies in their model causes the DM’s beliefs to change with the
menu she is considering.13 We view part (ii) as a technical condition requiring that the
DM’s preference be continuous, so we will not discuss it at any length.
13WARP violations are not common to every model of coarse contingencies, e.g. Kochov (2018) and Mi-
nardi and Savochkin (2017) both model a DM whose preference is a weak order.
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Part (iii) requires that the DM satises Certainty Independence, due to Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989). This axiom requires that the DM’s preference between two acts is
unchanged if they are each mixed with a common outcome using the same mixing co-
ecient. The reason we nd this axiom appealing in this setting is that a DM who may
not understand acts will nonetheless be indierent to the timing of the resolution of un-
certainty when that uncertainty is regarding mixing with some common outcome. To see
this more formally, let α f ⊕ (1−α )x denote the mixture of f and x where the uncertainty
is resolved before the DM makes a choice, and similarly for αд ⊕ (1 − α )x . If f % д, then
it is natural to assume that α f ⊕ (1−α )x % αд ⊕ (1−α )x , in line with the usual intuition
regarding the Independence axiom (keeping in mind that this preference is hypothetical,
as these objects are not in our domain of preference). The key to the argument underlying
Certainty Independence is that the DM would be indierent between α f ⊕ (1 − α )x and
α f + (1−α )x , where the randomization occurs after the choice is made. To see why, rst
observe that in the former case, the DM will only concern herself with understanding
f because she perfectly understands the outcome x in the event that the randomization
results in x . Moreover, our ongoing interpretation of the model is that the DM perfectly
understands the set of outcomes that may arise following an action. As such, in the latter
case, the DM can see that every outcome of α f + (1 − α )x is a mixture between some
outcome in f (S ) and x , all with the same probability of receiving x . Thus, she will ignore
the probability 1−α event in which she receives x regardless of the state, and focus on the
rest of the act. In this case, she again will only concern herself with understanding f . As
such, we expect that she will have the same sets of outcomes in mind when considering
α f ⊕ (1 − α )x and α f + (1 − α )x , and thus be indierent between the two.
Notice that the argument above hinges crucially on x being state independent. If x
were replaced with some arbitrary acth ∈ F , then we would expect the DM to prefer early
resolution of uncertainty, since in this case the DM knows what action she is evaluating
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when determining what events to focus on. For this reason we do not assume that the
DM’s preference satises the usual Independence axiom. Lastly, notice that Certainty
Independence implies that the DM satises Independence on X , which is consistent with
our interpretation of the model in which the DM understands the pure outcomes part of
her environment perfectly.
We now move on to identifying the DM’s understanding strategies from choice. For
any partition P , let FP ⊆ F denote the set of acts that are P-measurable, i.e. f ∈ FP if
and only if f (s ) = f (s′) for all s, s′ ∈ E and E ∈ P . As above, the DM may violate the
Independence axiom when the acts being mixed are such that the DM is using dierent
understanding strategies when considering the acts in isolation. However, we would not
expect such violations if the DM is using the same understanding strategy. Additionally, if
a partition P is an understanding strategy, we have hypothesized that the DM will use this
strategy when evaluating P-measurable acts. Combining these two observations yields
our strategy for identifying understanding strategies: A partition P is an understanding
strategy if the DM’s preference satises the Independence axiom when it is restricted to
P-measurable acts. In other words, a partition P is an understanding strategy if the DM
does not depart from expected utility when choosing between acts that only require the
DM to understand P to evaluate. This is borne out in the following denition.14
Definition 9. A partition P is an understanding strategy if for all f ,д,h ∈ FP and
α ∈ (0, 1),
f % д ⇐⇒ α f + (1 − α )h % αд + (1 − α )h.
We use P% to denote the set of all understanding strategies identied from the prefer-
ence in this fashion. If P  Q and P is an understanding strategy, then Q must also be an
understanding strategy since FQ ⊆ FP . Notice that P% is nonempty because % satises
Independence on X by Certainty Independence, so the trivial partition {S } ∈ P%.
14See Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) for a related idea in an ambiguity setting.
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Applying the above intuition a second time, we can identify from choice which un-
derstanding strategy the DM is using when evaluating a given act. More formally, x any
f ∈ F . If the DM is using the understanding strategy P to evaluate f , then the DM’s pref-
erence between f and acts in FP should not depart from expected utility. In particular, if
д,h ∈ FP and f  д, then mixing f and д with h should not result in a preference reversal,
since the DM was using the understanding strategy P when evaluating each of the three
acts in isolation. To see why, rst notice that αд + (1−α )h is perfectly understood by the
DM for any α , since P ∈ P% and the mixture is P-measurable. If the DM is using P when
evaluating f , then the DM sees the set of outcomes { f (E)}E∈P . When f is mixed with h,
the DM would then see the set of outcomes are all of the form {α f (E) + (1 − α )h(E)}E∈P ,
where eachh(E) is a single outcome sinceh is P-measurable.15 As such, the usual intuition
suggests that the DM knows that the choice between the two mixtures is again a choice
between f and д. The following denition formalizes this intuition.
Definition 10. An act f ∈ F is understood using P ∈ P% if for all д,h ∈ FP and
α ∈ (0, 1),
f  д =⇒ α f + (1 − α )h  αд + (1 − α )h, (2.2)
and there is no Q ∈ P% with Q  P satisfying (2.2).
We letU (P ) ⊆ F denote the set of all acts for which P comes to mind. The requirement
that there is no Q  P that satises the denition is what makes the denition sharp,
for if P satises (2.2), then so does any R  P since FR ⊆ FP . Interpreting U as a
correspondence, let U−1( f ) denote the set of P ∈ P% such that f ∈ U (P ). We later show
(Lemma 10) that every act is understood using some P ∈ P%.
Noticeably absent from our analysis to this point is a statewise monotonicity condi-
tion, which would require that if f (s ) % д(s ) for all s ∈ S , then f % д. Since the DM
may not understand acts nely enough to notice statewise dominance, we refrain from
15We use the notation α f (E) + (1 − α )x to mean the set of outcomes {αy + (1 − α )x | y ∈ f (E)}.
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imposing this axiom on the DM’s preference. In this setting, the natural monotonicity
condition involves the sets of outcomes that the DM sees when evaluating a given act.
More specically, if д is understood using P and for every E ∈ P , some act f dominates д
in the sense that the worst outcome in f (E) is better than the best outcome in д(E), then
the DM should notice this dominance and weakly prefer f . To formalize this, given any
E ∈ Σ and f ∈ F , let bE
f
∈ f (E) be the outcome such that bE
f
% f (s ) for all s ∈ E. Dene
wE
f
∈ f (E) analogously with the reverse preference.
Axiom 6 (Understanding Monotonicity). For every P ∈ P%, д ∈ U (P ), and f ∈ F , if
wE
f
% bEд for every E ∈ P , then f % д.
As described above, the axiom requires that if д is understood using P , and f domi-
nates д in the strong sense that wE
f
% bEд for every E ∈ P , then f is preferred to д. This
generalizes the standard statewise monotonicity condition, for in the standard model ev-
ery act is understood using the singletons partition, so setwise dominance in the axiom
above becomes statewise dominance.
The above axiom imposes a weak form of monotonicity on the DM’s preference given
the way the DM is understanding acts. The following axiom describes when the DM
should satisfy a stronger form of monotonicity. We discuss it following the statement.
Recall that E (P%) = ⋃P∈P% σ (P ) is the set of events that the DM is able to use when
understanding acts, though not necessarily at the same time.
Axiom 7 (Contingent Monotonicity). For any A,B ∈ E (P%) such that A ⊆ B, any
f ∈ F{A,B\A,Bc }, s ∈ B, and x ∈ X ,
f (s )  x =⇒ f  x {s} f .
To interpret the axiom, x any A,B ∈ E (P%) such that A ⊆ B. Recall that this means
that for any act f , the DM is able to think of f in terms of its outcomes on B and Bc .
Further, suppose that f ∈ F{A,B\A,Bc }, as in the axiom. This means that f yields three (or
fewer) outcomes—one onA, one on B\A, and one on Bc . Since the DM is able to split f into
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f (B) and f (Bc ) and the latter is a single outcome, the DM’s limited understanding only
aects her understanding of f (B), where she sees the two outcomes f (A) and f (B \ A).
The axiom requires that if a strictly worse outcome is added to either f (A) or f (B \ A),
the DM strictly disprefers this change. We view this is a natural requirement of the DM
we are modeling because A ∈ E (P%). In other words, the DM has already revealed her
ability to focus on A when understanding acts, so she is able to see that f (A) is distinct
from f (B \ A). Thus, she “notices” when a strictly worse outcome is added to either set,
resulting in a strictly worse act. Notice that while the axiom alludes to the individual state
s ∈ B, the reasoning just given does not rely on the DM focusing on s itself. Since f is
constant on A and B \ A, the DM notices the set of outcomes f (A) or f (B \ A) is worse
without knowing exactly which state is worse since previously the set was a singleton.
The nal axiom concerns the DM’s attitude toward her limited understanding. We will
focus on the case where the DM is averse to her limited understanding, since that seems to
be the more plausible attitude.16 To see what behavior reveals the DM’s attitude toward
her limited understanding, recall that if the DM is using the understanding strategy P
when evaluating the act f , then for each E ∈ P the DM sees the set of outcomes f (E)
and nothing else. If f (E) is a singleton, then the DM’s limited understanding of that part
of f is irrelevant, as she perfectly understands that she will receive f (E) if any s ∈ E is
realized. As such, we would expect a DM who dislikes her limited understanding to prefer
the situation when f (E) is a singleton. Now, suppose that we observe the preference
f  xE f .
This reveals that although xE f is simpler than f , the outcome x is not attractive enough
to compensate the DM for her limited understanding of f (E). If the DM is averse to her
16Additionally, the literature on ambiguity, especially in applications, has focused on aversion, and sim-
ilarly in the coarse contingencies literature. For example, Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998) discuss
notions of “unforeseen contingency aversion”.
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limited understanding, we would then expect that making xE f more complex does not
result in a preference reversal; i.e.
f  xAf
for any A ⊆ E. The following axiom is slightly weaker than what was just alluded to; we
revisit this point following Theorem 3 below.
Axiom 8 (Aversion to Limited Understanding). For all P ∈ P%, f ∈ U (P ), x ∈ X ,
and E ∈ P , if f  xE f and f  xE′ f for every nonsingleton E′ ∈ Q ∈ U−1( f ) such that
E ∩ E′ , ∅, then
f  xAf
for any A ⊆ E.
The axiom formalizes the intuition given above. It is weaker in that it requires not
only that f  xE f for E ∈ P ∈ U−1( f ), but also that f  xE′ f for any E′ that intersects
with E. In other words, it requires not only that x not be enough to compensate the DM
for her limited understanding of f (E), it must also not be sucient to compensate the DM
for her limited understanding of f (E′), where E′ overlaps with E. In this case, the axiom
requires that the DM’s preference does not reverse when xAf is made more complicated
by “mixing” x with f (E). When U−1( f ) is a singleton, this additional requirement has no
bite and the axiom is precisely the condition described above.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Representation
This section contains our main results. The rst subsection presents results that charac-
terize the RU representation using Axioms 5-8, as well as uniqueness results. All proofs
are in Section A.1.
Theorem 3. The preference % satises Axioms 5-8 if and only if it admits a RU represen-
tation.
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The proof of this result follows three main steps. First, we observe that Understanding
Monotonicity implies that for any P ∈ P% and f ,д ∈ FP such that f (E) % д(E) for all
E ∈ P , f % д. Since the preference satises Independence on FP by assumption, we can
invoke the Anscombe and Aumann (1963) SEU theorem to show that the restriction of %
to each FP has a SEU representation whenever P ∈ P%. Thus, for each P ∈ P%, there is a
probability piP dened on (S,σ (P )) such that VP ( f ) =
∑
E∈P piP (E)u ( f (E)) represents the
preference on each FP .
Second, we show that Aversion to Limited Understanding implies that for every f ∈ F ,
there exists P ∈ P% such that f ∼ wPf , where wPf B
(
wE
f
,E
)
E∈P . Thus, it follows that
for every f ∈ F , V ( f ) = ∑E∈P piP (E) mins∈E u ( f (s )) represents %, where P is such that
f ∈ U (P ). Moreover, for any Q ∈ P%, Understanding Monotonicity implies that f % wQf ,
so we can rewrite V as V ( f ) = maxP∈P%
∑
E∈P piP (E) mins∈E u ( f (s )).
Notice that only Axioms 5, 6, and 8 were used to this point. The nal step is showing
that the collection of probabilities {piP }P∈P% can be patched together to form pi . This is
where Contingent Monotonicity comes in. This step is slightly more subtle because it
may not be the case that there exists a well dened pi . More specically, the diculty
in this is that there may be disjoint events E1, . . . ,En such that Ei ∈ Pi for some Pi ∈
P%, while E = ⋃ni=1 Ei ∈ P for some P ∈ P%. In general, it need not be the case that
piP (E) =
∑n
i=1 piPi (Ei ), which leaves indeterminacy in dening pi . To overcome this, we
show that Contingent Monotonicity and Aversion to Limited Understanding imply that
P% is rich. To see how richness allows us to overcome the problem, suppose that i = 2.
In this case, notice that since E1 ∈ P1 ∈ P% and E = E1 ∪ E2 ∈ P ∈ P% by assumption,
richness implies that there must exist Q ∈ P% such that E1,E2 ∈ σ (Q ). Moreover, since
E1 ∈ σ (P1) ∩ σ (Q ) and VP1 and VQ represent restrictions of the same preference, we must
have piP1 (E1) = piQ (E1), and similarly piP2 (E2) = piQ (E2). Thus, since piQ is additive, it
follows that piP1 (E1) + piP2 (E2) = piQ (E), so there is no longer indeterminacy in dening pi .
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For i > 2, we can use induction on the size of i (it must be nite since S is nite).
Two remarks before we proceed. First, absent other assumptions, it can be demon-
strated by example that there may not exist a probability on S that extends pi . To the
extent that this calls into question the separation between ambiguity and coarse under-
standing of acts, one way of ensuring such an extension exists is to assume that the par-
tition {{s} , {S \ s}} ∈ P for every s ∈ S . This is true if and only if x  y implies x {s}y  y
for every x ,y ∈ X . Adding these additional assumptions ensure not only that an extension
exists, but that it is unique. All the results that follow also hold in this case.
Second, a remark about necessity. Consider the stronger version of Aversion to Lim-
ited Understanding that we described prior to the statement of the axiom. We show in
Section B.2 that f ∈ U (P ) if and only if P solves (2.1) and there is no R  P that also
does so. If P is the unique (minimal) solution and f  xE f , then wE
f
 x , so replacing
f (A) with x yields a strictly worse act if the new act is understood using P . In this case,
the stronger version of the axiom is satised. However, if both P and Q solve (2.1), and
s ∈ E ∈ P is such that f (s )  x % wQ (s )
f
for all s ∈ A, then replacing f (A) with x does
not change the utility of f given the understanding strategy Q , so f ∼ xAf . The weaker
version that we use rules out this possibility by ensuring that wQ (s )
f
 x . The stronger
version of the axiom is generically necessary under a joint nonredundancy condition on
pi and P .
We now move on to discussing the uniqueness properties of the representation. We
say that a RU representation 〈u,pi ,P〉 is nontrivial ifu is nonconstant. Given two functions
u,u′ : X −→ R, we write u ≈ u′ if there exist α > 0 and β ∈ R such that u = αu′ + β . The
following denes a similar equivalence on the space of sets of partitions.
Definition 11. If P and Q are two collections of partitions, we write P ≈ Q if
(i) P = Q,
(ii) or for every P ∈ P \Q and Q ∈ Q \ P , there exists P ′,Q′ ∈ P ∩Q such that P ′  P
and Q′  Q .
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In other words, P ≈ Q if P = Q or if P and Q dier only by adding coarsenings
of partitions common to both, i.e. their “minimal” sets are equal. Recall that E (P ) =⋃
P∈P σ (P ), so P ≈ Q implies that E (P ) = E (Q). The following result shows that the
parameters of the RU representation are essentially unique.
Theorem 4. Suppose 〈u,pi ,P〉 and 〈u′,pi ′,P′〉 are two nontrivial RU representations of the
same preference. Then P ≈ P′, u ≈ u′, and pi = pi ′.
Let V and V ′ denote the functionals corresponding to the two RU representations in
the statement of the theorem. Uniqueness ofu is standard. The key idea for the rest of the
uniqueness result is thatP is unique regardless of what pi is. More specically, notice that
% satises Independence onFP for every P ∈ P , regardless of pi . If there existsQ ∈ P \P′
and Q is not a coarsening of a partition common to both, then we can show that V ′ must
exhibit an Independence violation on FQ , regardless of what pi ′ is. This contradicts the
fact that % satises Independence on FP for all P ∈ P . Once we have established that
P ≈ P′ independently of pi and pi ′, uniqueness of pi on E (P ) follows from the fact that
each piP is unique, and the extension to E (P ) leaves no further indeterminacy.
For the remainder of this section, we assume that the utility function u in any RU
representation is nonconstant so we can work with essentially unique RU representations.
2.4.2 Comparing Understanding
Our framework allows us to behaviorally compare dierent DMs who have a limited un-
derstanding of acts. Thus, let %1 and %2 denote two preference relations over F corre-
sponding to two dierent DMs. The following is a choice based way of identifying which
DM has a ner understanding of acts.
Definition 12. %1 understands more than %2 if for every P ∈ P%2 , f ∈ F , and д ∈ FP ,
f %2 д =⇒ f %1 д.
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The denition parallels comparative denitions of risk and ambiguity aversion.17 DM2’s
understanding strategies can be identied from %2 following Denition 9. Recall that if
P ∈ P%2 , then our hypothesis is that P-measurable acts are perfectly understood in the
same way that constant acts are “ambiguity free” when dening comparative ambiguity
aversion (e.g. in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002)). As such, the denition says that DM1
understands more than DM2 if whenever DM2 prefers an act f to a perfectly understood
act д, so does DM1. The following result characterizes DM1 understanding more than
DM2 in terms of the parameters of the RU representation.
Proposition 5. Suppose %1 and %2 admit RU representations 〈u1,pi1,P1〉 and 〈u2,pi2,P2〉.
Then the following are equivalent:
(i) %1 understands more than %2.
(ii) P2 ⊆ P1, pi1(E) = pi2(E) for all E ∈ E (P2), and u1 ≈ u2.
The result shows that if DM1 understands more than DM2, then intuitively her set
of understanding strategies P1 is a superset of P2. The denition also implies that the
two DMs have the same risk preferences and beliefs on E (P2).18 Importantly, the part of
the above result concerning the DMs’ understanding does not rely on the DMs’ attitude
toward their coarseness. More specically, for any pair of preferences %1,%2 that satisfy
Axiom 5, if we elicit P%1 and P%2 as in Denition 9, then %1 understands more than %2
if and only if u1 ≈ u2 (where each ui represents the restriction of %i to X and exists by
Axiom 5) and P%2 ⊆ P%1 .
2.4.3 Ambiguity
In the Introduction, we argued that the distinguishing feature of a DM who may not
understand acts is P being nonsingleton. Otherwise, the DM is indistinguishable from an
17See Epstein (1999), Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), and the references therein.
18If one makes the assumption ensuring that pi1 and pi2 admit unique extensions to probability measures,
then the result would read that pi1 = pi2.
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ambiguity averse DM. In this section, we argue this point more formally by showing that
given Axioms 5-8, ambiguity aversion is equivalent to P being a singleton (without loss
of generality). Moreover, we show that in this case the model lies in the intersection of
two of the most commonly used models of ambiguity aversion, maxmin expected utility
(Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) and Choquet expected utility (Schmeidler, 1989).
We begin with some additional notation and denitions. Fix an RU representation
〈u,pi ,P〉. Unless P = {S }, then P is not a singleton since if P ∈ P , then every partition Q
such that P  Q is also in P . However, given the uniqueness result in Theorem 2, P may
be taken to be a singleton if there exists a partition P ∈ P such that P  Q for all Q ∈ P .
If such a partition P exists, it is easy to see that P must be the coarsest common renement
of everyQ ∈ P . Thus, given a set of partitions P , deneΩ (P ) to be the coarsest common
renement of all partitions in P . Notice that if Ω (P ) ∈ P , then Ω (P ) ≈ P , so 〈u,pi ,P〉
and 〈u,pi ,Ω (P )〉 represent the same preference. Therefore every act is understood using
the same partition Ω (P ).
Next, recall the following behavioral denition of ambiguity aversion from Schmeidler
(1989) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
Definition 13. A preference% isuncertainty averse if for every f ,д ∈ F andα ∈ (0, 1),
f ∼ д =⇒ α f + (1 − α )д % д.
The following result shows that within the RU model, uncertainty aversion is equiv-
alent to the DM understanding every act using the same strategy.
Proposition 6. Suppose % has an RU representation 〈u,pi ,P〉. Then Ω (P ) ∈ P if and
only if % is uncertainty averse.
The result above shows that when the DM uses the same understanding strategy when
evaluating every act, it is as if the DM views her limited understanding as generating am-
biguity. Indeed, the following is a trivial corollary of the above result. Say that a pref-
erence is MMEU (maxmin expected utility, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)) if there exists
56
〈u,M〉, where u : X −→ R is a utility function and M ⊆ ∆(S ) is a closed, convex set of
probabilities on S such that
VMMEU( f ) = min
µ∈M
∫
u ( f (s )) dµ (s )
represents %.19 Let co (·) denote the closed convex hull operator.
Corollary 2. Suppose % has an RU representation 〈u,pi ,P〉 and Ω (P ) ∈ P . Then %
admits a MMEU representation 〈u,M〉 where
M = co ({µ ∈ ∆(S )  ∀E ∈ Ω (P ), µ (E) = pi (E) = µ (s ) for some s ∈ E}) .
The additional structure from the RU representation allows us to characterize the set
M beyond the closedness and convexity that comes from the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
representation. In this special case, the set M is the set of probability measures µ that
agree with pi on each E ∈ Ω (P ) and whose conditionals µE are degenerate on some s ∈ E.
Interestingly, if Ω (P ) ∈ P , the RU model falls into another class of ambiguity models,
the Choquet expected utility model (CEU, Schmeidler (1989)). A capacity is a normalized,
monotone function ν : Σ −→ [0, 1]. A preference % is CEU if there exists a pair 〈u,ν〉,
where u is a utility function as above and ν is a capacity, such that
VCEU( f ) =
∫
u ( f ) dν
represents % (the integration here is the Choquet integral; see Schmeidler (1989) for de-
tails).
Proposition 7. Suppose % has an RU representation 〈u,pi ,P〉 and Ω (P ) ∈ P . Then there
exists a unique capacity ν such that the CEU representation 〈u,ν〉 represents %, where
ν (E) = max
A∈σ (Ω (P )):A⊆E
pi (A)
for every E ∈ Σ.
19Since S is nite, endow ∆(S ) with Euclidean distance.
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Again, the additional structure brought by the RU model allows us to characterize the
capacity ν in terms of the key parameters of the RU model pi and P . The capacity ν agrees
with pi on its domain, which in this case is σ (Ω (P )). For E ∈ Σ \ σ (Ω (P )), ν (E) is an
“inner approximation” using the DM’s belief pi .
A natural question that follows given the proposed connection between ambiguity
and limited understanding of acts is exactly what events the DM perceives as ambiguous.
If the DM indeed reduces her limited understanding to ambiguity when there is a single
understanding strategy, then the events in this partition Ω (P ) should be unambiguous to
the DM. To address this question, recall the following denition of unambiguous events
from Epstein and Zhang (2001).
Definition 14. An event E ∈ Σ is unambiguous if for every f ∈ F , x ,y, z, z′ ∈ X , and
disjoint events A,B ⊆ Ec ,

z E
x A
y B
f Ec \ [A ∪ B]
 %

z E
y A
x B
f Ec \ [A ∪ B]
 =⇒

z′ E
x A
y B
f Ec \ [A ∪ B]
 %

z′ E
y A
x B
f Ec \ [A ∪ B]
 ,
and the above holds when E is replaced with Ec .
The following proposition shows that unambiguous events (as dened above) are ex-
actly those that are in the algebra generated by Ω (P ).
Proposition 8. Suppose % has an RU representation 〈u,pi ,P〉 and Ω (P ) ∈ P . Then E ∈
σ (Ω (P )) if and only if E is unambiguous.
At an intuitive level, when the DM’s preference admits an RU representation 〈u,pi ,P〉
and Ω (P ) ∈ P , the DM’s preference satises a type of separability with respect to the
events in Ω (P ), akin to the Sure Thing Principle (Savage, 1954, P2). This type of sepa-
rability is exactly what Epstein and Zhang (2001) were focused on in their denition of
unambiguous events.
In the special case of the model where Ω (P ) ∈ P , we can revisit our comparative
denition of coarse understanding. A corollary of Proposition 3 is the following.
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Corollary 3. Suppose %1 and %2 admit RU representations 〈u1,pi1,P1〉 and 〈u2,pi2,P2〉
with Ω (Pi ) ∈ Pi for i = 1, 2. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) %1 understands more than %2.
(ii) Ω (P1)  Ω (P2), pi1(E) = pi2(E) for all E ∈ Ω (P2), and u1 ≈ u2.
The result says that when two DMs’ preferences have RU representations and each
have a single understanding strategy, if DM1 understands more than DM2 as in Deni-
tion 12, then DM1’s strategy is ner than DM2’s. In other words, DM1 can “read” more
closely than DM2. In this case, another implication is that DM1 is less ambiguity averse
in the sense the set of measures M1 in the MMEU representation of DM1’s preference
is a subset of M2. As such, our behavioral denition of “understands more” becomes a
denition for “more ambiguity averse” when the DMs each only have one understanding
strategy.
2.4.4 Dynamic Consistency
A natural question that follows our analysis is how a DM who does not understand acts
plans for the future and reacts to learning new information. While characterizing a dy-
namic model is beyond our scope, in this section we present a natural extension of the RU
model to accommodate ex ante and ex post choice. Throughout this section, we consider a
pair of preferences (%,%A) over F , where A ⊂ S . The interpretation is that %A represents
the DM’s choices after being told that the event A occurred. We assume that the DM is
directly told that the event A occurred, so that hearing this information would enable her
to focus on A if she was not able to before.20 In other words, even if A is too ne for the
DM to focus on according to her ex ante preference %, we assume that each partition ex
post is a partition of A.
20This echoes the intuition in Ahn and Ergin (2010), where explicit descriptions of the eventA ensure the
DM is aware of A.
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Before presenting the model, we need some additional notation. First, if Q is a set of
partitions of S and Q is any other partition of S , let Q ∨ Q B {Q′ ∨Q | Q′ ∈ Q} denote
the set of partitions obtained by taking the coarsest common renement of Q with each
Q′ ∈ Q. Second, if E ∈ Σ and Q is a set of partitions such that E ∈ σ (Q ) for all Q ∈ Q, let
Q|E denote the set of partitions obtained by truncating each Q ∈ Q at E; i.e.Q|E is the set
of partitions of E such that for every Q ∈ Q|E , there exists Q′ ∈ Q such that Q ⊆ Q′ and
if B ∈ Q′ \Q , then B ⊆ Ec . We can now state the model.
Definition 15. A pair of preferences (%,%A) has a dynamic revealed understanding
representation if % admits a revealed understanding representation 〈u,pi ,P〉 and %A admits
a revealed understanding representation 〈u,piA,PA〉, where PA = [P ∨ {A,Ac }] |A and piA :
E (PA) −→ [0, 1] is a normalized, additive, strictly monotone function satisfying
piA(E) =
pi (A ∩ E)
maxB∈E (P ):B⊆A pi (B)
for any E ∈ E (PA) such that A ∩ E ∈ E (P ).
When A is xed, we can compactly summarize the dynamic revealed understanding
(DRU) model using the tuple 〈u,pi ,piA,P〉. One can see the key modeling assumptions
brought forth in the DRU denition. The set of partitions is “updated” in the sense that
each partition ex post is the coarsest common renement of a partition ex ante with the
partition {A,Ac }. Moreover, the set of partitions PA are all partitions of A, so the DM
“believes” and understands her information that A occurred. Lastly, the posterior belief
piA is updated from the prior using a rule that reduces to Bayes rule whenever it is well
dened. If A < E (P ), then there are other natural choices for the denominator in the
denition of piA(E); however it will become clear that this will not matter for our purposes
in this subsection.
Recall the following denition that connects ex ante and ex post preferences in the
SEU model (see Ghirardato (2002)).
Definition 16. A pair of preference relations (%,%A) satises Dynamic Consistency if
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for every f ,д ∈ F ,
f Ah % дAh ⇐⇒ f %A д (2.3)
for some h ∈ F .
Loosely, dynamic consistency reveals that the DM’s ex post choices are guided by
what she planned to choose ex ante if confronted with the information that A occurred.
Intuitively, a DM who does not understand acts may violate Dynamic Consistency. The
main idea is that if the DM does not focus on the event A ex ante when evaluating f Ah or
дAh, then it is intuitive that learning A could lead to changes in her preferences, violating
dynamic consistency. The following result conrms this intuition—imposing dynamic
consistency in the DRU model requires the DM to always focus on the event A when
making choices ex ante.
Proposition 9. Suppose the pair of preferences (%,%A) admit a DRU representation given
by 〈u,pi ,P〉 and 〈u,piA,PA〉. If the pair of preferences also satisfy Dynamic Consistency, then
A ∈ σ (P ) for all P ∈ P .
The result says that if the DM’s preferences have a DRU representation and also satisfy
dynamic consistency, then the DM must be able to focus of the event A regardless of
what other parts of the acts she is focusing on. This result has far reaching implications
for how limited understanding interacts with dynamic consistency. To see this, suppose
that we instead took as primitive a collection of preferences {%A}A∈Σ and assumed each
pair (%,%A) admitted a DRU representation. Then if each pair (%,%A) satises dynamic
consistency, Proposition 9 implies that for everyA ∈ Σ,A ∈ σ (P ) for every P ∈ P . In other
words, we must have σ (P ) = Σ for every P ∈ P , so the DM must be SEU (and hence will
also be SEU ex post, where piA is the Bayesian update of pi ). Thus, if the DM is dynamically
consistent following any arrival of information, this rules out limited understanding.21
21A similar message appears in Minardi and Savochkin (2017) as well, where they argue that if the DM
satisies dynamic consistency following any arrival of information, then she must be SEU.
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However, some limited understanding can coexist with dynamic consistency if the DM is
only dynamically consistent with respect to the events she always focuses on.
One may wonder if the converse of this statement holds. It is easy to see that if P
is a singleton, then the converse of the result holds. However, the converse may fail in
general. The reason is that we may have acts f ,д,h ∈ F such that f Ah % дAh, but the
understanding strategies being used when evaluating f Ah and дAh dier on Ac , so the
ex ante preference may still fail to be separable on A. The converse would hold if every
P ,Q ∈ P agreed on A or Ac , or some combination of both.
2.4.5 Foresight
Intuitively, foresight relates to which events the DM plans for when making choices. At
an informal level, to plan for an event when choosing between acts requires focusing on
acts’ payos on that event. In this subsection we make this connection formal by consid-
ering a dierent dynamic extension of the model, which facilitates comparison with the
behavioral denition of foreseen events in Kochov (2018). In the main text, he considers
a preference over two period streams of state dependent outcomes, or equivalently pairs
of acts. The interpretation is that the DM makes a choice at time 0, the state is realized
at time 1, and the DM receives a state dependent outcome in time 1 and time 2. Pairs of
acts are elements of F2. To dierentiate generic elements of F2 from elements of F , we
use f, g, h, etc. to denote elements of F2, i.e. f = ( f1, f2), where f1, f2 ∈ F . Consider the
following dynamic extension of the RU model.
Definition 17. A preference %⊂ F2×F2 has an intertemporal revealed understand-
ing representation if there exists
• a continuous, mixture linear function u : X −→ R,
• a rich set of partitions P ,
• a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1),
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• and a normalized, additive, strictly monotone function pi : E (P ) −→ [0, 1],
such that
W (f) = max
P∈P
∑
E∈P
pi (E) min
s∈E u ( f1(s )) + δ maxP∈P
∑
E∈P
pi (E) min
s∈E u ( f2(s ))
represents %.
We can summarize the intertemporal revealed understanding (IRU) model using the
tuple of parameters 〈u,pi ,δ ,P〉. The model extends the RU model to intertemporal choice
by hypothesizing that the DM discounts the future and that the DM chooses an under-
standing strategy for each act in the stream. Notice that the IRU model is not a special
case of the representation in Kochov (2018), since it may violate his Coarse Recursivity
axiom.22
To introduce his denition of foreseen events, we need to introduce some preliminary
denitions. For any f ∈ F2, let f(s ) B ( f1(s ), f2(s )) ∈ X 2. If f, g ∈ F2 and E ∈ Σ, let
fEg = ( f1Eд1, f2Eд2). An act f is eectively certain if f(s ) ∼ f(s′) for all s, s′ ∈ S . An
eectively certain act f is subjectively certain if f ∼ f(s ) for some s ∈ S . An event A ∈ Σ
is foreseen if for every d,d′ ∈ X 2 such that dAd′ is eectively certain, dAd′ is subjectively
certain. The following result shows that within the IRU model, foreseen events are exactly
those in some P ∈ P ; i.e. an event that the DM is able to focus on when evaluating acts.
Proposition 10. Suppose the preference % admits an IRU representation 〈u,pi ,δ ,P〉. Then
an event A ∈ Σ is foreseen if and only if there exists P ∈ P such that A ∈ P .
This result also holds if we consider the alternative model where the partition varies
with the act but not with time, i.e. there is only a single “max” in the representation. Notice
that even in the case where P may be taken to be a singleton, the IRU model (and even
its counterpart with a single “max” term) allow unforeseen events given the proposed
denition.
22Coarse Recursivity requires that for any collection of minimal foreseen events (in terms of set inclusion)
A1, . . . ,An and acts f, g ∈ F2, if fAig % g for all i = 1, . . . ,n, then f
[
∪ni=1Ai
]
g % g.
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Proposition 10 suggests that the type of foresight captured by Kochov’s denition is
similar to the type of focus we consider. In particular, in his model, if A is foreseen, then
the DM’s preference between (streams of) acts that are bets on A conforms to discounted
subjective expected utility. Similarly, in our model, for any A ∈ P ∈ P , the DM’s prefer-
ence between acts that are bets onA conforms to subjective expected utility. However, the
set of events E (P ) and Kochov’s set of foreseen events dier in a signicant way. First,
notice that Kochov’s denition identies each foreseen event individually, and the axioms
he imposes on the preference imply that the DM can foresee any collection of foreseen
events simultaneously. For example, if A and B are disjoint foreseen events, Kochov’s ax-
ioms imply that the DM’s preference between {A,B, [A ∪ B]c }-measurable acts conforms
to discounted SEU. On the contrary, since we identify entire partitions (understanding
strategies) and not individual events, our model does not require this type of “combina-
tion” of coarse events. Returning to the previous example where A and B are disjoint
foreseen events (and hence each in some P ,Q ∈ P by Proposition 10), our model permits
the DM violate to Independence when choosing between {A,B, [A ∪ B]c }-measurable acts,
unlike in Kochov (2018). This makes sense in our setting because this is precisely the type
of bounded rationality our model intends to capture; the DM’s cognitive limitations may
preclude her from focusing onA and B simultaneously even though she can focus on them
separately.
2.4.6 Comparison with Ahn and Ergin (2010)
We conclude with a comparison with Ahn and Ergin (2010), which is facilitated by the
results from Section 2.4.3. They study a DM whose preferences over acts depend on the
way the act is described, or framed; these descriptions take the form of partitions of S . For
example, if P and Q are partitions of S and P  Q , they allow the DM’s preferences over
Q-measurable acts to depend on whether the state space was described using P orQ . Their
main motivation is explaining how a DM’s beliefs may depend on how acts are described,
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and they provide a behavioral notion of events that are “transparent”, or independent of
how acts are described. The authors argue that one could interpret transparent events as
those that are perfectly “foreseen” by the DM.
As discussed in the previous subsection, foresight of an event is related to which events
the DM has in mind when evaluating an act. In this subsection, we provide a formal
comparison of the “foreseen” events in Ahn and Ergin (2010) with the events that the
DM focuses on. Transparent events are not directly comparable with the events in the
partitions that we identify due to the dierent primitives considered. However, in the
special case of our model where Ω (P ) ∈ P , one could compare the algebra generated by
this partition with the collection of transparent events, which is also an algebra. This is
natural since their foreseen events are independent of the description and the act the DM
is evaluating.
Ahn and Ergin (2010) present a model with two parameters: a utility function u and
a support function λ : Σ −→ R+ such that ∑E∈P λ(E) > 0 for every partition P in some
exogenously specied set. Ahn and Ergin present a behavioral denition of “transparent”
events; let A denote the set of transparent events. In their Proposition 2, they show that
A has the following properties:
• A is an algebra,
• λ is additive on A,
• A = Σ if and only if λ is additive on Σ,
• and A ∈ A if and only if
λ(E) = λ(E ∩A) + λ(E ∩Ac )
for all E ∈ Σ.
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In the special case of the RU representation where Ω (P ) ∈ P , the natural object to com-
pareAwith isσ (Ω (P )), the set of events that are generated by the DM’s xed understand-
ing strategy (recall these events “are unambiguous” in the ambiguity interpretation). By
denition, σ (Ω (P )) is an algebra so it is similar to A in that respect. Similarly, pi is ad-
ditive on σ (Ω (P )) by denition (and hence so is ν given Proposition 7). The following
result shows that σ (Ω (P )) also shares the other two properties that A has.
Proposition 11. Suppose % has an RU representation 〈u,pi ,P〉 and Ω (P ) ∈ P . Let 〈u,ν〉
be the CEU representation obtained in Proposition 7. Then the following hold:
(i) A ∈ σ (Ω (P )) if and only if ν (E) = ν (E ∩A) + ν (E ∩Ac ) for all E ∈ Σ.
(ii) σ (Ω (P )) = Σ if and only if ν is additive.
In words, this means that the capacity ν obtained in Proposition 7 has many of the
same properties regarding σ (Ω (P )) as the support function in Ahn and Ergin (2010) and
moreover, their transparent events share properties with the events that the DM studied
here focuses on. This strengthens the connection between foresight and focus, suggest-
ing that the events for which their DM is able to form beliefs that are invariant to the
description of the state space are closely related to the events that our DM focuses on
when making a choice. Both ideas capture a sophistication on the part of the DM that the
models permit to fail.
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Chapter 3
Limited Understanding in Auction Design
3.1 Introduction
The theoretical mechanism design literature has oered numerous suggestions as to which
mechanisms should be used in various applied situations. A natural and longstanding
concern when using these mechanisms in practice is that the optimal mechanism is often
very complex.1 This concern spawned a large literature investigating if and when “sim-
ple” mechanisms arise endogenously when relaxing standard assumptions about com-
mon knowledge or agents’ beliefs (e.g. Chung and Ely (2007), Jehiel, Meyer-ter Vehn,
Moldovanu, and Zame (2006), and Heifetz and Neeman (2006)).
In this chapter, I take these concerns literally and study a mechanism design prob-
lem in which agents may imperfectly understand the mechanism. In contrast with the
papers cited above, I retain the common knowledge assumption and relax assumptions
on the agents’ preferences. In particular, I consider a canonical single unit private val-
ues auction, and model imperfect understanding of the auction using the representation
developed in Chapter 2. To see how the representation in Chapter 2 can be applied to
limited understanding of a mechanism in general, consider a standard mechanism design
problem. Each agent i = 1, . . . , I is of type θi ∈ Θi , which is private information. There is a
set of outcomesX , and for each type prole, the mechanism designer wants to implement
an outcome given by the social choice function f (θ1, . . . ,θI ).2 Agents have vNM utility
1Complex in an informal, intuitive sense. See Bergemann and Morris (2005) and the references therein
for more discussion.
2For illustration and because the main results concern auctions, I limit attention to social choice func-
67
functions ui dened on X . In any incentive compatible and individually rational direct
mechanism, agent i’s choice of which type to report is an act dened on the state space
Θ−i , i.e. the set of the other agents’ possible types (Savage, 1954; Anscombe and Aumann,
1963). Thus, imperfect understanding of the (direct) mechanism corresponds to imperfect
understanding of the act induced by a type report and social choice function. In this case,
I can endow agents with Revealed Understanding (RU) preferences as in Chapter 2, and
study the mechanism design problem when agents have RU preferences.
In addition to the papers on “robust” mechanism design cited above, this chapter is
also related to the literature on mechanism design with ambiguity averse agents due to
the connection between limited understanding and ambiguity aversion discussed in Sec-
tion 2.4.3. Closest to this chapter is Bose, Ozdenoren, and Pape (2006), who study auction
design when agents and the auction designer may be ambiguity averse. Their main result
is that when the bidders are more ambiguity averse than the auction designer, the opti-
mal auction is a “full insurance” auction, i.e. each bidder’s net utility is independent of the
other bids. In contrast, the optimal auction in this setting is “understood” in the sense of
Chapter 2, i.e. each bidder’s net utility—a function of the bid prole—is measurable with
respect to one of the bidder’s feasible partitions. I discuss the relationship between the
two results further in Section 3.2. Bodoh-Creed (2012) and Wolitzky (2016) study imple-
mentation when agents are ambiguity averse, and apply their results to canonical bilateral
trade models.
In Section 3.2, I formalize the auction design problem and state the main results. The
rst shows that an optimal auction exists in this setting, while the second pins down the
structure of the optimal auction. Section 3.3 closes the chapter with additional discussion.
tions instead of social choice correspondences.
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3.2 Model & Results
An auctioneer possesses a single, indivisible good for which she has 0 value. There are
two agents i = 1, 2.3 Their type θ is drawn independently from the common nite set
Θ ⊂ R+ with probability pi (θ ). A mechanism 〈x , t〉 B (x1,x2, t1, t2) consists of functions
xi : Θ×Θ −→ [0, 1], which determines the probability that agent i receives the item given
the two type reports (I use the convention that agent i’s report is the rst argument of
xi ).4 The probability functions satisfy x1(θ ,θ ′) + x2(θ ′,θ ) ≤ 1 for every θ ,θ ′ ∈ Θ. The
functions ti : Θ ×Θ −→ R determine the transfer to agent i given the pair of reports.
I assume the bidders have linear utility functions, so the net surplus to type θ of agent
i of reporting type θˆ when agent j reports type θ ′ is is θxi (θˆ ,θ ′) − ti (θˆ ,θ ′). Let qi (θ ,θ ′) B
θxi (θ ,θ
′) − ti (θ ,θ ′) denote the net surplus of bidder i when she reports truthfully and
bidder j bids θ ′.
As I discussed in Section 3.1, given a mechanism 〈x , t〉, an agent’s choice of report is
an act dened on the state space Θ. As such, limited understanding of the mechanism
corresponds to limited understanding of the act. As in Chapter 2, let Pi denote bidder i’s
set of partitions of Θ, which capture the ways in which agent i can understand a given
act. Thus, if bidder i is type θ , he chooses a report θˆ to maximize
max
P∈Pi
∑
E∈P
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
{
θx (θˆ ,θ ′) − t (θˆ ,θ ′)
}
.
Recall the interpretation of this utility representation: given a partition P ∈ Pi , the agent
understands that the sets of possible net payos are distinct for each E,E′ ∈ P , but within
each event E ∈ P , the agent does not understand how his payo depends on his opponent’s
type. I also point here that in the denition of a mechanism, we permitted the assignment
probability and transfer functions to be asymmetric. As we can see now, it would entail
3Our results hold for any nite number of agents, but I focus on the two agent case for notational
simplicity.
4The revelation principle holds in this setting.
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loss of generality to restrict attention to symmetric mechanisms, as dierent agents may
have dierent abilities to understand the mechanism and the auctioneer may wish to
exploit that.
I normalize each bidder’s reservation utility to 0. I assume the auctioneer wishes to
maximize expected revenue from the mechanism, given by
R (x , t ) B
∑
(θ ,θ ′)∈Θ2
pi (θ )pi (θ ′) (t1(θ ,θ ′) + t2(θ ′,θ )).
Thus, the seller’s optimization problem is as follows:
max
〈x ,t〉
R (x , t )
subject to: max
P∈Pi
∑
E∈P
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
{
θx (θˆ ,θ ′) − t (θˆ ,θ ′)
}
≥ 0 (IR)
θ ∈ argmax
θˆ
max
P∈Pi
∑
E∈P
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
{
θx (θˆ ,θ ′) − t (θˆ ,θ ′)
}
(IC)
The (IR) constraint is the standard ex ante individual rationality or participation constraint
adapted to this setting; it ensures both agents weakly prefer participating in the auction.
The (IC) constraint is the standard truth telling constraint; it ensures that both agents
weakly prefer reporting their type truthfully.
Our rst main result shows that the set of optimal mechanisms is nonempty; i.e. the
maximization problem above always has a solution.
Proposition 12. If only bounded transfer functions are feasible, then an optimal auction
exists.
The assumption of boundedness is not needed for the next result, but is needed for the
existence proposition above. This assumption is also used in an analogous result in Bose
et al. (2006) and is included in the denition of a transfer rule in Wolitzky (2016).
Before stating the main result, I need to introduce one more piece of terminology.
Definition 18. A mechanism 〈x , t〉 is understood if for every i and θ ∈ Θ, there exists
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Pi (θ ) ∈ Pi such that qi (θ ,θ ′) is a Pi (θ )-measurable function of θ ′.
The denition formally captures what it means for an auction to be (subjectively)
simple to the agents. If the mechanism is such that for both agents, truth telling (thought
of as an act onΘ) is measurable for some feasible partition, then the auction is understood.
This is the natural denition of understanding a mechanism given the way understanding
was discussed in Chapter 2.
The following is our main result; it characterizes the structure of the optimal auction
in this setting.
Theorem 5. Fix any incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism 〈x , t〉.
Then there exists an incentive compatible and individually rational simple mechanism 〈x′, t ′〉
such that R (x′, t ′) ≥ R (x , t ). Moreover, if 〈x , t〉 is not simple and pi has full support, then
R (x′, t ′) > R (x , t ).
The result shows that it is strictly optimal for the auctioneer to design the auction
such that it is understood by the bidders. This may seem counterintuitive, as one might
hypothesize that the optimal auction would take advantage of the bidders’ coarse under-
standing by designing a very complex auction. The full proof is in Section C.2, but we
outline the intuition here. The idea is simply that if the mechanism is not understood,
then there is a bidder i of type θ and an event E in the partition that she is using to under-
stand truth telling such that qi (θ ,θ ′) , qi (θ ,θ ′′). Since the bidder looks at the lower (net)
payo of these two, the auctioneer can increase the transfer in the higher payo state
without aecting the (IR) or (IC) constraints. The second part of the result shows that
this is strictly optimal for the auctioneer in many cases. Thus, the auctioneer does use the
bidders’ limited understanding to extract more rents, but not via designing a complicated
mechanism.
This result also provides another distinction between the ambiguity literature and
the revealed understanding model. Bose et al. (2006) prove a result analogous to Theo-
rem 5, namely that if bidders are ambiguity averse, then the optimal auction must fully
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insure them against ambiguity. Formally, this means that the optimal auction is such that
qi (θ ,θ
′) is a constant function of θ ′ for every agent i and type θ . Of course, full insurance
mechanisms are always understood, but the converse is not true in general. As such, an
implication of this result is that ambiguity averse agents will be treated dierently than
RU agents in mechanism design settings.
The nal result of this chapter sheds more light on the structure of simple mechanisms.
To motivate, recall that in Myerson (1981), any incentive compatible auction is such that
the probability of each bidder receiving the good is nondecreasing in their type θ . In this
setting, a “coarse” version of the Myerson result holds. A bit more notation facilitates the
statement of the result. Fix an understood mechanism 〈x , t〉. By denition, for each i and
θ , there exists Pi (θ ) ∈ Pi such that qi (θ ,θ ′) is a Pi (θ )-measurable function of θ ′. As such,
for each i and θ , let
Xi (θ ) B
∑
E∈Pi (θ )
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
xi (θ ,θ
′)
be the “coarse” expected probability that bidder i receives the good. Lemma 16 implies
that Pi (θ ) is the partition the bidder has in mind when choosing to report truthfully given
the mechanism 〈x , t〉 (we suppress the dependence on the mechanism for simplicity).
Proposition 13. Given any incentive compatible and understood mechanism 〈x , t〉, for
each i = 1, 2, Xi (θ ) is nondecreasing in θ .
Recall that for a xed bidder i , the partition used depends on the type θ . Thus, the
statement that Xi (θ ) is nondecreasing is that if θ ≥ θˆ , then
∑
E∈Pi (θ )
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
xi (θ ,θ
′) ≥
∑
E∈Pi (θˆ )
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
xi (θˆ ,θ
′).
This accounts for the possibility that Pi (θ ) , Pi (θˆ ). As I mentioned above, this is the
natural counterpart of the Myerson result when bidders only coarsely understand the
auction. Each bidder is using the partition Pi (θ ) to understand their expected utility from
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reporting truthfully. As such, Xi (θ ) is the coarse expected probability that they receive
the good, given how they “choose” to understand the auction.
3.3 Discussion
I conclude with two comments about the setup I have assumed throughout and how the
analysis might change if this were to be altered.
The rst observation is that the auction designer knows exactly what the set of par-
titions are for each agent, i.e. the auctioneer knows each Pi . This knowledge is vital in
constructing simple auctions, but may be dicult to obtain in practice. A natural alter-
ation of the model would then be to design a mechanism to include a report of both the
agent’s type and her set of partitions Pi . However, this is not particularly tractable. To
see why, notice that in this case the auction designer would need to have committed to a
mechanism that depends on the announced sets of partitions. Given our initial motivation,
there is no reason to assume that the bidders understand how this “larger” mechanism de-
pends on the announced type prole, which then suggests a new set of partitions to model
this larger limited understanding. Of course, then one might ask the auction designer to
elicit these larger partitions, which suggests an innite regress problem. The takeaway
here is that while it is natural to explicitly model how the auction designer learns the sets
of partitions, it is not clear how to incorporate that into the model.
Second, notice that each bidder’s set of partitions is assumed to be a partition of
their opponent’s (or set of opponents’) type space. This precludes bidder i not under-
standing how the auction treats dierent types of bidder i herself. For example, suppose
Θ = {θ1,θ2}. In this case, each bidder’s (minimal) set of partitions is either {{θ1,θ2}} or
{{θ1} ; {θ2}}. This implies that each type θ of bidder i is either SEU or unable to distinguish
their net payo in given the proles (θ ,θ1) and (θ ,θ2). Even in the latter case, the model
does not permit the bidder to misunderstand the net payo given the proles (θ ,θ1) and
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(θ ′,θ1), which is an equally plausible way to misunderstand the auction. To model this
additional type of limited understanding, one would need to model the sets of partitions
Pi as partitions of Θ × Θ, rather than partitions of only Θ. However, absent any addi-
tional structure on these partitions the model is not particularly tractable, so we eschew
this additional form of coarse understanding for the time being and leave it for additional
research.
74
Appendix A
Appendices to Bayesian Optimism
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We present the proof in a series of steps, where each step is a subsection. Within each sub-
section, we will use lemmas to prove formal results. We begin with suciency, necessity
is discussed in the nal subsection.
A.1.1 Preliminary Steps
Since Axiom 1 implies that the ex ante preference % satises the Anscombe and Aumann
(1963) axioms, there exists a vNM utility function u : X −→ R and a unique probability
measure pi on the measurable space (S,Σ) such that VS ( f ) =
∫
u ( f ) dpi represents %.
Moreover, Strong Monotonicity implies that pi has full support and Continuity implies
that u is continuous.
The following short lemma shows that u dened above represents the restriction of
%A to X .
Lemma 1. Suppose (%,%A) satises Axiom 1. Then (%,%A) satises Loery Invariance:
for all x ,y ∈ X , x % y if and only if x %A y.
Proof. First, suppose that x % y. Then by Strong Monotonicity, x %A y. Conversely,
suppose that x %A y, and per contra that y  x . Then again Strong Monotonicity implies
that y A x , a contradiction. 
Recall that we have used w,b ∈ X to denote the %-minimal and maximal elements of
X , respectively. Let
Fint B { f ∈ F  b  f (s )  w ∀s ∈ S }
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denote the “interior" ofF . Since Theorem 1 holds trivially ifu is constant, for the remain-
der of the proof we assume that there exist x ,y ∈ X such that u (x ) > u (y). Of course, this
implies that Fint is nonempty, since b % x  αx + (1 − α )y  y % w for any α ∈ (0, 1), so
αx + (1 − α )y ∈ Fint.
Consider the following weakening of Independence, which we will call Convexity. It
is the analog of uncertainty aversion from Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
Axiom 9 (Convexity). For every f ,д ∈ F , and α ∈ [0, 1],
f ∼A д =⇒ f %A α f + (1 − α )д.
We next show that this condition is implied by Axioms 1-3.
Lemma 2. Suppose that (%,%A) satises Axioms 1-3. Then %A is convex.
Proof. Take any f ∈ Fint. First we show that a relevant event always exists. Let f B
mins∈S u ( f (s )). Then by Strong Monotonicity, f % f  w . Now, suppose that there is no
relevant event for f . In other words, either f  f Ew for every E ⊆ S , or for every E such
that f ∼ f Ew , there exists E′ ⊂ E such that f ∼ f E′w . Since f = f Sw , we cannot have
the rst. So we must have the second. Applying the second condition iteratively, we have
that f ∼ f ∅w = w , a contradiction.
Now, suppose per contra that there exists f ,д ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1) such that f ∼A д but
α f + (1 − α )д A f (i.e. %A is not convex). Moreover, assume that f ,д ∈ Fint and hence
α f + (1 − α )д ∈ Fint.1 Let E denote any relevant event for α f + (1 − α )д given A, which
exists by the previous argument. Without loss of generality, suppose that f Eh % дEh.
Since % is SEU, this implies that f Eh % [α f + (1 − α )д]Eh % дEh for every α ∈ (0, 1).
Then Optimistic DC implies that f %A α f + (1 − α )д, a contradiction. 
Given the above result, notice that %A satises the GS axioms (of course, with Convex-
ity replacing uncertainty aversion). As such, there exists a closed,2 convex set QA ⊂ ∆(S )
1If either f or д is not interior, we can mix all three acts with some x ∈ X such that b  x  w and
preserve all the rankings above. Such an x ∈ X exists by the discussion following the denition of interior.
2Since S is nite, endow ∆(S ) with the topology induced by Euclidean distance.
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and a continuous and mixture linear function uA : X −→ R such that for every f ∈ F ,
UA( f ) = max
µ∈QA
∫
uA( f ) dµ . (A.1)
Moreover, by Lemma 1, uA = u.
For convenience, we will dene the “argmax" correspondence corresponding to (A.1)
as follows. Let
φA( f ) B argmax
µ∈QA
∫
u ( f ) dµ .
Now, let
B B {µ ∈ ∆(S )  µ = piE,E ∈ Σ \ ∅}
denote the set of probability measures on S that are Bayesian updates of pi . We will show
that UA = VA, where
VA( f ) = max
µ∈BA
∫
u ( f ) dµ
and BA B B ∩QA. There is then a trivial mapping into the Bayesian Optimism represen-
tation, as pi has full support, so there is a bijection between events and measures that are
Bayesian updates of pi .
Before proceeding, we dene one new term. Analogously to Denition 5, for any
f ∈ F , if µ f ∈ φA( f ), and there is no µ′f ∈ φA( f ) such that supp (µ′f ) ⊂ supp (µ f ), we say
that µ f is a minimal solution for f given A.
A.1.2 Relevant Events
Take any f ∈ Fint, xed throughout this subsection and the following subsection (Sec-
tion A.1.3). Then we know that there exists µ f ∈ φA( f ) since the solution set to (A.1)
is nonempty for every f ∈ F . Moreover, we can choose µ f to be a minimal solution to
(A.1) for f given A (it need not be unique). This follows since S is nite, so the process of
restricting attention to measures with smaller supports must terminate eventually. Let E
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denote the support of µ f . We can now state and prove the following collection of results.
Lemma 3. Given A and f above, the following statements hold:
(i) E is relevant for f given A,
(ii) E is relevant for f Ew given A,
(iii) if µ ∈ φA( f Ew ), then supp (µ ) = E.
Proof. We begin by proving (i). Recall that to prove E is relevant for f given A, we need
to prove two claims. First, we prove that f ∼A f Ew . To see why, notice that
UA( f ) =
∫
u ( f ) dµ f ≥ UA( f Ew ) = max
µ∈QA
∫
u ( f Ew ) dµ ≥
∫
u ( f Ew ) dµ f = UA( f ),
(A.2)
where the rst inequality follows from Strong Monotonicity, and the nal equality follows
since µ f ∈ φA( f ) and the support of µ f is E. It remains to show that f A f E′w for every
E′ ⊂ E; this is the second part of the denition of relevant. So x any E′ ⊂ E, and take
any µ′ ∈ φA( f E′w ). There are two cases to consider. First, if supp (µ′) ⊆ E′, then we must
have
UA( f ) >
∫
u ( f ) dµ′ = UA( f E′w ),
else µ f would not be minimal. So in this case, f A f E′w . The second case is supp (µ′) *
E′, i.e. there exists s ∈ E′c such that µ′(s ) > 0. In this case,
UA( f ) ≥
∫
u ( f ) dµ′ >
∫
u ( f E′w ) dµ′ = UA( f E′w ),
where the strict inequality follows since f (s )  w for every s ∈ S and µ′(s ) > 0 for some
s ∈ E′c . Since these two cases are exhaustive, f A f E′w for every E′ ⊂ E and hence E is
relevant for f given A.
Proving (ii) is trivial given (i). It is clear that [f Ew]Ew = f Ew , so f Ew ∼A [f Ew]Ew .
As for the second part of the denition, for every E′ ⊂ E, f Ew ∼A f A f E′w , so E is
relevant for f Ew given A.
To prove (iii), take any µ ∈ φA( f Ew ). We rst show that E ⊆ supp (µ ). If this was not
true, then it follows that there exists s ∈ E such that µ (s ) = 0, and so an argument as in
(A.2) above shows that f Ew ∼A f [E \ {s}]w , contradicting the fact that E is relevant for
f Ew given A.
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To see that in fact supp (µ ) = E, suppose that there exists s ∈ supp (µ ) \ E, i.e. µ (s ) > 0
for some s ∈ Ec . Then since f (s )  w for every s ∈ S , it follows that
UA( f ) ≥
∫
u ( f ) dµ >
∫
u ( f Ew ) dµ = UA( f Ew ),
which implies that f A f Ew , a contradiction since E is relevant for f given A. 
A.1.3 Bayesian Updates
This subsection contains the two key arguments that remain in the proof of Theorem 1.
Since A and f were chosen arbitrarily (at the beginning of Section A.1.2), it suces to
show that µ f = piE , i.e. the measure from the GS representation is actually a Bayesian
update of the prior. In this case, setting UA( f ) = VA( f ) for all f ∈ Fint follows without
loss of generality.
In pursuit of a contradiction, suppose that µ f , piE . Under this assumption, we prove
the following two lemmas, which together imply a contradiction. In the rst lemma, we
construct an act h ∈ F such that h A f and f Eh′  hEh′. The second lemma shows that
we may take the h we constructed to be such that E is relevant for h given A. In this case,
the two preference statements above jointly contradict Optimistic DC.
Lemma 4. If µ f , piE , then there exists h ∈ F such that h A f and f Eh′  hEh′ for any
h′ ∈ F .
Proof of Lemma 4. We will construct such an h. Since µ f , piE , there exist states s1, s2 ∈ E
such that piE (s1) > µ f (s1) and µ f (s2) > piE (s2). Recall that E is the support of µ f and pi has
full support, so all of these quantities are strictly positive. This implies that
piE (s1)
piE (s2)
>
µ f (s1)
µ f (s2)
.
Thus, there exists ε,δ > 0 and small such that
piE (s1)
piE (s2)
>
ε
δ
>
µ f (s1)
µ f (s2)
.
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Moreover, since f ∈ Fint, we can choose ε and δ such that u ( f (s1)) − δ > u (w ) and
u ( f (s2)) + ε < u (b). Now, dene h ∈ F as follows. Let h(s ) = f Ew (s ) for every s ,
s1, s2. Let h(s2) be such that u (h(s2)) = u ( f (s2)) + ε , and let h(s1) be such that u (h(s1)) =
u ( f (s1)) − δ , where ε and δ are as above.3 The way we dened h implies that∫
u (h) dpiE =
∫
u ( f ) dpiE − δpiE (s1) + εpiE (s2) <
∫
u ( f ) dpiE,
where the last inequality holds because δpiE (s1) > εpiE (s2). Therefore f Eh′  hEh′ for any
h′ ∈ F . Similarly, since εµ f (s2) > δpiE (s1), it also follows from the denition that∫
u (h) dµ f =
∫
u ( f ) dµ f + εµ f (s2) − δµ f (s1) >
∫
u ( f ) dµ f ,
and hence h A f . 
Notice given the two preference statements in Lemma 4, if E were relevant for h given
A, we would have contradicted Optimistic DC and we could conclude that piE = µ f . How-
ever, E is generically not relevant for h given A. As such, we proceed by constructing an
act that also satises these two preference statements while ensuring that E is relevant;
in other words, we claim that E is relevant for h given A without loss of generality. To
this end, for every α ∈ [0, 1], let дα B αh + (1 − α ) f Ew (recall that h(s ) = w for every
s ∈ Ec , so дα (s ) = w for all s ∈ Ec as well). By construction of дα , it follows that for any
α ∈ (0, 1),∫
u (дαm ) dµ f = αm
∫
u (h) dµ f + (1 − αm )
∫
u ( f ) dµ f >
∫
u ( f ) dµ f ,∫
u (дαm ) dpiE = αm
∫
u (h) dpiE + (1 − αm )
∫
u ( f ) dpiE <
∫
u ( f ) dpiE,
and hence дα A f and f Eh′  дαEh′ for every α ∈ (0, 1) and h′ ∈ F . The nal step of the
proof is showing that there exists α ∈ (0, 1) such that E is relevant for дα . This contradicts
Optimistic DC and hence we may conclude that µ f = piE .
3We know it’s possible to construct such a h since u is continuous. In particular, it is standard practice
to construct h(s1) and h(s2) by mixing f (s1) with w and mixing f (s2) with b.
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Lemma 5. There exists α ∈ (0, 1) such that E is relevant for дα given A.
Proof of Lemma 5. Consider a sequence {αn} → 0 such that αn > 0 for all n ∈ N. No-
tice that obviously, дαn → f Ew . For every f ∈ F , recall that φA : F  ∆(S ) is the
correspondence dened as
φA( f ) B argmax
µ∈QA
∫
u ( f ) dµ .
Notice that the hypotheses of the maximum theorem hold: QA is a closed and bounded
subset of R|S | , and so is compact (and nonempty by the GS theorem), sinceu is continuous
and the integral is linear, the objective function is continuous on F ×∆(S ). Therefore, by
the maximum theorem,φA is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence.4 Let µn ∈ φA(дαn )
for every n, and choose each µn to be minimal (choosing each µn to be minimal is instru-
mental to the argument). Thus, since {дαn } → f Ew , it follows from upper hemicontinuity
that {µn} has a limit point in φA( f Ew ), call it µ. Equivalently, since ∆(S ) is a metric space,{
µn
} has a convergent subsequence {µm} → µ ∈ φA( f Ew ), and this convergence can
be taken to be pointwise for each s ∈ S .5 Since µ ∈ φA( f Ew ), Lemma 3 implies that
supp (µ ) = E.
Since µm → µ pointwise, we know that µm (s ) → µ (s ) for every s ∈ S . Thus, for any
s ∈ S such that µ (s ) > 0, there exists Ms ∈ N such that for all m > Ms , µm (s ) > 0.
Letting M B maxs∈S Ms , it follows that for all m > M , supp (µm ) ⊇ supp (µ ) = E. Now,
x some m > M . Let Em denote the support of µm. Notice that дαm (s ) = w for every
s ∈ Ec by construction. Thus, дαm = дαmEmw = дαmEw , so дαm ∼A дαmEw and the rst part
of the denition of E being relevant for дαm given A holds. Moreover, by construction,
µm was chosen to be minimal, i.e. there is no µ′m ∈ φA(дαm ) with supp (µ′m ) ⊂ supp (µm ).
Additionally, since f (s )  w and h(s )  w for every s ∈ E, by construction, дαm (s )  w
for every s ∈ E. In this case, we can use arguments analogous to those in the second part
of the proof of part (i) of Lemma 3 to show that дαm  дαmE′w for every E′ ⊂ E.6 Thus E
is relevant for дαm given A. 
Thus, we have shown that for some α ∈ (0, 1), E is relevant for дα given A, дα A f ,
4This conclusion also requires that the space containing the image of the constraint correspondence is
Hausdor, which follows since ∆(S ) is a metric space.
5Since S is nite, convergence in the topology induced by the Euclidean distance is equivalent to point-
wise convergence, e.g. (Aliprantis and Border, 2006) Example 2.2.
6In particular, for any E ′ ⊂ E, we can take µ ′ ∈ φA (дαmE ′w ). There are two cases, depending on whether
supp (µ ′) ⊆ E ′ or supp (µ ′) * E ′. The argument in each case is analogous to the corresponding case in the
proof above.
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and f Eh′  дαEh′ for any h′ ∈ F . Since E is also relevant for f given A, this contradicts
Optimistic DC. Thus, we must have µ f = piE .
We have shown that for any f ∈ Fint, the solution to (A.1) is a Bayesian update of the
prior. As such, it follows that it is without loss of generality to set UA( f ) = VA( f ) for all
such f ∈ Fint. We now extend this result to every f ∈ F .
A.1.4 Extending to All Acts
Lemma 6. For every f ∈ F , VA( f ) = UA( f ).
Proof. Take any д ∈ F \ Fint, and notice that the functional UA is continuous (in the uni-
form metric) by the maximum theorem (we veried the conditions in the proof of Lemma 5
above). Moreover, sinceu (·) is continuous, andBA is nite, the maximum theorem implies
that VA is supnorm continuous, i.e. if
{
fn
} → f , then VA( fn ) → VA( f ).7
Given д above, construct a sequence {дn} ∈ F∞ such that, if д(s ) ∼ b, дn (s ) ≺ д(s )
for all n ∈ N, and if д(s ) ∼ w , дn (s )  д(s ) for all n ∈ N, such that each {дn (s )} → д(s )
monotonically.8 Then дn ∈ Fint for every n ∈ N, and sinceF is endowed with the uniform
metric, {дn} → д. Then, since UA(дn ) = VA(дn ) for every n ∈ N, and both sequences
converge, it follows thatUA(д) = VA(д). 
Lastly, since there is a bijection between Bayesian updates and their supports (given
pi ), we can let
EA B {E | piE ∈ BA}
denote the set of all possible information sets the agent may choose given A. So we can
rewrite VA once again as
VA( f ) = max
E∈EA
∫
u ( f ) dpiE . (A.3)
7For any f ,д ∈ F , the uniform metric on F is dened as d ( f ,д) = maxs ∈S dˆ ( f (s ),д(s )), where dˆ is a
metric on X . Recall from Footnote 9 that since S is nite, the topology induced by the uniform metric is
equivalent to the product topology.
8This can be done since u (·) is continuous, so for example let дn (s ) be such that u (дn (s )) = u (д(s )) + 1/n
for each s such that д(s ) ∼ w , and analogously when д(s ) ∼ b.
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Henceforth, we slightly abuse notation and use φA( f ) to denote the solution set to (A.3)
above.
A.1.5 Verifying Properties of Representation
Lemma 7. A ⊆ E for all E ∈ EA.
Proof of Lemma 7. Fix any E ∈ EA and nd f ∈ F such that E ∈ φA( f ) and A * E (if no
such E exists, then the result follows without loss of generality). Then there exists s ∈ A
such that s < E. Construct д ∈ F such that д(s′) = f (s′) for all s′ , s , and set д(s )  f (s ).9
Then
∫
u (д) dpiE =
∫
u ( f ) dpiE , so д %A f , but Strong Monotonicity implies that f A д,
a contradiction. 
Lemma 8. A ∈ EA.
Proof of Lemma 8. Take any f ∈ F and consider ∫ u ( f ) dpiA. Since ∫ u ( f ) dpiA ∈ u (X ), by
continuity of% there exists x ∈ X such thatu (x ) = ∫ u ( f ) dpiA. Therefore f Ax % x . Again
assuming that x  w , notice that Constant Consequentialism and Strong Monotonicity
jointly imply that A is relevant for x given A. Then since f Ax % x , Optimistic DC implies
that f %A x , which implies that
VA( f ) ≥ u (x ) =
∫
u ( f ) dpiA.
Since f was taken arbitrarily, this holds for all acts, and so A ∈ EA follows without loss of
generality. 
A.1.6 Necessity of Axioms
As for necessity, recall that by denition pi has full support and A ∈ EA, so Strong Mono-
tonicity follows. As for Optimistic DC, take any f ,д ∈ F such that E is relevant forд given
A and f Eh % дEh. Since pi has full support, this implies that
∫
u ( f ) dpiE ≥
∫
u (д) dpiE .
Since E is relevant for д given A, it follows that there exists B∗ ∈ φA(дEw ) such that
9Again, assume for simplicity that f is interior, and use the arguments as in Lemma 6 to apply the result
to all acts.
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B∗ ⊇ E. Suppose toward a contradiction that д A f , then дEw A f , so
VA(дEw ) =
∫
u (дEw ) dpiB∗ > VA( f ) ≥ VA( f Ew ) ≥
∫
u ( f Ew ) dpiB∗,
which implies that
∫
u ( f ) dpiE <
∫
u (д) dpiE , a contradiction (the last inequality follows
from the fact that B∗ ∈ EA).
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
A.2 Proofs of Other Results in the Text
We begin by proving Theorem 2. We rst state a lemma that makes the proof of Theorem 2
an application of the GS uniqueness result. The proof of Lemma 9 follows the proof of the
uniqueness theorem.
Lemma 9. Fix a Bayesian Optimism representation 〈u,pi , EA〉. Take any distinct {Ei }ni=1 ⊆
EA with n > 1. Then there is no collection {αi }ni=1 ⊂ (0, 1) such that
∑n
i=1 αi = 1 and
n∑
i=1
αipiEi = piE,
where E =
⋃n
i=1 Ei .
Proof of Theorem 2. Let V and V ′ denote the functional representations corresponding to
each Bayesian Optimism representation in the statement of Theorem 2. Uniqueness of u
(up to ane transformation) and pi are standard and omitted. Without loss of generality,
assume u = u′. Let QA ⊂ ∆(S ) denote the set of measures induced by pi and EA, i.e.
QA B
{
µ ∈ ∆(S )  µ = piE for some E ∈ EA} ,
and dene Q′A analogously. Since the integral is linear, its maximum over QA occurs at an
extreme point of QA, so we may write V as
V ( f ) = max
µ∈co(QA )
∫
u ( f ) dµ,
and analogously forV ′, where co (QA) denotes the closed convex hull of QA. Then by the
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GS uniqueness theorem, we know that co (QA) = co
(
Q′A
)
. Thus, it follows that EA = E′A if
we can ensure that the set of Bayesian updates of pi that are in co (QA) are exactly those
in QA. This is precisely the content of Lemma 9. 
Proof of Lemma 9. Fix a Bayesian Optimism representation 〈u,pi , EA〉, and take any {Ei }ni=1 ⊆
EA. Let E = ⋃ni=1 Ei . Recall that by the denition of a Bayesian Optimism representation,
A ⊆ Ei for all i and hence A ⊂ E. Toward a contradiction, suppose that there exist
{αi }ni=1 ⊂ (0, 1) such that
∑n
i=1 αi = 1 and
n∑
i=1
αipiEi = piE .
Since the collection {Ei }ni=1 are distinct, there must exist s ∈ Ac such that piEi (s ) = 0 for
some i . Fix this s , and x j such that piEj (s ) > 0 (again this follows since the collection is
distinct and n > 1). Since each αi > 0, this implies that piE (s ) > 0 as well. Fix any s′ ∈ A.
Since A ⊆ Ei for all i , piEi (s′) > 0 for all i . Now, since piE and piEj are Bayesian updates of
pi , the relative likelihoods of s and s′ must be the same. In other words, we must have
piEj (s )
piEj (s
′)
=
piE (s )
piE (s′)
=
∑n
i=1 αipiEi (s )∑n
i=1 αipiEi (s
′)
.
Rearranging terms implies that
n∑
i=1
αipiEi (s
′) =
piEj (s
′)
piEj (s )
n∑
i=1
αipiEi (s ). (A.4)
Again, since each piEi is a Bayesian update of pi , for all i such that piEi (s ) > 0, we must
have
piEj (s
′)
piEj (s )
=
piEi (s
′)
piEi (s )
.
Plugging this condition into the right hand side of (A.4) implies that
n∑
i=1
αipiEi (s
′) =
∑
i:piEi (s )>0
αipiEi (s
′),
and so we have ∑
i:piEi (s )=0
αipiEi (s
′) = 0.
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Since each αi ∈ (0, 1), this implies that piEi (s′) = 0 for all i such that piEi (s ) = 0. From
above, we know there is at least one such i . This is a contradiction because s′ ∈ A ⊆ Ei for
all i and so we must have piEi (s′) > 0 for all i (recall that pi has full support by denition
of the Bayesian Optimism representation). 
Proof of Proposition 1. It is trivial to show that (iii) implies (i) and (ii). The assumptions
on u and pi stated in Denition 1 are satised since we have assumed Axioms 1-3. We
rst show that (i) implies (iii). Thus, take any f ∈ F . Let x fA ∈ X denote the cer-
tainty equivalent for f given A, so VA( f ) = u
(
x
f
A
)
. Then Consequentialism requires
that VA
(
f Ax
f
A
)
= VA( f ) = u
(
x
f
A
)
. Since Axioms 1-3 are satised, %A admits a Bayesian
Optimism representation. Take any E ∈ φA
(
f Ax
f
A
)
. Thus, we have
VA
(
f Ax
f
A
)
=
∫
u
(
f Ax
f
A
)
dpiE = u
(
x
f
A
)
.
Since A ⊆ E by Denition 1, the above implies that u
(
x
f
A
)
=
∫
u ( f ) dpiA, and hence
VA( f ) =
∫
u ( f ) dpiA as desired.
We now show that (ii) implies (iii). So suppose Dynamic Consistency holds. Take any
f ∈ F , and again take the certainty equivalent such that f ∼A x fA . Then by Dynamic
Consistency, we must have f Ax fA ∼ x fA , which implies that u
(
x
f
A
)
=
∫
u ( f ) dpiA. This
then implies that VA( f ) =
∫
u ( f ) dpiA, as desired. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Take any f ∈ F such that f (s )  w for every s ∈ S , and let E be
a minimal solution. Then it follows that f ∼A f Ew . Moreover, since f (s )  w for every
s ∈ S , for any E′ ⊂ E we must have f A f E′w , for otherwise there would be a solution
contained in E and E would not be minimal. Thus minimal solutions are relevant.
Now, suppose E is relevant. As above, we know that E is contained in every solution
to f Ew , so there exists B∗ ⊇ E such that
VA( f ) = VA( f Ew ) =
∫
u ( f Ew ) dpiB∗ .
However, we must have E = B∗, for if E was strictly contained in B∗ then
∫
u ( f ) dpiB∗ >∫
u ( f Ew ) dpiB∗ and hence we would haveVA( f ) > VA( f Ew ), a contradiction. Thus, E is a
solution for f given A. Moreover, if E was not minimal, then there exists E′ ⊂ E such that
VA( f ) = VA( f E
′w ), contradicting the fact that E is relevant. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Assume the two representations are nontrivial, for if they are the
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result holds trivially. If E2A ⊆ E1A, then it follows trivially that V 1A ( f ) ≥ V 2A ( f ) for all
f ∈ F , and hence Agent 1 is more optimistic than Agent 2. To prove the other direction,
suppose that Agent 1 is more optimistic than Agent 2 given A, i.e. V 1A ( f ) ≥ V 2A ( f ) for all
f ∈ F . Toward a contradiction, suppose that E2A * E1A, i.e. there exists E ∈ E2A such that
E < E1A. By denition, each V iA is a Bayesian Optimism representation, so E ⊇ A; in fact
this inclusion is strict since by denition A ∈ E1A ∩ E2A. Then, by Lemma 9 (see also the
proof of Theorem 2), the two representations may be written as
V iA( f ) = max
µ∈co(QiA )
∫
u ( f ) dµ,
whereQiA is dened as in the proof of Theorem 2 for i = 1, 2. Then a separating hyperplane
theorem implies that there exists f ∈ F such that ∫ u ( f ) dpiE > maxB∈E1A ∫ u ( f ) dpiB , a
contradiction (see also the uniqueness theorem in GS).10 
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that (%,%A) satises Axioms 1-4. Assume that there exist
x ,y ∈ X with x  y, for otherwise the result follows trivially. Then of course, %A is
represented by the Bayesian Optimism functional dened in Denition 1. Take any f ∈
Fint, and consider f Ab. By Strong Monotonicity, f Ab %A f . If f Ab ∼A f , then Strong
Monotonicity implies that f A′b A f for all A′ ⊂ A, and hence A is p-relevant. If f Ab A
f , consider f [A ∪ {s}]b for each s ∈ Ac . If there exists s∗ ∈ Ac such that f [A ∪ {s}]b ∼A
f , thenA∪{s∗} is p-relevant. If not then continue as before. Since S is nite and f Sb ∼A f ,
this procedure must eventually end, so every interior act admits a relevant event.
Now, suppose there exists f ,д ∈ Fint and α ∈ (0, 1) such that f ∼A д but f A α f +
(1−α )д.11 Let E denote the p-relevant event forα f +(1−α )д, and without loss of generality
suppose that f Eh % дEh. Then since % is SEU, this implies that [α f + (1 − α )д]Eh % дEh,
and so Pessimistic DC implies that α f + (1 − α )д %A д, a contradiction.
Therefore, %A is uncertainty neutral, i.e. for all f ,д ∈ F , f ∼A д implies that f ∼A
α f + (1 − α )д for all α ∈ [0, 1]. It is well known that this implies that %A is SEU,12 so EA
is a singleton. Given points (i) and (ii) in the Bayesian Optimism representation, we must
have EA = A.
As for the other direction, notice that since pi has full support, A is both relevant and
10More transparently, the intuition of the result is that if E ∈ E2A \ E1A, there must exist f ∈ F such that
the agent will strictly prefer to distort to E over any B ∈ E1A. It can be shown that this act is b [E \A]w , a
bet on the part of E that is not in A.
11Given that we are assuming % is nondegenerate, it is sucient to work with interior acts, see Lemma 2.
12See Maccheroni et al. (2006), for example.
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p-relevant for every act, so both Optimistic DC and Pessimistic DC follow. The other
axioms follow trivially. 
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Appendix B
Appendices to Revealed Understanding
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3—Suciency
Throughout, we assume that there exist f ,д ∈ F with f  д, otherwise the result follows
trivially. We also assume that for every P ∈ P%, there exists E ∈ P with |E | ≥ 2. Otherwise,
{{s}s∈S } ∈ P%, so % satises Independence everywhere and is SEU, so the result follows
trivially.1
Now, the vNM theorem implies that there exists a mixture linear function u : X −→ R
such that u represents the restriction of % to X . It is routine to show that Continuity
implies thatu is continuous (in the given metric onX , which is metrizable by assumption).
The rst lemma shows that F = ⋃P∈P% U (P ).
Lemma 10. For every f ∈ F , there exists P ∈ P% such that f ∈ U (P ).
Proof. Notice that by Certainty Independence, for every x ,y, z ∈ X and α ∈ [0, 1], we
have that
x % y ⇐⇒ αx + (1 − α )z % αy + (1 − α )z.
Thus, the trivial partition {S } ∈ P%. Applying Certainty Independence again, for every
f ∈ F , x ,y ∈ X , and α ∈ (0, 1), we have
f  x =⇒ α f + (1 − α )y  αx + (1 − α )y.
Since X = F{S }, it follows that either f ∈ U ({S }), or f ∈ U (P ) for some P  {S }. 
1It is easy to see that Understanding Monotonicity implies the Anscombe and Aumann (1963) mono-
tonicity axiom if {{s}s ∈S } ∈ P%.
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Similarly to the text, for any partition P , letwP
f
=
(
wE
f
,E
)
E∈P . We next show that each
f ∈ F is indierent to wP
f
for some P ∈ P%.
Lemma 11. For every f ∈ F , there exists P ∈ P% such that f ∼ wPf .
Proof. We prove the result by strong induction on the size of f (S ). We begin with thef (S ) = 2 case (the singleton case is trivial). Thus, take any f ∈ F with f (S ) = 2. We
begin with the following claim.
Claim 1. For every f ∈ F , there exists P ∈ U−1( f ) and E ∈ P such that f - wE
f
E f .
Proof of Claim 1. Suppose toward a contradiction that for every P ∈ U−1( f ) and E ∈ P ,
f  wE
f
E f . This implies that each E contains both outcomes of f , for otherwisewE
f
E f = f ,
contradicting the supposed strict preference. Moreover, notice that for any such E and P ,
if s ∈ E is such that f (s ) = wE
f
, wE
f
{s} f = f , so the contrapositive of of Aversion to
Limited Understanding implies that eitherwE
f
E f % f or that there exists Q ∈ U−1( f ) and
s ∈ E such thatwE
f
Q (s ) f % f . Since the former possibility is ruled out by assumption, we
proceed under the latter assumption. However, since f only has two outcomes and wE
f
is
the dispreferred of the two, wE
f
= w
Q (s )
f
, so the desired result follows. 
From here, the proof proceeds iteratively. Take E ∈ P ∈ U−1( f ) as established in the
claim above, and considerwE
f
E f . If wEf E f (S ) = 1, thenwEf E f = wSf (recall f (S ) = 2), so
f (S \E) = wE
f
). Thus, apply Understanding Monotonicity to conclude that P is the desired
partition. So suppose wEf E f (S ) = 2. Then we can apply Claim 1 to wEf E f , keeping in
mind it need not be understood using P . Continue on in this fashion until one of two
things occurs:
1. wS
f
% f , in which case Understanding Monotonicity implies that f % wP
f
% wS
f
% f ,
so any P ∈ P% is satisfactory.
2. There exists P ∈ P% such that wPf % f . By Denition 10, it follows that there exists
Q ∈ P% such thatQ  P andwPf ∈ U (Q ). SinceQ  P , for every E ∈ P , there exists
A1E, . . . ,A
n
E ∈ Q such that E =
⋃n
i=1A
i
E . By denition, for every A ∈ Q , bAwPf = w
E
f
for any E ∈ P such that A ⊆ E. Since A ⊆ E, wA
f
% wE
f
. Thus, Understanding
Monotonicity implies that f ∼ wP
f
, as desired.
We now move to the inductive step. So suppose that for every f ∈ F with f (S ) ≤ n,
there exists P ∈ P% such that f ∼ wPf . Consider any f ∈ F with f (S ) = n + 1. Recalling
90
that U−1( f ) is nonempty by Lemma 10, take any P ∈ U−1( f ) and any nonsingleton E ∈ P
such that wS
f
∈ f (E).2 We now show that Claim 1 applies to E. Again, suppose toward
a contradiction that f  wE
f
E f . Let s ∈ E be any state such that f (s ) = wE
f
. Then since
{s} ⊂ E andwE
f
{s} f = f , the contrapositive of Aversion to Limited Understanding implies
that either wE
f
E f % f or that there exists Q ∈ U−1( f ) and s ∈ E such that wE
f
Q (s ) f % f ,
where Q (s ) is nonsingleton. Recall that by assumption, wE
f
is the worst outcome in f (S )
such that there exists R ∈ U−1( f ) with R
(
f −1
(
wE
f
))
nonsingleton. Thus it follows that
wE
f
∼ wQ (s )
f
, so Q is the desired partition. As above, repeat this procedure for wQ (s )
f
Q (s ) f
and so on until one of the Q (s ) events contains more than one outcome. If this does not
occur, then the conclusion of Lemma 11 follows. At this point, we have constructed an
act д % f such that д(s ) - f (s ) for every s ∈ S and д(S ) ≤ n. As such, the inductive
assumption implies that there exists R ∈ P% such that wRд ∼ д % f . Since f (s ) % д(s )
for every s ∈ S , wR
f
% wRд % f . An argument identical to case 2 above then shows that
wR
f
∼ f , as desired.

If f ∈ FP and E ∈ P , let u ( f (E)) B u ( f (s )) for any s ∈ E. This is well dened
because u ( f (s )) = u ( f (s′)) for all s, s′ ∈ E ∈ P whenever f ∈ FP . Moreover, notice that
if P ∈ P%, Understanding Monotonicity implies that for any f ,д ∈ FP , if f (E) % д(E)
for all E ∈ P , then f % д (since д ∈ FP , either д ∈ U (P ) or д ∈ U (Q ) for some Q  P ,
the statement holds in either case). By denition, % satises Independence on FP for any
P ∈ P%. Hence it follows from standard results that there exists a unique probability
measure piP : σ (P ) −→ [0, 1] such that
V ( f ) =
∑
E∈P
piP (E)u ( f (E))
represents the restriction of % to FP . The utility function u is independent of P above
because X ⊆ FP for every P ∈ P%.
By Lemma 11, for every f ∈ F , there exists P ∈ P% such that f ∼ wPf . Moreover,
for any Q ∈ P%, it follows from Understanding Monotonicity that f % wQf . Thus, we can
2If no such P exists, move on to the next worst outcome in f (S ) and so on. One such P must exist,
otherwise the preference is SEU and the proof of suciency is complete.
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extend the function V dened above from ⋃P∈P% FP to all of F by setting
V ( f ) = max
P∈P%
∑
E∈P
piP (E) min
s∈E u ( f (s )).
The above lemmas ensure V is well dened and represents %. Notice that V satises
monotonicity, i.e. if f (s ) % д(s ) for all s ∈ S , then V ( f ) ≥ V (д). As such, % satises
monotonicity, which we will use in the sequel.
The remainder of the proof is to show that we can take each piP above to be inde-
pendent of P , show that this new set function is dened on the appropriate domain, and
satises the conditions set out in Denition 8. This relies onP% being rich, which we next
show is indeed true.
Lemma 12. For any P ,Q ∈ P%, A ∈ σ (P ), and B ∈ σ (Q ) such that A ⊂ B, there exists
Q′ ∈ P% such that A,B \A ∈ σ (Q′).
Proof. Take P ,Q,A,B as in the statement of the lemma. Assume A,B are nonempty, for if
either is empty the result follows trivially. Let E = B \A. Suppose toward a contradiction
that there is no Q′ ∈ P% such that A,E ∈ σ (Q′). Fix any x ,y, z ∈ X such that x  y  z,
and let f = xAyEz. Let R ∈ P% be such that f ∈ U (R), which exists by Lemma 10. By
assumption, either A < σ (R), E < σ (R), or both. If A < σ (R) and E ∈ σ (R), then there
exists E′ ∈ R such that E′ ∩ A , ∅ and E′ ∩ Bc , ∅ (in words, E′ contains states in A and
in Bc ). By denition, x , z ∈ f (E′) where x  z by assumption. Therefore, we can apply
Claim 1 to E′ and conclude that
f - f
[
(A \ E′) ∪ E] z,
a contradiction to Contingent Monotonicity since f [(A \ E′) ∪ E] z - z {s} f for any s ∈
E′ ∩A by monotonicity (and E′ ∩A is nonempty).
The case where A ∈ σ (R) and E < σ (R) is symmetric. Lastly, suppose that A < σ (R)
and E < σ (R). Then neither A nor E is in R. If B ∈ σ (R), then there exists B′ ⊆ B such that
B′ ∈ R, B′ ∩A , ∅, and B′ ∩ E , ∅. In this case, applying Claim 1 to B′ yields f - yB′ f , a
contradiction to Contingent Monotonicity. If B < σ (R), then there exists B′ ∈ R such that
B′ ∩ Bc , ∅ and either B′ ∩ A , ∅, B′ ∩ E , ∅, or both. In this case, similar arguments to
above imply that f - zB′ f , a contradiction to Contingent Monotonicity. 
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Recall that E (P%) = ⋃P∈P% σ (P ) denotes the set of all events that are in the algebra
generated by some partition in P%. We now dene a set function pi : E (P%) −→ [0, 1]
by pi (E) = piP (E) for any P ∈ P% such that E ∈ σ (P ). Since S ∈ σ (P ) for all P ∈ P% and
each piP is a probability, pi is normalized. Moreover, the monotonicity of % implies that
pi is weakly monotone.3 Notice that pi is well dened, for if there exists E ∈ E (P%) such
that E ∈ σ (P ) ∩σ (P ′) for some P , P ′ ∈ P%, we can choose x ,y ∈ X such that u (x ) = 1 and
u (y) = 0, so we must have
V (xEy) = piP (E) = piP ′ (E).
We will now show that pi is additive on E (P%) (recall that this set is nite), whenever
E (P%) is closed under disjoint unions.
Lemma 13. Take any E ∈ E (P%) such that E = ⋃ni=1 Ei , where Ei ∈ E (P%) for all i =
1, . . . ,n and Ei ∩ Ej = ∅ for all i, j. Then pi (E) = ∑ni=1 pi (Ei ).
Proof. We will prove the result by induction on n. Notice that n must always be nite
because E (P%) is nite. We assume throughout that all events are nonempty, as the empty
cases are trivial. We begin with the n = 2 case. So suppose E,E1,E2, ∈ E (P%), where
E = E1 ∪ E2 and E1 ∩ E2 = ∅. Let P , P1, P2 ∈ P% denote their corresponding partitions in
P%, so E ∈ σ (P ), E1 ∈ σ (P1), and E2 ∈ σ (P2). By Lemma 12, there exists Q ∈ P% such that
E1,E2 ∈ σ (Q ). Since piQ is additive and pi is well dened, we must have
pi (E) = piP (E) = piQ (E) = piQ (E1) + piQ (E2),
as desired.
Now, take any m ∈ N, and assume that the lemma is true for all m′ < m. Take any
E ∈ E (P%) such that E = ⋃mi=1 Ei , where Ei ∈ E (P%) for all i = 1, . . . ,m and Ei ∩ Ej = ∅
for all i, j. Let A = ⋃m−1i=1 Ei . Then by the inductive step,
pi (A) =
m−1∑
i=1
pi (Ei ).
By Lemma 12, there exists Q ∈ P% such that A,Em ∈ σ (Q ). Since piQ is additive and pi is
3A set function µ is weakly monotone if for every A,B such that A ⊆ B, µ (B) ≥ µ (A).
93
well dened, we must have
pi (E) = piQ (E) = piQ (A) + piQ (Em ) =
m−1∑
i=1
pi (Ei ) + pi (Em ) =
m∑
i=1
pi (Ei ),
as desired. 
The following lemma shows that pi is strictly monotone on its domain, completing the
proof of Theorem 3.
Lemma 14. pi is strictly monotone on E (P%).
Proof. Take any A,B ∈ E (P%) such that A ⊂ B. By denition, there exists P , P ′ ∈ P% such
that A ∈ σ (P ) and B ∈ σ (P ′). Therefore, by Lemma 12, there exists Q ∈ P% such that
A,B \ A ∈ σ (Q ). Toward a contradiction, suppose that pi (A) = pi (B) (recall pi is weakly
monotone). Since pi is additive, it follows that pi (B \A) = 0. Therefore, for any x ,y, z ∈ X
such that x  y  z, we have
V (xAy [B \A] z) = pi (A)u (x ) + pi (Bc )u (z) ≤ pi (A)u (x ) + pi (Ac )u (z) ≤ V (xAz),
so xAz % xAy [B \A] z (the rst equality above follows from Lemma 16, whose proof does
not rely on the strict monotonicity of pi ). However, for any s ∈ B \ A, Contingent Mono-
tonicity implies that xAy [B \A] z  xAy [(B \A) \ {s}] z, while monotonicity implies that
xAy [(B \A) \ {s}] z % xAz, a contradiction. 
B.2 Proof of Theorem 3—Necessity
Throughout, x a RU representation 〈u,pi ,P〉 that represents a preference %. For any
f ∈ F , dene
φ ( f ) B argmax
P∈P
∑
E∈P
pi (E) min
s∈E u ( f (s ))
to be the argmax correspondence. Dene
φ∗( f ) B
{
P ∈ φ ( f )  @Q ∈ φ ( f ) s.t. Q  P }
to be the set of “minimal” solutions in the argmax.
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Necessity of Order and Certainty Independence is routine and omitted. Continuity fol-
lows given the following lemma, which we will use throughout the rest of this subsection
as well.
Lemma 15. If fn → f , there exists N ∈ N such that φ ( fn ) ⊆ φ ( f ) for all n ≥ N .
Proof. Take any sequence { fn} such that fn → f . Take any P < φ ( f ). Then there exists
δ > 0 such that V ( f ) − V ( f | P ) > δ . Since fn → f and u is continuous, there exists
NP ∈ N such that V ( f ) −V ( fn ) < δ2 and V ( f | P ) −V ( fn | P ) < δ2 for all n ≥ NP . This
implies that P < φ ( fn ) for all n ≥ NP . Taking N = maxP∈P\φ ( f ) NP (which exists since P
is nite) yields the desired conclusion. 
Notice that the lemma above also holds for φ∗. The following two results are used
in proving Lemma 17 and the necessity of Understanding Monotonicity and Contingent
Monotonicity.
Lemma 16. For every P ∈ P and f ∈ FP , P ∈ φ ( f ).
Proof. Take any P ∈ P and f ∈ FP . Enumerate the events in P such that P = {Ei }ni=1
and x1 % x2 % · · · % xn, where f = (xi ,Ei )ni=1. Now, take any Q ∈ P . We will show that
V ( f | Q ) ≤ V ( f | P ). For each i , let
Bi =
⋃ {
E ∈ Q  u (xi ) = mins∈E u ( f (s ))} .
Thus, we can write
V ( f | Q ) =
∑
E∈Q
pi (E) min
s∈E u ( f (s )) =
n∑
i=1
pi (Bi )u (xi ) ≤ V ((xi ,Bi )ni=1)
(since each Bi is a union of cells in Q , each pi (Bi ) is well dened). Notice that by the
denition of V ( f | Q ), we have
B1 ⊆ E1
B2 ⊆ [E1 \ B1] ∪ E2
B3 ⊆ [E2 \ B2] ∪ E3
...
Bn ⊆ [En−1 \ Bn−1] ∪ En .
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Thus, it follows from monotonicity of V and the arguments above that
V ( f | Q ) ≤ V ((xi ,Bi )ni=1) ≤ V ((xi ,Ei )ni=1) = V ( f | P ),
as desired. 
Notice that in the above proof, in the displayed set inclusions, at least one of inclusion
must be strict wheneverQ 4 P . Thus, if we took f = (xi ,Ei )ni=1 such that x1  x2  · · · 
xn, then it would follow from the strong monotonicity of pi that V ( f | P ) > V ( f | Q ) for
any Q 4 P . We will rely on this version of Lemma 16 in the proof of Lemma 17 below.
Lemma 17. For every P ∈ P and f ∈ F , f ∈ U (P ) if and only if P ∈ φ∗( f ).
Proof. Take any P ∈ P and f ∈ U (P ). Toward a contradiction, suppose that P < φ∗( f ),
and hence P < φ ( f ).4 Notice also that if P ′  P , P ′ < φ ( f ), for this would contradict the
fact that f ∈ U (P ) (P would no longer be minimal). This implies that V ( f ) > V ( f | P ′),
where P ′ = P or P ′  P . Now, x some д ∈ FP such that f ∼ д. Then by the denition of
U (P ), we must have α f + (1−α )h % αд+ (1−α )h for all h ∈ FP and α ∈ [0, 1].5 Take any
h ∈ FP such that φ∗(h) = P ′, where P ′ = P or P ′  P .6 Then Lemma 15 implies that there
exists α suciently close to 0 yet positive such that P ′ ∈ φ (α f + (1− α )h). Then we have
V (α f + (1 − α )h) = V (α f + (1 − α )h | P ′)
= αV ( f | P ′) + (1 − α )V (h)
< αV ( f ) + (1 − α )V (h)
= αV (д) + (1 − α )V (h)
= V (αд + (1 − α )h),
so αд + (1 − α )h  α f + (1 − α )h, a contradiction.
Conversely, if P ∈ φ∗( f ), then f ∼ wP
f
. Therefore, Denition 10 implies that f ∈ U (P ′)
for some P ′  P . However, if P ′ , P , then the rst part of this proof would imply that P
is not minimal, a contradiction. 
Given this result, Understanding Monotonicity follows trivially.
4If P ∈ φ ( f ) \ φ∗ ( f ), then one can immediately see that P is not minimal and so f < U (P ).
5This is not the exact denition of U (P ) stated in Denition 10, but can be obtained by considering a
sequence дn → д with f  дn for all n ∈ N.
6This can be done because of the discussion following the proof of Lemma 16 and the fact thatP is nite.
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Lemma 18. The preference % satises Contingent Monotonicity.
Proof. Take any A,B ∈ E (P ) such that A ⊆ B. We may assume B is nonempty, for
otherwise the axiom is not well dened. Let E = B \ A. Take any f ∈ F{A,E,Bc }. By
the richness of the RU representation, there exists Q ∈ P such that A,E ∈ Q . Lemma 16
implies that Q ∈ φ ( f ).
Take any x ∈ X and s ∈ B such that f (s )  x . Let д = x {s} f . Without loss of
generality, assume that s ∈ E.7 Moreover, it is without loss of generality to assume that
x  f (Bc ), f (A) since the representation is monotonic. Again since the representation is
monotonic, f % д, so suppose toward a contradiction that f ∼ д.
Take any P ∈ φ (д), so V (д) = V (д | P ). Then there exists Ai , i = 1, 2, 3, 4 such that
each Ai ∈ σ (P ) and
V (д | P ) = pi (A1)u ( f (E)) + pi (A2)u (x ) + pi (A3)u ( f (Bc )) + pi (A4)u ( f (A)),
where A1,A2 ⊆ E. We consider two cases.
First, suppose A2 is nonempty. Then since A2 ⊆ E and pi (A2) > 0, V (д) = V (д | P ) <
V ( f | P ) ≤ V ( f ), which is the desired conclusion.
Second, suppose A2 is empty. Then it follows that V ( f | Q ) = V (д | P ) = V ( f | P ).
There are then two possibilities. Either P = Q , which contradicts A2 being empty, or
P , Q and P ∈ φ ( f ). Given the discussion following Lemma 16, in the second case it must
also hold that f (Bc ) ∼ f (A). In this case, it must be that A1 ⊂ E, and
V ( f | Q ) = pi (E)u ( f (E)) + pi (A)u ( f (A)) + pi (Bc )u ( f (Bc ))
= pi (A1)u ( f (E)) + pi (A ∪ Bc ∪ [E \A1])u ( f (Bc ))
= V ( f | P ),
a contradiction since f (E)  f (Bc ) and pi is strictly monotone. 
The nal part of the proof is to show that Aversion to Limited Understanding is satis-
ed.
Lemma 19. The preference satises Aversion to Limited Understanding.
Proof. Take any f ∈ F and x ∈ X such that f  xE f for some E ∈ P ∈ U−1( f ) and
f  xE′ f for every nonsingleton E′ such that E′ ∩ E , ∅ and E′ ∈ Q ∈ U−1( f ). In other
7If A = B, so E is empty, then replace E with A and the argument goes through unchanged.
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words, f  xQ (s ) f for every s ∈ E andQ ∈ U−1( f ) such thatQ (s ) is nonsingleton. Notice
that this implies that wE
f
 x and wQ (s )
f
 x for all such Q (s ), otherwise we would have
xQ (s ) f % f and similarly for E.
Now, let д = xAf for any A ⊆ E. Take any R ∈ φ∗(д). There are two cases. First, if
R < φ∗( f ), then V ( f ) > V ( f | R) ≥ V (д | R) = V (д), as desired. So suppose R ∈ φ∗( f ).
Then by assumption, wR (s )
f
 x for every s ∈ E such that R (s ) is nonsingleton. Moreover,
if R (s ) is a singleton for every s ∈ A, then since f (s ) % wE
f
 д(s ) for every s ∈ E,
it follows that V ( f ) = V ( f | R) > V (д | R) = V (д), as desired. So there must exist
s ∈ A such that R (s ) is nonsingleton. In this case, by assumption, wR (s )
f
 x , so again
V ( f ) = V ( f | R) > V (д | R) = V (д), as desired. 
This completes the proof of necessity.
B.3 Proofs of Other Results in the Text
We rst present a simple lemma that will be used in the proof of Theorem 4 below. Recall
from Schmeidler (1989) that two acts f ,д ∈ F are comonotonic if there are no s, s′ ∈ S
such that f (s )  f (s′) and д(s ) ≺ д(s′).
Lemma 20. For any f ,д ∈ F , there exists α ∈ (0, 1) such that f and α f + (1 − α )д are
comonotonic.
Proof. Take any s, s′ ∈ S , and without loss of generality suppose that f (s )  f (s′) and
д(s′)  д(s ), otherwise the result follows trivially. Per contra, suppose that for all α ∈
(0, 1),
α f (s′) + (1 − α )д(s′)  α f (s ) + (1 − α )д(s ).
Then taking a sequence {αn} ⊂ (0, 1) such that αn → 1, we have that αn f (s′) + (1 −
αn )д(s
′)  αn f (s )+ (1−αn )д(s ) for all n ∈ N, so by Continuity we must have f (s′) % f (s ),
a contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 4. Uniqueness of u is routine and omitted. Henceforth without loss of
generality assume u = u′. Let V and V ′ be the functionals corresponding to each RU
representation in the statement of the theorem. We now show that P ≈ P′. In pursuit of
a contradiction, suppose P 0 P′, so (without loss of generality) there exists P ∈ P \ P′
and there is no P ′ ∈ P ∩ P′ such that P ′  P . Notice that by Lemma 16, V satises
Independence on FP , so % satises Independence on FP . Thus, since V ′ also represents
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%, V ′ must satisfy Independence. We now proceed to show that V ′ must in fact violate
Independence, a contradiction.
We consider two cases. First, suppose there exist comonotonic acts f ,д ∈ FP such
that φ′( f ) ∩φ′(д) = ∅. Without loss of generality, assume f ∼ д. Let {αn} ⊆ (0, 1) be such
that αn → 1. By Lemma 15, there exists N ∈ N such that φ′(αn f + (1 − αn )д) ⊆ φ′( f ) for
all n ≥ N . Fix some n ≥ N and let α = αn for simplicity. Take any Q ∈ φ′(α f + (1 − α )д)
and R ∈ φ′(д). Since f and д are comonotonic, it follows that
V ′(α f + (1 − α )д) = V ′(α f + (1 − α )д | Q )
= αV ′( f | Q ) + (1 − α )V ′(д | Q )
< αV ′( f ) + (1 − α )V ′(д)
= V ′( f ),
a contradiction since V ′ must satisfy Independence.
Now, let
{
FcP
}
c∈C denote the collection of subsets of FP such that for every f ,д ∈ FcP ,
f andд are comonotonic. Clearly, ⋃c∈C FcP = FP , and if f ,д ∈ FcP , then α f + (1−α )д ∈ FcP
for everyα ∈ [0, 1]. Moving to the second case, suppose that for every c ∈ C and f ,д ∈ FcP ,
φ′( f ) ∩ φ′(д) , ∅. We claim that this implies that for every c ∈ C , there exists Qc ∈ P′
such that Qc ∈ φ′( f ) for every f ∈ FcP .
Claim. Under the hypotheses of Theorem 4, if for every c ∈ C and f ,д ∈ FcP ,φ′( f )∩φ′(д) ,
∅, then there exists Qc ∈ P′ such that Qc ∈ φ′( f ) for every f ∈ FcP .
Proof of Claim. Fix any f ,д ∈ FcP , and suppose toward a contradiction that there exists
h ∈ FcP such that φ′( f ) ∩ φ′(д) ∩ φ′(h) = ∅. By assumption, there exists Q ∈ φ′( f ) ∩
φ′(д). Moreover, since f and д are comonotonic, for any R ∈ P′ and α ∈ [0, 1], we have
V ′(α f + (1−α )д | R) = αV ′( f | R) + (1−α )V ′(д | R), so it follows that for any α ∈ (0, 1),
φ′( f ) ∩ φ′(д) ⊆ φ′(α f + (1 − α )д). We now show that the reverse inclusion holds. Thus,
for some α ∈ (0, 1), suppose there existsQ ∈ φ′(α f + (1−α )д) such thatQ < φ′( f )∩φ′(д).
Without loss of generality, suppose Q < φ′( f ) and that f ∼ д. Then we have
V ′(α f + (1 − α )д) = V ′(α f + (1 − α )д | Q )
= αV ′( f | Q ) + (1 − α )V ′(д | Q )
< αV ′( f ) + (1 − α )V ′(д)
= V ( f ),
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a contradiction to Independence since f ,д ∈ FP . Thus, for every α ∈ (0, 1),φ′( f )∩φ′(д) =
φ′(α f + (1−α )д). Sinceφ′( f )∩φ′(д)∩φ′(h) = ∅, this implies thatφ′(α f + (1−α )д)∩φ′(h) =
∅, which contradicts the assumption that φ′( f ′) ∩ φ′(д′) , ∅ for all f ′,д′ ∈ FcP , since
α f + (1 − α )д,h ∈ FcP . 
Given the claim above, suppose that for every c ∈ C , there exists Qc ∈ P′ such that
Qc ∈ φ′( f ) for all f ∈ FcP . There are two subcases. First, suppose that there exists c, c′ ∈ C
such that Qc , Qc ′ . Then take f ∈ FcP and д ∈ Fc
′
P such that f ∼ д and Qc < φ′(д), which
can be done by assumption (if Qc ∈ φ′(д) for all д ∈ Fc ′P , then we may without loss
of generality assume Qc = Qc ′). By Lemma 20, there exists α ∈ (0, 1) such that f and
α f + (1 − α )д are comonotonic, so Qc ∈ φ′(α f + (1 − α )д). Thus, it follows that
V ′(α f + (1 − α )д) = V ′(α f + (1 − α )д | Qc )
= αV ′( f | Qc ) + (1 − α )V ′(д | Qc )
< αV ′( f ) + (1 − α )V ′(д)
= V ′( f ),
a contradiction since V ′ must satisfy Independence.
Lastly, suppose that Qc = Qc ′ = Q for all c, c′ ∈ C . In this case, V ′( f ) = V ′( f | Q ) for
all f ∈ FP . Take any E ∈ Q . SinceQ is not ner than P , there exists disjointA1,A2 ∈ σ (P )
such that Ai ∩ E , ∅ for i = 1, 2 and E ⊆ A1 ∪ A2. Take any x ,x′,y,y′ ∈ X with x  y,
x′  y′, and xA1y ∼ x′A2y′. Without loss of generality, we may assume x  x′  y′  y.
Then we have
V ′(xA1y) =
∑
B∈Q :B⊆A1\E
pi (B)u (x ) +
∑
B∈Q :B*A1\E
pi (B)u (y)
V ′(x′A2y′) =
∑
B∈Q :B⊆A2\E
pi (B)u (x′) +
∑
B∈Q :B*A2\E
pi (B)u (y′).
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Since A1 and A2 are disjoint, for any α ∈ [0, 1] we have
V ′(αxA1y + (1 − α )x′A2y′) =
∑
B∈Q :B⊆A1\E
pi (B)u (αx + (1 − α )y′)
+
∑
B∈Q :B⊆A2\E
pi (B)u (αy + (1 − α )x′)
+ pi (E) min {u (αx + (1 − α )y′),u (αy + (1 − α )x′)}
+
∑
B∈Q :B*A1\E,B*A2\E
pi (E)u (αy + (1 − α )y′).
Dene a function V ∗ : [0, 1] −→ u (X ) by V ∗(α ) = V ′(αxA1y + (1 − α )x′A2y′) for each
α ∈ [0, 1]. It is easy to see that V ∗(0) = V ∗(1) since xA1y ∼ x′A2y′, V ∗ is continuous,
and V ∗ is weakly concave. Moreover, since pi (E) > 0 and x  x′  y′  y, there exists
β, λ,α ∈ (0, 1) such that V ∗(αλ + (1 − α )β ) > αV ∗(λ) + (1 − α )V ∗(β ). Thus, V ∗ is strictly
concave on [0, 1], so letting α∗ = argmaxα∈[0,1]V ∗(α ) (which exists by the Weierstrass
Theorem), we haveV ∗(α∗) > V ∗(0), and hence α∗xA1y + (1−α∗)x′A2y′  xA1y ∼ x′A2y′,
a contradiction to Independence.
Thus, we have shown P ≈ P′. Notice that if P , P′, they only dier by adding
a coarsening of some P ∈ P ∩ P′. Removing any such coarsenings does not aect the
underlying preference, so assume without loss of generality that P = P′. In this case,
E (P ) = E (P′), and pi and pi ′ are extended from the same collection of unique probabilities
{piP }P∈P , so it follows that pi = pi ′. 
Proof of Proposition 5. The (ii) implies (i) case is trivial. So suppose that for every f ∈ F ,
P ∈ P2, and д ∈ FP ,
f %2 д =⇒ f %1 д.
Notice then that for every P ∈ P2, %1 and %2 agree on FP , and hence on X , so u1 = u2 = u
without loss of generality. We next show that P2 ⊆ P1. Toward a contradiction, suppose
that P2 * P1, so there exists P ∈ P2 such that P < P1. By Lemma 16, %2 satises
Independence on FP , and so must %1. Thus, we can mimic the arguments in the proof of
Theorem 4 to obtain a contradiction since P < P1. So we have P2 ⊆ P1. Since V1( f ) =
V2( f ) for all f ∈ FP and P ∈ P2 (by passing to certainty equivalents), it follows that we
must have pi1(E) = pi2(E) for every E ∈ E (P2). 
Proof of Proposition 6. Throughout, we shortenΩ (P ) to justΩ. First, suppose thatΩ ∈ P .
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Then % is represented by
V ( f ) =
∑
E∈Ω
pi (E) min
s∈E u ( f (s )).
Let
MΩ B {µ ∈ ∆(S )  ∀E ∈ Ω,∃s ∈ E s.t. µ (s ) = pi (E)}
denote the set of measures µ ∈ ∆(S ) such that for every E ∈ Ω, µ (E) = pi (E) and each
conditional measure µE is a degenerate measure on some s ∈ E. Then it follows that we
can write V as
V ( f ) = min
µ∈MΩ
∑
s∈S
µ (s )u ( f (s )).
Taking the closed convex hull of MΩ if necessary (which does not aect the underlying
preference), V is a multiple priors representation (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), so % is
uncertainty averse.
Second, suppose % is uncertainty averse, but Ω < P . Then |P | ≥ 2, for if it were a
singleton that single partition would be Ω. Now, x some P ∈ P . Note that there must
exist Q ∈ P and д ∈ FQ such that V (д) = V (д | Q ) > V (д | P ), otherwise every Q ∈ P
such that Q , P is redundant, and the preference could be represented by V (· | P ), in
which case P = Ω and Ω ∈ P . Thus, take any д as described, and any f ∈ FP such that
f ∼ д. Then by Lemma 16, P ∈ φ ( f ). Moreover, for α ∈ (0, 1) suciently large, we must
have P ∈ φ (α f + (1 − α )д) (see Lemma 15). This implies that
V (α f +(1−α )д) = V (α f +(1−α )д | P ) = αV ( f )+(1−α )V (д | P ) < V ( f )+(1−α )V (д) = V ( f ),
contrary to uncertainty aversion. 
Proof of Proposition 7. First, notice that if Ω ∈ P , the functional
V ( f ) =
∑
E∈Ω
pi (E) min
s∈E u ( f (s ))
represents %. It is easy to see thatV satises Comonotonic Independence (and so must %),
so by Schmeidler (1989), there exists a unique capacity ν such that the Choquet represen-
tation 〈u,ν〉 represents %. Moreover, % is biseparable (Ghirardato and Marinacci, 2001).
Without loss of generality, x x ,y ∈ X with u (x ) = 1 and u (y) = 0. Hence, by Ghirardato
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and Marinacci (2001), for every E ∈ Σ,
ν (E) = V (xEy) =
∑
A∈Ω
pi (A)1(A ⊆ E) = max
A∈σ (Ω):A⊆E
pi (A),
as desired (the nal equality follows from the additivity of pi ). 
Proof of Proposition 8. Suppose that Ω ∈ P . Then by Proposition 7, % has a CEU repre-
sentation 〈u,ν〉 where
ν (E) = max
A∈σ (Ω):A⊆E
pi (A) (B.1)
for every E ∈ Σ. Recall also that the preference can be represented by V (· | Ω). Notice
that for every x ,y ∈ X , f ,д ∈ F , and E ∈ σ (Ω), xE f % xEд if and only if yE f % yEд. This
implies any E ∈ σ (Ω) is unambiguous.
Suppose E is unambiguous but E < σ (Ω). Let {Ei }ni=1 enumerate the events such that
Ei ⊆ E and Ei ∈ Ω for all i . Since E < σ (Ω), there exists A1,A2 ∈ Σ such that A1 ⊆ E,
A2 ⊆ Ec , and A1 ∪A2 ∈ Ω. Notice that since A2 is a proper subset of a cell inΩ, ν (A2) = 0.
If A2 is nonsingleton, x any s ∈ A2, so ν ({s}) = ν (A2) = 0. However, we have
ν (E ∪A2) = pi
(
[A1 ∪A2]
⋃
[∪iEi]
)
> ν (E ∪ {s}) = pi (B∗)
for some B∗ ⊂ [A1 ∪A2]⋃ [∪iEi] (recall pi is strictly monotone and the denition of
ν from Proposition 7). Thus, by Lemma 7.2 of Epstein and Zhang (2001), E cannot be
unambiguous, a contradiction.
If A2 is a singleton, then ν (Ec \ A2) = ν (Ec ), for if B ∈ σ (Ω) and B ⊆ Ec , then A2 < B,
sinceA1 * B andA1∪A2 ∈ Ω by assumption. Therefore, B must also be a subset of Ec \A2.
However,
ν (E ∪ Ec ) = 1 > ν (E ∪ Ec \A2) = 1 − pi (A1 ∪A2),
a contradiction to Lemma 7.2 in Epstein and Zhang (2001) given that pi is strictly mono-
tone. 
Proof of Proposition 9. Throughout, assume that P is minimal without loss of generality.
Suppose that Dynamic Consistency holds. Toward a contradiction, suppose there exists
P ∈ P such that A < σ (P ). Then there exists E ∈ P such that E ∩ A , ∅ and E ∩ Ac , ∅.
Fix any x ,y, z ∈ X such that x  y  z. Find h ∈ FP such that φ (h) = {P }, which must
exist by the uniqueness of P (Theorem 4). By Lemma 15, there exists α ∈ (0, 1) such that
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P ∈ φ (αx [A ∩ E] z + (1 − α )h) ∩ φ (αy [A ∩ E] z + (1 − α )h). Thus, it follows that
V (αx [A ∩ E] z + (1 − α )h) = αV (x [A ∩ E] z | P ) + (1 − α )V (h) = αu (z) + (1 − α )V (h)
and
V (αy [A ∩ E] z + (1 − α )h) = αV (y [A ∩ E] z | P ) + (1 − α )V (h) = αu (z) + (1 − α )V (h),
so αx [A ∩ E] z + (1 − α )h ∼ αy [A ∩ E] z + (1 − α )h. Thus, since αx [A ∩ E] z + (1 −
α )h(s ) = αy [A ∩ E] z + (1 − α )h(s ) for all s ∈ Ac , Dynamic Consistency would require
that αx [A ∩ E] z + (1 − α )h ∼A αy [A ∩ E] z + (1 − α )h. However, P ∨ {A,Ac } ∈ PA, so
A ∩ E ∈ PA. Since αx [A ∩ E] z + (1 − α )h and αy [A ∩ E] z + (1 − α )h are PA-measurable,
it follows that
VA(αx [A ∩ E] z + (1 − α )h) = α [piA(A ∩ E)u (x ) + (1 − piA(A ∩ E))u (z)] + (1 − α )VA(h)
> α [piA(A ∩ E)u (y) + (1 − piA(A ∩ E))u (z)] + (1 − α )VA(h)
= VA(αx [A ∩ E] z + (1 − α )h),
a contradiction to dynamic consistency. 
Proof of Proposition 10. First, take any P ∈ P and A ∈ P . We will show A is foreseen. As
such, x any x ,x′,y,y′ ∈ X such thatu (x )+δu (y) = u (x′)+δu (y′), i.e. the act (xAx′,yAy′)
is eectively certain. Since A ∈ P ∈ P it follows from Lemma 16 that
W (xAx′,yAy′) = pi (A)u (x ) + pi (Ac )u (x′) + δpi (A)u (y) + δpi (Ac )u (y′)
= pi (A) [u (x ) + δu (y)] + pi (Ac ) [u (x′) + δu (y′)]
= u (x ) + δu (y),
since (xAx′,yAy′) is eectively certain. Therefore, (xAx′,yAy′) is subjectively certain, so
A is foreseen as desired.
Conversely, take any foreseen A ∈ Σ, and suppose toward a contradiction that there
is no P ∈ P such that A ∈ P . Fix x ,x′,y,y′ ∈ X as above, and assume without loss
of generality that x  x′ and y′  y. Take any P ∈ φ (xAx′) and Q ∈ φ (yAy′). Then
there exists B ∈ σ (P ) and E ∈ σ (Q ) such that V (xAx′) = pi (B)u (x ) + pi (Bc )u (x′) and
V (yAy′) = pi (E)u (y) + pi (Ec )u (y′). Thus we have
W (xAx′,yAy′) = pi (B)u (x ) + pi (Bc )u (x′) + δpi (E)u (y) + δpi (Ec )u (y′).
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SinceA is foreseen, (xAx′,yAy′) is subjectively certain, so it follows thatW (xAx′,yAy′) =
u (x ) + δu (y). Combining the two expressions above, we have that
pi (Bc )u (x ) + δpi (Ec )u (y) = pi (Bc )u (x′) + δpi (Ec )u (y′),
and equivalently
u (x ) + δ
pi (Ec )
pi (Bc )
u (y) = u (x′) + δ
pi (Ec )
pi (Bc )
u (y′).
Moreover, notice that since A < P for any P ∈ P , we must have B ⊂ A ⊂ E, so by the
strict monotonicity of pi it follows that pi (E) > pi (B) and hence pi (Bc ) > pi (Ec ), so pi (E
c )
pi (Bc ) ,
1.8 However, since (xAx′,yAy′) is eectively certain, the previous displayed equation
simplies to
δ
[
pi (Ec )
pi (Bc )
− 1
]
u (y) = δ
[
pi (Ec )
pi (Bc )
− 1
]
u (y′),
which contradicts the fact that y′  y since
[
pi (Ec )
pi (Bc ) − 1
]
, 0. 
Proof of Proposition 11. We begin with (i). Suppose A ∈ σ (Ω), and take any E ∈ Σ. First,
notice that since E ∩A and E ∩Ac are disjoint, the convexity of ν implies that
ν (E ∩A) + ν (E ∩Ac ) ≤ ν ([E ∩A] ∪ [E ∩Ac]) = ν (E).
As such, suppose toward a contradiction that ν (E) > ν (E ∩A) + ν (E ∩Ac ). Take any
B∗ ∈ arg max
B∈σ (Ω):B⊆E
pi (B),
so ν (E) = pi (B∗). Notice that since A,B∗ ∈ σ (Ω) and pi is additive on σ (Ω), pi (B∗) =
pi (B∗ ∩A) + pi (B∗ ∩Ac ). Moreover, by the denition of ν , B∗ ⊆ E, so B∗ ∩A ⊆ E ∩A and
B∗ ∩Ac ⊆ E ∩Ac . These facts together imply that
pi (B∗ ∩A) + pi (B∗ ∩Ac ) = pi (B∗) = ν (E) > ν (E ∩A) + ν (E ∩Ac ) ≥ pi (B∗ ∩A) + pi (B∗ ∩Ac ),
a contradiction (the rightmost inequality follows from the denition of ν ).
Conversely, take any A ∈ Σ and suppose that for every E ∈ Σ, ν (E) = ν (E ∩A)+ν (E ∩
Ac ). Suppose toward a contradiction thatA < σ (Ω). Let {Ai }ni=1 enumerate the events such
8If pi (B) = 0, then since A is foreseen, we have W (xAx ′,yAy ′) = u (x ′) + δpi (E)u (y) + δpi (Ec )u (y ′) =
u (x ′) + δu (y ′). This implies that pi (E)u (y) = pi (E)u (y ′), again a contradiction to y ′  y, since pi (E) > 0
follows since E ⊃ B.
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that Ai ∩A , ∅ and Ai ∈ Ω. Let E = ∪ni=1Ai , so A ⊂ E (A , E since E ∈ σ (Ω)). Notice that
since eachAi ,Aj are pairwise disjoint, E∩Ac = E \A = ∪i [Ai \A]. As such, ν (E∩Ac ) = 0,
for if not, then there must exist B′ ⊆ ∪i [Ai \A] and B ⊆ B′ such that B ∈ Ω, which is
impossible since Ω is a partition. Moreover, notice that since A < σ (Ω) and E ⊃ A, we
must have ν (E) > ν (E ∩ A) = ν (A) (recall that pi is strictly monotone). Thus, we have
constructed an E ∈ Σ such that ν (E) > ν (E ∩A) + ν (E ∩Ac ), a contradiction.
As for (ii), if σ (Ω) = Σ, then Σ = σ (Ω) = E (P ), so pi is a probability on (S,Σ).
Therefore, by the denition of ν , ν (E) = pi (E) for all E ∈ Σ and hence ν is additive.
Conversely, if ν is additive, 〈u,ν〉 is a SEU representation for%, so% satises Independence
on F = F{s}s ∈S , so Ω = S and hence σ (Ω) = Σ. 
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Appendix C
Appendices to Limited Understanding in
Auction Design
C.1 Proof of Proposition 12
I can identify each xi (θ ,θ ′) with a number in [0, 1], and similarly for each ti with a real
number. Thus, I can view the maximization over mechanisms 〈x , t〉 as maximization over
Z B [0, 1]Θ × [0, 1]Θ × RΘ × RΘ, where I abuse notation and let Θ denote the cardinality
ofΘ.
Now, note that R (x , t ) is a continuous function mapping Z into R. Alluding to the
Weierstrass theorem, it suces to show that the constraint set is closed and bounded (and
hence compact as Z is a subset of a nite dimensional Euclidean space). Clearly [0, 1]Θ is
bounded. Moreover, transfers are bounded by assumption. Thus, it suces to show that
the set of z ∈ Z satisfying (IC) and (IR) is closed. Thus, take any sequence {zn} ⊆ Z such
that zn → z (in the Euclidean metric) and zn satises (IC) and (IR). Note that by Lemma 15,
it follows that z must also satisfy (IR). Moreover, if zn1 + zn2 ≤ 1 for all n ∈ N, it follows
that z1 + z2 ≤ 1.
It remains to show that z satises (IC). Applying Lemma 15 again and using the fact
that zn satises (IC) for all n ∈ N and θ ∈ Θ, for every θ there exists N ∈ N and partitions
Pi ,Qi such that for allm > N ,
∑
E∈Pi
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
{
θxmi (θ ,θ
′) − tmi (θ ,θ ′)
} ≥ ∑
A∈Qi
pi (A) min
θ ′∈A
{
θxmi (θˆ ,θ
′) − tmi (θˆ ,θ ′)
}
.
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Since Θ is nite, all of the events in the partitions above are nite. Thus the functions
above are continuous since they are sums of continuous functions (the minimum of a
nite set of continuous functions is continuous). Thus, it follows that
∑
E∈Pi
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
{
θxi (θ ,θ
′) − ti (θ ,θ ′)} ≥ ∑
A∈Qi
pi (A) min
θ ′∈A
{
θxi (θˆ ,θ
′) − ti (θˆ ,θ ′)
}
,
where z = x1,x2, t1, t2. Thus z satises (IC), so the set of feasible mechanisms is a closed
and bounded subset of Euclidean space and is thus compact. Therefore an optimal mech-
anism exists.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 5
Many of the ideas in this proof come from the proof of Proposition 1 in Bose et al. (2006).
Fix a mechanism 〈x , t〉, and dene qi as in the text. As in Chapter B, dene φi : Θ  Pi to
be the “argmax” correspondence, i.e.
φi (θ ) B argmax
P∈Pi
∑
E∈P
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
{
θx (θˆ ,θ ′) − t (θˆ ,θ ′)
}
.
Take any θ ∈ Θ and any P ∈ φi (qi (θ , ·)). We x this P throughout the argument and
suppress the dependence on i and θ for notational simplicity. Let
Ki (θ ) =
∑
E∈P
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
qi (θ ,θ
′)
denote the utility of bidder i truth telling, and let
Ki (θ ,θ
′) = min
θ ′′∈P (θ ′)
qi (θ ,θ
′′)
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denote the worst case net surplus of bidder i truth telling when bidder j’s type is in P (θ ′).1
Dene
δi (θ ,θ
′) B qi (θ ,θ ′) − Ki (θ ,θ ′)
and let
t ′i (θ ,θ
′) = ti (θ ,θ ′) + δi (θ ,θ ′)
denote an alternative transfer rule. Consider the mechanism 〈x , t ′〉. We begin by proving
that 〈x , t ′〉 is understood. To see this, notice that for any θ ′ ∈ Θ,
q′i (θ ,θ
′) = θxi (θ ,θ ′) − t ′i (θ ,θ ′)
= θxi (θ ,θ
′) − ti (θ ,θ ′) − δi (θ ,θ ′)
= qi (θ ,θ
′) − qi (θ ,θ ′) + Ki (θ ,θ ′)
= Ki (θ ,θ
′),
which by construction is P-measurable. Hence 〈x , t〉 is understood since P ∈ Pi . Next, we
show that 〈x , t ′〉 is incentive compatible. To this end, we rst show that the payo of truth
telling under 〈x , t ′〉 is the same as under 〈x , t〉 (this also shows that 〈x , t ′〉 is individually
rational). To see this, notice that the payo of truth telling is
max
Q∈Pi
∑
E∈Q
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
q′i (θ ,θ
′) =
∑
E∈P
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
q′i (θ ,θ
′)
=
∑
E∈P
pi (E)Ki (θ ,E) = Ki (θ ),
where the rst inequality follows from Lemma 16, where P ∈ φ (qi (θ , ·)) is as above and
we abuse notation slightly by writingKi (θ ,E) in place ofKi (θ ,θ ′) for any θ ′ ∈ E ∈ P since
Ki is constant within each cell of P . We now show that 〈x , t ′〉 is incentive compatible. The
1Recall from Section 2.2.2 that P (θ ) is the event in P containing θ .
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utility from deviating from θ to some θˆ is
max
Q∈Pi
∑
E∈Q
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
{
θxi (θˆ ,θ
′) − t ′i (θˆ ,θ ′)
}
= max
Q∈Pi
∑
E∈Q
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
{
θxi (θˆ ,θ
′) − ti (θˆ ,θ ′) − δi (θˆ ,θ ′)
}
≤ max
Q∈Pi
∑
E∈Q
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
{
θxi (θˆ ,θ
′) − ti (θˆ ,θ ′)
}
−min
θ ′∈E
δi (θˆ ,θ
′).
We now focus on the δi term in the nal inequality above. Fix Q∗ ∈ φi (qi (θˆ , ·)). Notice
that for any Q ∈ Pi ,
∑
E∈Q
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
δi (θˆ ,θ
′) =
∑
E∈Q
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
[
qi (θˆ ,θ
′) − Ki (θ ,θ ′)
]
=
∑
E∈Q
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
[
qi (θˆ ,θ
′) − min
θ ′′∈Q∗ (θ ′)
qi (θˆ ,θ
′′)
]
≥ 0,
where the inequality follows because the term in square brackets above is weakly positive
since for any θ ′ ∈ E, θ ′ ∈ Q∗(θ ′) and thus qi (θˆ ,θ ′) ≥ minθ ′′∈Q∗ (θ ′) qi (θˆ ,θ ′′). Combining
this observation with the previous inequality implies that
max
Q∈Pi
∑
E∈Q
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
{
θxi (θˆ ,θ
′) − t ′i (θˆ ,θ ′)
}
≤ max
Q∈Pi
∑
E∈Q
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
{
θxi (θˆ ,θ
′) − ti (θˆ ,θ ′)
}
≤ max
Q∈Pi
∑
E∈Q
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
{
θxi (θ ,θ
′) − ti (θ ,θ ′)}
= max
Q∈Pi
∑
E∈Q
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
{
θxi (θ ,θ
′) − t ′i (θ ,θ ′)
}
,
so 〈x , t〉 is incentive compatible (the second inequality follows since 〈x , t〉 was assumed
to be incentive compatible, while the nal equality follows from the above claim that the
payo to truth telling is the same under 〈x , t〉 and 〈x , t ′〉).
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What remains to show is that R (x , t ′) ≥ R (x , t ). The seller’s revenue is given by
R (x , t ′) =
∑
(θ ,θ ′)∈Θ2
pi (θ )pi (θ ′)
(
t ′1(θ ,θ
′) + t ′2(θ
′,θ )
)
= R (x , t ) +
∑
(θ ,θ ′)∈Θ2
pi (θ )pi (θ ′) (δ1(θ ,θ ′) + δ2(θ ,θ ′)).
By construction, for any i = 1, 2 and θ ,θ ′ ∈ Θ,
δi (θ ,θ
′) = qi (θ ,θ ′) − Ki (θ ,θ ′) = qi (θ ,θ ′) − min
θ ′′∈P∗θ (θ ′)
qi (θ ,θ
′),
where P∗
θ
is the partition corresponding toKi (θ , ·). Again, δi is weakly positive, soR (x , t ′) ≥
R (x , t ) as desired. Moreover, if 〈x , t〉 is not understood, then there exists i such that qi (θ , ·)
is not P-measurable for any P ∈ Pi . In this case, δi must be strictly positive for some (θ ,θ ′),
so R (x , t ′) > R (x , t ).
C.3 Proof of Proposition 13
Take any understood mechanism 〈x , t〉. For each i and θ , let Pi (θ ) denote the partition for
which qi (θ , ·) is Pi (θ )-measurable. Lemma 16 ensures that Pi (θ ) is the partition type θ of
bidder i is using to understand the payo of truthtelling. Let
Vi (θ ) B
∑
E∈Pi (θ )
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
qi (θ ,θ
′)
denote the coarse expected utility from truthtelling and let
Vi (θˆ | θ ) B max
P∈Pi
∑
E∈P
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
{
θxi (θˆ ,θ
′) − ti (θˆ ,θ ′)
}
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denote the coarse expected utility of reporting θˆ when bidder i is type θ . Notice that if
θ ≥ θˆ , then
Vi (θˆ | θ ) ≥
∑
E∈Pi (θˆ )
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
{
θxi (θˆ ,θ
′) − ti (θˆ ,θ ′)
}
=
∑
E∈Pi (θˆ )
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
{
θˆxi (θˆ ,θ
′) − ti (θˆ ,θ ′) + (θ − θˆ )xi (θˆ ,θ ′)
}
= Vi (θˆ ) +
∑
E∈Pi (θˆ )
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
(θ − θˆ )xi (θˆ ,θ ′),
where the nal equality follows because 〈x , t〉 is understood so the term θˆxi (θˆ ,θ ′)−ti (θˆ ,θ ′)
is constant in θ ′ for each E ∈ Pi (θˆ ). Now, notice that (IC) requires that
Vi (θ ) −Vi (θˆ | θ ) ≥ 0 ≥ Vi (θ | θˆ ) −Vi (θˆ ).
Combining this with the previous inequality, we have
Vi (θ ) −
∑
E∈Pi (θˆ )
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
(θ − θˆ )xi (θˆ ,θ ′) ≥ Vi (θ | θˆ ). (C.1)
Similarly, notice that
Vi (θ | θˆ ) ≥
∑
E∈Pi (θ )
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
{
θˆxi (θ ,θ
′) − ti (θ ,θ ′)
}
=
∑
E∈Pi (θ )
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
{
θxi (θ ,θ
′) − ti (θ ,θ ′) + (θˆ − θ )xi (θ ,θ ′)
}
= Vi (θ ) +
∑
E∈Pi (θ )
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
(θˆ − θ )xi (θ ,θ ′),
where the nal equality again follows from the fact that 〈x , t〉 is understood. Combining
the above inequality with (C.1) yields
Vi (θ ) −
∑
E∈Pi (θˆ )
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
(θ − θˆ )xi (θˆ ,θ ′) ≥ Vi (θ ) +
∑
E∈Pi (θ )
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
(θˆ − θ )xi (θ ,θ ′),
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or equivalently
∑
E∈Pi (θ )
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
xi (θ ,θ
′) ≥
∑
E∈Pi (θˆ )
pi (E) min
θ ′∈E
xi (θˆ ,θ
′),
as desired.
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